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Abstract 
While many persuasive communications tend to be perceived as increasing consumer 
choice, others, such as public service announcements, more or less forcefully restrict 
that choice. This research examines the effects of threats to freedom on receptivity to 
message information, as a function of the level of construal at which the message is 
processed. The findings indicate that consumers are more open to high threat message 
information at high (vs. low) levels of construal, and this pattern holds when construal 
level is manipulated via message wording (study one) or is non-consciously primed 
prior to message exposure (study two). Also, the results point to the level of detail at 
which the message is considered, and the resulting use of persuasion knowledge, as 
the underlying reason for this pattern of results (study three). Specifically, at high 
levels of detail (i.e. low construal) there is a greater use of persuasion knowledge and 
lower information receptivity in face of high threat to freedom messages. At low level 
of detail (high construal), by contrast, persuasion knowledge use is lower and 
receptivity to information in freedom threatening messages higher. 
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1. Introduction 
This research examines how people respond to messages that threaten their 
freedom, depending on the level of construal at which those messages are processed. 
In particular, it suggests that high levels of construal can mitigate the negative impact 
of threats to freedom on consumers’ openness to the information presented in 
persuasive messages. The focus is therefore on the intersection between Psychological 
Reactance Theory (Brehm 1966) and Construal Level Theory (Liberman and Trope 
1998; Trope and Liberman 2003); and the manner in which this intersection affects 
openness to, perceptions of, and so ultimately the effectiveness of, persuasive 
communications containing threats to freedom.  
Reactance has been defined as “a motivational state of arousal” resulting from the 
removal, or the threat of removal, of a previously held freedom, which is cherished 
and one believes one should continue to possess (Brehm 1966; Burnkrant and 
Cousineau 1975, p.213). Once reactance occurs, there is a motivated shift in focus 
towards restoring the threatened freedom, by whatever means possible or available at 
the time (ibid). For instance, in discrete choice situations, the removal of an option has 
been shown to increase its attractiveness, while forced options suffer reduced appeal 
(Brehm et al. 1966).  
The same is expected to occur in situations where the imposition on freedom is 
present in a persuasive message. The restriction should cause a move away from the 
position or course of action proposed in the message, and towards alternative stances 
(Burgoon et al. 2002). These movements can be in reflected in attitudes – the mental 
effects of reactance, whereby it affects perceptions and judgments - or in action, 
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through behavioural effects (Brehm 1972). At the level of mental effects, reactance 
might for instance reduce receptivity to information, leading the persuasive message 
to be ignored or discounted as lacking in credibility; in terms of action, it can plausibly 
cause behavioural shifts in the direction opposite to that intended (Burgoon et al. 
2002). 
The level of construal at which such messages are framed or processed, however, 
is posited to help mitigate these negative effects. Construal level theory distinguishes 
between two forms of depicting objects and events, associated with different levels of 
psychological distance from these objects and events. High level of construal 
representations are abstract and schematic, focusing on primary and goal relevant 
features; while low level of construal representations are concrete, contextualised and 
detail-rich. These latter depictions are also more encompassing, in that they include 
peripheral and goal-unrelated features of objects and events; but are less able to 
provide a global, bird’s eye view of those items (Liberman, Trope, and Stephan 2007). 
Thus, for instance, “conducting a study” may be represented as “advancing science” at 
a high level of construal, but as “testing a hypothesis” or “entering the data collected 
this morning” at a low level of construal (Trope and Liberman 2003, p. 405). Similarly, a 
low level representation of “two children playing catch with a ball in a backyard” might 
include details such as the children’s ages, “the colour of the ball”, or “the 
temperature outside”; while a high-level construal of this activity might simply be 
“having fun” (Trope, Liberman, and Wakslak 2007, p. 83). 
According to the theory, as psychological distance from an object or event 
increases, so does the level of construal at which that event or object is perceived; 
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resulting in systematic differences in evaluations, judgments and predictions (Trope 
and Liberman 2010). Construal level has been shown to not only impact the kind of 
information emphasised - the relative weighting given to different object features - but 
can also influence the kinds of knowledge accessed in decision making. 
It seems likely, therefore, that level of construal will also exert a significant effect 
on the manner in which freedom threatening persuasive messages are approached; 
and in particular, on the level of receptivity consumers display toward their 
informational content. The proposal in this research is that this effect results from the 
differences in the level of detail at which persuasive messages are considered at high 
construal (low detail) vs. low construal (high detail), and the associated level of 
persuasion knowledge use. When more message details are considered, the threat to 
freedom increases in salience and serves as a cue to persuasion knowledge use, thus 
lowering information receptivity. When fewer message details are taken into account, 
persuasion knowledge remains inaccessible, and receptivity increases.  
This research thus brings together with reactance effects and construal level 
theory, previous research regarding the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and 
Wright 1994), and the conditions for the use of such knowledge structures. The 
relationships between these constructs are not only of theoretical interest, but also of 
practical consequence. Persuasive messages, where they contain some form of 
restriction on freedom, cannot hope to achieve their goals - whether these relate to 
attitudinal, affective/emotional or behavioural outcomes – unless the information 
contained in them is first attended to and believed.  
 13 
 
This is of particular relevance to Public Service Announcements - advertisements 
considered to be of “community interest”, often run or sanctioned by the Government 
or non-profit organizations - because these messages are typically information based 
and directive, and their end result is overwhelmingly to restrict, rather than enhance, 
choice (Wright and Palmer 1996). Creating PSAs at once clear and direct, but able to 
overstep the negative effects of perceived restrictions of freedom, has long been 
noted as a challenge for those in charge of developing such messages (Miller et al. 
2007).  
From a reactance point of view, the most effective way of doing so would appear 
to be to remove any threats to freedom altogether. However, presenting both sides of 
an issue, for instance, or giving less directive advice in order to reduce perceptions of 
threat, is not always a possibility with the sensitive topic matters of many PSAs, such as 
responsible alcohol consumption, smoking or protecting against sexually transmitted 
infections. Furthermore, there is often a concern that if the message is not clear and 
unequivocal enough, it may leave room for misinterpretations. Thus, some degree of 
threat to freedom appears inevitable in such communications. 
From a construal level perspective, on the other hand, one’s approach to 
persuasive messages might be to use low level representations, with the intent of 
making the communications appear more “real” and closer to the self. Chandran and 
Menon (2004) show that in health communications, low level of construal message 
framings can help lower the self positivity bias and increase perceptions of risk with 
regard to hazardous health behaviours. However, low levels of construal might also 
have the unintended effect of making the desired behaviours appear more 
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unattainable, as they shift emphasis toward the potentially difficult feasibility issues 
involved in carrying these behaviours out. 
Finally, from a persuasion knowledge point of view, the aim would be to avoid any 
cues to these knowledge structures, such as elements relating to ulterior motives or 
features that might make the message appear manipulative or unfair. These cues 
include threats to freedom, controlling or directive language, or any apparent vested 
interest in the situation. As noted above, however, creating fully balanced, impartial 
messages is neither always possible nor necessarily the aim with many persuasive 
messages, PSAs in particular.  
Putting these constructs together, however, can provide clues as to what impacts 
on information receptivity and how this receptivity can be increased; even in situations 
when it is not possible to remove the presence of the threat to freedom. This is of 
interest, because these relationships have not previously been fully explored, and 
suggest important linkages between level of construal, persuasion knowledge, and 
reactance effects in consumers’ openness to freedom restricting messages. From a 
practical perspective, they offer new options with regard to persuasive message 
elaboration, which allow for the recommendations derived from the different theories 
to be reconciled.  
The next chapter explores the constructs of reactance, construal level and 
persuasion knowledge in greater detail, by reviewing the relevant literature pertaining 
to each one (chapter two). Then, possible relationships between them, not yet covered 
in the literature, are considered and proposed in the hypothesis chapter, along with 
methods for testing the proposed interactions (chapter three). The following chapters 
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then discuss each of the three studies undertaken to determine the basic pattern of 
results (study one), replicate and extend those results (study two), and uncover an 
underlying mechanism (study three) in chapters four, five and six respectively, where 
study design, procedures and results are described. The general discussion chapter 
(chapter seven) brings together the results of the three studies, as well as their 
contributions and implications, limitations and avenues for further research; and 
chapter eight offers concluding remarks. 
 16 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
Persuasion and influence attempts are ubiquitous in our day to day lives. While 
estimates of advertising exposure vary considerably, from approximations of 600 all 
the way to 3000 advertisements a day (Dahl et al. 2003), there is a consensus that this 
number has been progressively increasing over the years (Media Matters 2007). 
Whether in interpersonal settings or in the form of advertising and campaigning, there 
are constant pressures on our freedoms of choice and even opinion – more or less 
direct, more or less imposing. Psychological Reactance Theory (PRT, Brehm 1966) is a 
“social psychological theory dealing with people's reactions to threatened or 
eliminated freedoms” (Clee and Wicklund 1980, p. 389). It addresses what happens 
when people are faced with influence attempts perceived to be curtailing a previously 
held freedom, and the relatively spontaneous motivation to restore that freedom 
which follows (Sherman et al. 2004).  
Because in Western cultures autonomy is viewed as a basic need, and is reinforced 
from an early age as such, anything that acts to remove or otherwise restrict 
autonomy produces a negative state of arousal, and an impetus to restore the 
threatened freedom (Sherman et al. 2004). Thus, reactance can occur not only in 
discrete choice or preference ordering contexts, as in early studies of the theory, but 
also as a result of persuasive communications, public service announcements and 
social marketing messages in particular (Wright and Palmer 1996). 
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Reactance can be automatic (Chartrand et al. 2007), and it can also result from 
consumers’ inferences regarding intention to persuade, the influence agent’s motives, 
and/or consumers’ knowledge of persuasion and influence tactics, as per the 
Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM; Friestad and Wright 1994). Thus, in reviewing the 
literature, we will not only look at Psychological Reactance Theory (Brehm 1966) and 
its application to persuasive communications, public service announcements in 
particular, but also at the Persuasion Knowledge Model, and how such knowledge 
structures can be both related to, and an antecedent of, the experience of reactant 
arousal.  
The main thrust of this research, however, lies in the intersection of reactance 
theory with Construal Level Theory (CLT; Trope and Liberman 2003): in probing how 
perceptions of threat and resulting responses might be altered by high versus low level 
representations of that threat and the message in which it is contained. The third part 
of the literature review thus looks at Construal Level Theory, and its potential 
relevance and association with experiences of reactance. 
The review of the literature on reactance, persuasion knowledge and construal 
level presented below is not, nor was it intended to be, exhaustive. Rather than 
attempt to present all the literature in these areas, the aim was to cover a subset of 
this work, which would convey important principles necessary to both understand the 
theories themselves, and their link to the current research.  
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2.2. Reactance Theory  
2.2.1. Overview and Research 
Psychological reactance (Brehm 1966) has been defined as a “motivational state of 
arousal” experienced when “a freedom is eliminated or threatened with elimination” 
(Brehm and Brehm 1981, p. 37). Freedom or freedoms in this context include not only 
actions, but also attitudes and emotions (Dillard and Shen 2005). Reactance places 
emphasis on “the affective (‘I don’t like it’) and motivational (‘I won’t do it!’) sides of 
resistance” (Knowles and Linn 2004, p. 7), and once experienced, motivates individuals 
to endeavour to directly or indirectly restore their lost or threatened freedoms (Eagly 
and Chaiken 1993). 
As a pre-condition for the occurrence of reactance one must have both knowledge 
of the freedom, and the perceived ability to enact it prior to the threat (Brehm and 
Brehm 1981). Then, given the removal of, or threat to, a cherished freedom, reactance 
will be more intense: a) the greater the number or proportion of “free behaviours 
jeopardized”; b) the larger the “magnitude of the threat” (Fogarty 1997); and c) “the 
greater the absolute and/or relative importance of [the] threatened or eliminated 
freedom” (Brehm et al. 1966). This refers to the freedom’s importance to the person, 
as well as its “relative importance” compared to that of “other freedoms present at 
the moment” (ibid, p. 302). Reactance can further be magnified when a threat to one 
freedom is perceived as also being a threat to other cherished freedoms (Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993). 
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Initial examinations of reactance focused on choice situations, and measured the 
concept in terms of preference or choice reversals, whereby unavailable options 
became more attractive, while pressure towards a particular choice made it less 
popular. Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, and Shaban (1966) for instance, asked college 
students to rate music records, of which they would be able to keep one. Participants 
in the experimental condition were initially led to believe they would have a choice as 
to which record they would take home, but were subsequently informed that the 
shipment had failed to include their third ranked record. They were then asked to rank 
the records one more time, presumably as a measure of the effects of time on 
evaluations of music. As expected, “subjects for whom there was no elimination of the 
rank 3 record showed no dominant tendency either to raise or lower their rating of 
that record. On the other hand, subjects who were told that the rank 3 record was 
unavailable showed a clearly significant tendency to raise their rating of that record” 
(Brehm et al. 1966, p. 307).  
Similar results were obtained by Hammock and Brehm (1966) using child 
participants, who were asked to rank a set of candy bars in exchange for receiving one 
of them at the end of the session. Removing their freedom to choose which would be 
the prize/reward candy led the children to reduce their ratings of the candy bar 
imposed on them (in a repetition of the ranking exercise) while the eliminated option 
increased in attractiveness.  
In yet another study, Brehm and Sensenig (1966) had participants choose between 
pairs of pictures, while receiving notes, ostensibly from other participants in the study. 
In the low threat condition, the note simply stated the (ostensible) other participant’s 
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preference, but in the high threat condition it read “I think we should both do…” As 
expected, this led to a significant rejection of the proposed painting; an effect which 
the authors note, is “not subtle: the dependent measure tapped only the all-or-none 
effect of complete acceptance or rejection of the attempted influence rather than a 
graded tendency toward rejection. Nor could it be said that the threat to freedom was 
particularly strong and compelling” (Brehm and Sensenig 1966, p. 706). This rejection 
of a forced alternative, and increased attraction to an eliminated or proscribed option, 
represent what has been termed a “boomerang” effect (Brehm and Brehm 1981).  
Beyond these early examinations of reactance which sought to establish the effect 
and its boundaries, the theory has been applied in a variety of different contexts. Jones 
(1970), for instance, showed how reactance could reduce helping behaviours, in 
situations where a high level of need for help was perceived as an imposition on 
freedom and/or when the plea was seen to carry “with it the possibility that the 
stimulus person would again be dependent on the subjects’ aid in the future” (p. 127). 
Goodstadt (1971) also applied reactance to helping, and demonstrated how a simple 
statement perceived by participants to carry with it a judgment as to how much they 
would help a confederate, led them to behaviours in the opposite direction. 
Of greater interest to the current research, however, are the applications of 
reactance to consumer behaviour and persuasive messages – warnings and public 
service announcements (discussed in section 2.2.3) in particular. Mazis (1975), for 
instance, applied the concept of reactance in a field study conducted shortly after the 
introduction of an anti-phosphate law in Miami. This law disallowed the sale and use of 
products - such as laundry detergents, for example - containing phosphates. Critically, 
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there were few no-phosphate alternatives available at the time, which meant that 
consumers’ choices were effectively being restricted.  
It was expected that this reduction in freedom of choice would make the 
unavailable options appear more attractive. Indeed, in comparison with subjects from 
the control city of Tampa, Miami residents were both more favourable to phosphate 
laundry detergents, and less favourable to regulation and its ability to be useful or 
successful in controlling water pollution. Significant differences also emerged within 
the Miami sample, between those shoppers whose habitual brands immediately 
brought out non-phosphate versions of their products and those whose brands did 
not. The greater constraint on choice faced by those unable to buy their habitual 
brands led them to be more reactant. 
Another examination of constraints to freedom in the retail context examined the 
effects of imposing a limit on the number of units of a particular product customers 
were able to purchase. Lessne and Notarantonio (1988) presented participants with a 
“sale circular” offering a special deal on soft drinks, but in which the maximum number 
of units of the promotional product shoppers were allowed to purchase was 
manipulated to be either two, four, or in the control condition, no limit. As per 
reactance theory, constraining choice to four units increased the product’s 
attractiveness to participants, as well and their purchase and purchase quantity 
intentions vis a vis the control condition.  
A two unit limit, however, did not have the same effect, since over-restrictiveness 
can actually reduce product desirability (Lessne and Notarantonio 1988). This is 
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parallel to the tension produced in persuasion contexts containing a threat to freedom, 
between the forces of persuasion, which influence targets toward the proposed idea 
or action, and reactance effects, which push targets in the opposite direction. When 
reactance effects fully outweigh persuasion, attitudinal or behavioural boomerangs 
result; when they do not, the effect of reactance can typically be gauged in terms of 
differences in the extent of persuasion or acceptance of a message or position. In the 
current research, reactance is measured in terms of consumers’ openness or 
receptivity to message information. 
Another application of reactance to situations of reduced consumer choice was 
carried out by Fitzsimons (2000), in an analysis of the impact of stock-outs. Being 
exposed to this situation not only had significant effects on decision satisfaction, but 
reduced the likelihood that the consumer would subsequently return to the 
“offending” store (i.e. it increased store switching behaviour). This was particularly 
true for consumers who were more personally committed to the unavailable 
alternative – those who had included it in their consideration set, or for whom it 
constituted their preferred option. 
Reactance has also been found to produce counter-intuitive results, as in the case 
of expert advice. While expert recommendations would generally be expected to have 
a positive impact on consumers’ decision making processes, by helping reduce “the 
effort required (…) as well as the uncertainty surrounding a decision” (Fitzsimons and 
Lehmann 2004, p. 82), this was found to hold only when the recommendations were in 
favour of a dominant, or against a dominated, option. When the recommendations did 
not conform to this pattern, consumer satisfaction levels decreased; and when a 
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dominant alternative was recommended against, there was actually “a ‘reactance 
style’ response”, which created a “backlash”, such that there was an “increase in 
choice of the option that was recommended against” (ibid. p. 82). 
Reactant responses can also be consequential to ethical consumer behaviours. 
Miyazaki, Rodriguez, and Langenderfer (2009) related reactance effects resulting from 
scarcity to consumer willingness to purchase counterfeit products. The authors found, 
across three different settings, the authors showed that scarcity influences “the 
degree to which consumers are willing to condone and/or participate in the purchase 
of pirated products” (p. 81), such that this willingness increases with unavailability. 
It is worth noting that while reactance as initially proposed by Brehm (1966) 
referred to situational responses to threats to freedom, it has since been found to vary 
over the life cycle, and across individuals as well. The experience and intensity of 
reactance have been argued to fluctuate during the course of one’s life, such that they 
are particularly pronounced in certain phases, such as adolescence, the teen years or 
the “terrible twos” (Miller et al. 2007). “Trait” or “dispositional” reactance is an 
individual difference variable, measurable through specific scales, such as the Hong 
Psychological Reactance Scale (Hong and Faedda 1996). 
Individuals scoring high on this scale are considered high in trait reactance, and 
accordingly show greater sensitivity to threats to freedoms, and greater attempts at 
freedom restoration, than their low trait reactance counterparts. In smoking 
behaviours, for instance, trait reactance has been identified as “an important predictor 
of smoking initiation among adolescents” (Miller et al. 2007; Miller et al. 2006). It has 
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also been shown to impact on patient compliance (Fogarty 1997), and even on the kind 
of rewards people seek: Kivetz (2005) found that high trait reactance individuals 
tended to seek more effort-congruent rewards than their low threat counterparts.  
Although the studies presented above, whether relating to situational or trait 
reactance, focus mainly on boomerang effects, in either behaviour (e.g. helping) or 
attitudes (e.g. choice ratings), there are other ways to reclaim a threatened freedom. 
The next section outlines possible forms of freedom restoration, and focuses on 
reduced information receptivity as an important mode of restoration in persuasion 
situations such as those considered in this research. Although attitudinal and 
behavioural restorations are more extensively covered in the literature, receptivity to 
message information is an easily available and consequential form of restoring 
threatened autonomy which, while less well covered, deserves attention.  
2.2.2. Forms of Restoration 
The overriding motivation, once arousal resulting from an imposition to one’s 
freedom is experienced, is to reduce that discomfort. This is done by a “restoration of 
freedom, no matter how that restoration comes about” (Worchel and Brehm 1971, p. 
294). Indeed, it is often the context which determines the form of restoration used, 
not only by way of the available alternatives, but also through its impact on the 
strength and implications of the threat.  
Forms of restoration can be categorised according to who carries them out, and 
with regard to their visibility. Freedom restoration carried out by the target of a threat 
to freedom herself is labelled direct restoration, whereas when the sense of autonomy 
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is reinstated by a third party, the restoration is said to be indirect (Worchel and Brehm 
1971). With respect to visibility, freedom restoration, or the effects of reactance, can 
be said to be mental or behavioural (Brehm 1972). Mental effects refer to changes in 
perceptions or judgments which result from threats to freedom, whereas behavioural 
effects refer to those attempts at freedom restoration subsequent to a threat which 
are observable by others (ibid). 
Perhaps the most extreme reactions to threatened freedoms are the boomerang 
effects described in the previous section, whereby targets increase their liking of the 
threatened position, embrace “that attitude threatened by the proscription” (Burgoon 
et al. 2002, p. 216), or at a behavioural level, actually engage in the forbidden activity 
or conduct. Less obvious forms of restoration include “prior exercise” of a freedom or 
its indirect restoration.  
Worchel and Brehm (1970) examined the impact of participants’ prior opinions on 
an issue vis a vis communicator opinions, on their experiences of reactance, and found 
that reactance to the high threat message tended to be higher among those 
participants who initially agreed with the communicator. Those originally in 
disagreement, tended to shift towards the communicators’ position after exposure to 
the message, in both its low and high threat formats. Snyder and Wicklund (1976) 
replicated these results, and explained them in terms of prior exercise – the idea that 
affirming one’s disagreement with the position subsequently threatened can provide 
an a priori form of restoration, which prevents “the onset of reactance in the face of 
an actual threat” (Snyder and Wicklund 1976, p. 128).  
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The concept of indirect restoration was tested by Worchel and Brehm (1971) by 
putting subjects in a group situation where others restored the threatened freedom. 
Having a confederate “restorer” in the group speaking out against the “threatener” 
trying to impose his choice on the participant, eliminated the reactance effects 
observed in the no-restorer condition (Worchel and Brehm 1971). The same held true 
when the participant merely observed the confederate question the position of the 
“threatener”, apparently acting in self interest with without even acknowledging the 
participant’s involvement. 
Another form of indirect restoration consists of performing “a different freedom as 
an alternative to the one threatened” (Miller et al. 2007). Heilman and Garner (1975) 
illustrated this in an interpersonal context, where presenting subjects with a different 
freedom - a choice as to the form of compliance with a request containing a threat – 
served to reduce feelings of reactance and defiance; although it did not reduce the 
negative affective impact of the threat. Miller et al. (2007) applied the concept to 
freedom threatening “promotional health appeals”, and found that a simple post-
script reminding readers that the ultimate decision rested with them was sufficient to 
lead them to rate the message as significantly less explicit and less freedom 
threatening than those in the control condition.  
Yet another form of indirect restoration is self-affirmation, the boosting of distinct 
spheres of self-esteem, in order to compensate for, or reduce the defensiveness which 
arises from a threat to a particular aspect of the self. Although self-affirmation theory 
deals with threats to global self-esteem, rather than threats to freedom in particular, 
self-affirmation effects have been shown to also attenuate reactance effects (Steele 
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1988). This is consistent with the notion that the freedom or autonomy to make one’s 
own choices constitute an important part of the self. 
Of greater interest in the context of persuasive communications, however, are the 
more common and easily available forms of reactance restoration, based on 
discounting or derogation of the threatening message or its source. These forms of 
direct, mental restoration are key, because they do not depend on third parties or 
other external circumstances, but are always immediately available in the face of a 
restriction on freedom. Furthermore, they can critically impact the effectiveness of 
persuasive communications. If these communications are not even attended to or 
believed, it is unlikely that they will achieve their desired results, as reflected in 
changes in attitudes, affect or behaviours.  
On the assumption that the aim of persuasive communications is to ultimately 
impact behaviour, reaching this objective is a process and follows a series of steps, of 
which message acceptance and belief - being receptive to the message information - is 
the first. Krugman, Fox, and Fischer (1999) allude to three “broad criteria” for 
evaluating persuasive communications - those relating to actions or behaviour 
(“conative criteria”), those relating to emotions and attitudes (“affective criteria”), and 
those related to learning (“cognitive criteria”), which are “oriented to awareness, 
knowledge and comprehension” (p. 99). Achieving behavioural goals requires that 
affective and cognitive changes also take place; however, when receptivity to message 
information is low, the path is blocked for even these initial cognitive shifts to take 
place. 
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With these forms of mental restoration, then, the reader is closing herself off from 
the message content – discounting its credibility, the strength of the threat, its 
relevance to one’s own situation (Burgoon et al. 2002; Sherman et al. 2000), or the 
expertise of its source. Miller et al. (2007) point to the “long term implications” of this 
last form of restoration, since “the sources of reactance producing messages may lose 
referent power and credibility, and thus suffer diminished future influence over 
reactance audiences” (p. 222). This is likely to be particularly problematic in the 
context of public service announcements, where often the same entity is identified as 
the source behind various different communications (e.g. the Surgeon General in the 
U.S., or The Federal Government in Australia). The next section discusses Public Service 
Announcements, and the applicability of reactance theory to this context, in greater 
detail. 
2.2.3. Reactance, Persuasive Communications and Public Service Announcements 
As noted before, although the present research deals with freedom threatening 
persuasive messages in general, it is of particular interest in the context of Public 
Service Announcements (PSAs) – typically not-for-profit communications which 
“inform the public about safety and health information, community services or public 
affairs” (PBS 2005). Indeed, Burgoon et al. (2002) argue that reactance theory “ought 
to be a mainstay of the armamentarium of anyone attempting to do battle in the social 
influence arena” (p. 215)  
This is not only because PSAs deal with important social issues, where reactance 
and boomerang effects can be particularly consequential; but also because such 
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communications are especially prone to causing reactance in the first place. Contrary 
to commercial advertising, campaigns “undertaken by public sector and non-profit 
entities are often freedom reducing”, rather than freedom enhancing (Wright and 
Palmer 1996). Indeed, PSAs meet all (but one) of the four criteria proposed to increase 
the likelihood of the onset of reactance: blatant statements of intent to influence; 
censorship; a vested interest in a situational outcome; and one-sided communication 
(Clee and Wicklund 1980). With the exception of a vested interest, since PSAs are 
typically thought of as being of public interest, all the other criteria are stereotypically 
present in public service announcements. 
It is worth noting that this discussion is based on traditional or archetypical PSAs. 
As with any type of communication, PSAs can assume many diverse forms. Indeed, in 
more recent times, some of these messages and campaigns have tried to distance 
themselves from freedom restricting, “scare” or “shock” tactics typically associated 
with PSAs. An example is the “Embrace Life” campaign, made by Alexander 
Commercials, for the Sussex Safer Roads Partnership. 
Notwithstanding, such campaigns are still greatly perceived as the exception. More 
typically, PSAs are associated with communicating a single acceptable position, to the 
exclusion of all other attitudinal or behavioural alternatives; and making the constraint 
on choice very clear. This can lead to reactance independent of one’s regard for the 
proposed course of action. Pechmann and Slater (2005) note that in certain situations 
message recipients may be aware of the “merits of the recommendation”, and even 
consider it “viable and efficacious”, but still experience reactance; because they are 
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not only or necessarily reacting “against the recommendation being made”, but also 
“the manner in which it was made” (p. 195). 
Although it has long been established that the “knowledge that someone else 
wants to exert control or influence [our] behaviour generates motivation to resist and 
behave in contrary ways” (Clee and Wicklund 1980), with PSAs this influence intent is 
completely overt. This is a distinguishing feature of such communications. With 
promotional communication campaigns, “marketers, advertising agents, and 
salespeople often avoid making their persuasive intention explicit”, precisely because 
they fear that “when confronted with an obvious intent to persuade, consumers might 
become more easily suspicious of the ulterior motives (i.e., self-interest) behind the 
persuasion attempt, and so the impact of the message might decrease” (Reinhard et 
al. 2006), p. 249). With public service announcements, however, there generally seem 
to be no such concerns – the proposed position is communicated clearly, and often 
forcefully, with an obvious intent to persuade.  
Evidence of resistance to PSAs and warnings has been uncovered in both 
laboratory and quasi-experimental settings. For instance, posting “no diving” signs by a 
swimming pool used for physical education classes by middle and high school students 
was found to increase intentions to dive amongst some of the students (DeTurck and 
Goldhaber (1991). Males and those with a history of diving into the shallow end of the 
pool were the most likely to notice the signs, but also the most likely to actually dive 
into the shallow end, as measured by self reported intentions. While acknowledging a 
potential role for feelings of greater self-efficacy among this group, the authors 
interpreted the results as a “boomerang effect”, whereby by restricting their freedom, 
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the signs led those for whom they were of greatest relevance to the opposite 
behaviour from what was intended.  
Hyland and Birrell (1979) obtained similar boomerang effects for cigarette 
advertisement health warnings. They found that placing the statement: “Warning by 
HM Government: Smoking can damage your health” on a cigarette ad actually led to 
an increased desire to smoke, vis a vis a no-warning control group. The effects were 
most marked among high involvement participants, i.e. smokers rather than non-
smokers. Indeed, involvement can often entail greater knowledge of an issue, but also 
produce greater disagreement or defiance toward it. 
For instance, Unger et al. (1999) found that while awareness of anti-tobacco 
policies among adolescents was highest for those who smoked, support for them was 
lowest among this group. The authors argued that to the extent that the adolescents 
perceived “restrictive anti-tobacco policies as a threat to their freedom”, they may 
have been smoking to “reassert their personal autonomy” (Unger et al. 1999, p. 752). 
Robinson and Killen (1997) also found a significant association between knowledge of 
the warning labels on cigarette packets and levels of smoking, based on their cohort 
analytic study of ninth-grade high-school students in northern California.  
Grandpre et al. (2003) examined attitudes toward smoking messages among 
middle and high school aged-children. They exposed participants to explicit and 
implicit messages, both pro and against the behaviour; and consistent with the notion 
that the very overt nature of PSAs can sometimes be in their detriment, found a main 
effect of explicitness. Both the implicit messages and their sources received more 
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favourable overall ratings than their explicit counterparts. There was also an impact of 
age, consistent with the life cycle perspective of reactance, in so far as the teen-aged, 
tenth grade respondents [15-16 years old] “felt significantly less free to make their 
own choices” than their 4th or 7th grade counterparts (aged 9-10 and 12-13 
respectively) (Grandpre et al. 2003, p. 351) 
In general, then, both involvement and high levels of trait reactance tend to lead 
to higher perceptions of threat and resulting motivation to restore freedom; which 
implies that paradoxically, reactance effects tend to be stronger for those to whom the 
message is of greatest relevance - high involvement participants (Liberman and 
Chaiken 1992; Burgoon et al. 2002). Indeed, in the absence of involvement with the 
issue at hand, there ceases to be a perception of threat to freedom. For instance, 
Bushman and Stack (1996) examined the effects of policy warnings for violent content 
in movies, and found no significant effects of these warnings when participants were 
choosing or rating films for others. 
On the other hand, when participants were choosing for themselves, and there 
was therefore an imposition on their freedom, the presence of a warning increased 
subjects’ attraction to violent movies. There was further a main effect of naming (vs. 
not naming) the source of the warning as the US Surgeon General, such that doing so 
led to an increased desire to watch violent movies; presumably because identifying the 
source of the message as a person of authority increased the perception of threat to 
freedom inherent in the message.  
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The authors also contrasted the warning labels with mere information labels. 
Although both labels provided the readers with the same facts regarding the violent 
content of the movies, the information labels, which did not contain a threat to 
freedom, did not “increase viewers’ desire to watch the violent films” (Bushman and 
Stack 1996, p. 224). This suggests that “it is possible to convey information about the 
violent content of a television program without inducing reactance in viewers” (ibid, p. 
224); namely, by removing the perceived restriction on viewers’ freedom. 
Reactance theory has also been applied to research in other public service 
contexts, such as those relating to drugs and alcohol. An early analysis was undertaken 
by Feingold and Knapp (1977), who examined the effects of anti-drug commercials 
over a three week period, and found evidence of a slight boomerang effect. Although 
all the experimental groups in the study “tended to have a negative attitude towards 
drugs” (p. 25), consistent with a reactance interpretation, this attitude became less 
negative after repeated exposure to the anti-drug messages. Presumably, participants 
would have been reacting against the perceived restrictiveness of the ads, by 
increasing the positivity of their attitudes towards drugs. This is a particularly 
important effect because of the possibility that such shifts in attitudes might spill over 
to behaviour. With regard to alcohol, for instance, it has been shown that “beliefs and 
attitudes (...) are closely related associated with drinking behaviour” (Russell and 
Russell 2008). 
Similar results have been obtained using different designs and stimuli. Czyzewska 
and Ginsburg (2007) examined the immediate effects of anti-marijuana advertising 
with a sample of first year college students. They found that after viewing the ads, 
 34 
 
participants’ attitudes became less negative towards marijuana, and their intentions to 
use the substance increased. However, such boomerang effects did not occur with 
anti-tobacco advertisements, presumably due to floor effects, since “viewers’ average 
ratings of tobacco were close to the lowest end of the measurement scale” from the 
start, for both those participants viewing the anti-marijuana, and those viewing the 
anti-tobacco PSAs (Czyzewska and Ginsburg 2007, p. 123). 
Bensley and Wu (1991) examined the impact of alcohol related messages. 
Participants were presented with alcohol messages “adapted from alcohol prevention 
materials in the popular press” (p. 1113) promoting either complete abstinence or 
controlled drinking, in either a high or low threat version. The former (high threat 
condition) included more dogmatic statements intended to limit perceived freedom of 
opinion, and ended with the statement: “any reasonable person must acknowledge 
these conclusions”. In the low threat condition this sentence was changed to “we 
believe that these conclusions are reasonable”.  
Consistent with reactance theory, the high threat messages resulted both in more 
negative evaluations and in higher drinking intentions, with the effect being greatest 
for participants identified as “heavy drinkers” – i.e. those for whom the message 
recommendations were most restrictive of their freedom - both male and female. 
Ironically, these are also the groups that in a real life setting would be considered most 
in need of help, and to whom such a message would most likely be targeted. For male 
participants, consistent results were also found for a behavioural measure, taken 
under the guise of a beer “taste rating task” (Bensley and Wu 1991). The pattern did 
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not occur as anticipated for female respondents, possibly due to women’s “greater 
unwillingness to drink considerable quantities with strangers” (Bensley and Wu 1991).  
Although such behavioural measures are typically difficult to obtain in 
experimental studies, other research has tried to obtain them in field settings. Engs 
and Hanson (1988), for instance, examined the effects of the increase in legal drinking 
age to 21 in the US (to which all States were obliged to comply by July 1987) on 
drinking patterns among college students. They found that although the proportion of 
students who drank decreased during the period when the change in the law was 
taking place, the number of heavy drinkers remained constant; and in support of 
reactance theory, the proportion of underage students drinking increased relative to 
those of legal age.  
For the underage students, to whom the new law appeared as a threat, engaging 
in the newly forbidden behaviour provided a means of reasserting their freedom, an 
explanation supported by later research by Allen, Sprenkel and Vitale (1994). These 
authors found that “the alcohol consumption of underage students was significantly 
higher than their legal-age counterparts” (Allen et al. 1994, p. 37); and moreover, this 
difference between the age groups was not apparent in the consumption of other 
drugs, which were not affected by the legislation.  
There is therefore robust evidence of reactance effects – the motivated search for 
ways to restore a threatened freedom - in a variety of contexts. The next sections 
examine the processes by which reactance occurs, i.e. its antecedents; and distinguish 
between automatic, non-conscious reactance, and those reactance effects which result 
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from an at least partly conscious deliberation on the threat and freedom in question. 
Critically, they also explore the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and Wright 
1994), and its potential links to the occurrence of reactance. 
2.2.4 .Conscious and Non-Conscious Reactance 
Not all threats to freedom produce reactance, but specifically those which 
threaten freedoms the person is aware of, values, previously possessed, and therefore 
feels she should possess (Brehm 1966). Furthermore, the extent of reactance 
experienced varies with considerations relating to the magnitude of the threat, its 
implications, or the relative importance of the freedom imposed on – all of which 
imply some degree of deliberation, and so suggest that reactance is in some measure 
“consciously guided” (Chartrand et al. 2007, p. 721).  
Reactance can also be automatic, however. That is, it can be experienced in the 
absence of any “generalizations and assumptions” and without the target even 
consciously perceiving the reactance-evoking stimulus (Chartrand et al. 2007, p. 721). 
This automatic reactance results because reactance is a motivational state, and so “the 
frequency and consistency with which one has experienced it in a particular situation 
will determine whether it can be activated and guide behaviour without conscious 
awareness or intention” (ibid).  
Experimental evidence suggests that indeed it can. For instance, when a significant 
other who is considered highly controlling becomes associated with a certain goal, that 
person can trigger reactance (i.e. engagement in the opposite goal) even when “their 
psychological presence is not consciously recognised by the individual” (Chartrand et 
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al. 2007, p. 721). Non-conscious reactance has also been found in the context of 
relationships, such that externally, but implicitly “limiting people’s attention to 
attractive alternatives” led to detrimental relationship outcomes, such as lower 
reported relationship satisfaction or more positive attitudes toward infidelity (DeWall 
et al. 2011, p. 627). 
The notion of automatic reactance is also consistent with the conception of 
freedom as a basic human need. According to Self-Determination Theory, there are 
three such “innate, essential and universal” needs, fundamental for “facilitating 
optimal functioning of the natural propensities for growth and integration” (Ryan and 
Deci 2000, p. 68). One of these is the need for autonomy (the others are the needs for 
competence and relatedness) – the perception “that one’s activities are endorsed by 
or congruent with the self” (Reis et al. 2000, p. 420). It has been argued that over time 
and in Western cultures in particular, this need for autonomy has become “a chronic 
construct that automatically guides behaviour” (Sherman et al. 2004, p. 158), and as a 
result, anything that threatens this ability to decide for oneself produces negative 
arousal and a concomitant motivation to restore the threatened freedom, i.e. 
reactance. Because this is a “motivated response”, it can happen “without conscious 
mediation or awareness” (ibid, p. 157), particularly when it affects areas of people’s 
lives for which they “have distinct and strong preference to see themselves as masters 
of their own fate” (Burgoon et al. 2002, p. 216). 
The need for autonomy can also give rise to more deliberate forms of reactance, 
however, because it affects perceptions and interpretations of contexts and objects 
(Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999). This is the more commonly studied form of reactance, 
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in which there is some level of “cognitive elaboration” with regard to the threat and its 
context (Chartrand et al. 2007, p. 721). In this conception, reactance occurs because 
the imposition on freedom is recognised as such, and produces resistance in the form 
of attempts to restore that freedom.  
There is much research evidence showing that people do not like to feel pressured, 
and that awareness of an influence attempt reduces its effectiveness. For instance, 
Ewing (1942) manipulated the way in which an extreme communication was 
introduced to subjects. He found that “those subjects who expected the 
communication to disagree with their opinions were actually less influenced by it”; but 
exactly the same communication was “more effective if the audience falsely 
anticipated that it would support their existing views” (Festinger and Schachter 1989, 
p. 469). Presumably, the expectation that the communicator held an opposite view to 
their own and would be trying to influence participants, led participants to greater 
resistance to that persuasion (ibid). 
Walster and Festinger (1962) studied the impact of “overheard communications”. 
The authors found that for highly involving issues, communications thought to have 
been “overheard” were more persuasive than those in a “regular” condition where the 
speaker was presumably aware that he was being listened to. They interpreted these 
results in terms of intent to influence, since “if a speaker is seen as intending to 
influence one, then suspicions concerning possible ulterior motives may serve to 
nullify the possible effectiveness of the communication”. But because the listener’s 
assumption in the “overheard” condition is that “the speaker does not know anyone is 
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listening, it is not conceivable that the listener, knowing this, could imagine that the 
speaker intends to influence him” (Walster and Festinger 1962, p. 401).  
It would appear, therefore, that with respect to the causes of reactance, a 
continuum is formed – at one extreme there is an automatic form of reactance, in 
which both the trigger and its effects occur non-consciously; and at the other extreme 
are experiences of reactance resulting from conscious processing about the influence 
attempt or threat to freedom, its implications, where it is coming from and the ulterior 
motives behind it. Interest here rests in these more conscious forms of reactance, in 
particular, those instances in which it results from the use of persuasion knowledge; 
such that when persuasion knowledge is activated the experience of reactance 
increases, and when it remains unused, reactance effects are mitigated. In the current 
study, the detail at which a message is considered is shown to influence persuasion 
knowledge use and the level of reactance experienced, as measured by information 
receptivity. The Persuasion Knowledge Model, and its implications for reactance in 
particular, are discussed in the next sections. 
2.3. The Persuasion Knowledge Model 
2.3.1. Overview 
The Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and Wright 1994) is a 
conceptualisation of persuasion episodes not as one-way attempts to influence, but as 
the result of a “dyadic interaction between the persuasion agent and the target” 
(Kirmani and Campbell 2004, p. 574). In this formulation, persuasion targets are not 
passive recipients of persuasion efforts, but active and “resourceful participants who 
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pursue their own goals” and have their own “repertoire” of “response tactics”, parallel 
to the portfolio of persuasion tactics possessed by persuasion agents (Friestad and 
Wright 1994).  
The idea is that people “develop personal knowledge about the tactics used in (…) 
persuasion attempts” over time, from “conversations about how feelings, attitudes, 
etc. can be influenced; individuals’ social interactions, observation of known 
persuasion agents; from commentary on persuasion in the media”, and critically, also 
from “firsthand experience in social interactions” (Friestad and Wright 1994). This 
refers not only to those interactions in which one is the persuasion target, but also 
those in which one is the agent, since “in everyday life, people often move rapidly and 
fluently” between the two roles (ibid, p.3).  
Persuasion knowledge is thus “to some degree, historically contingent”, influenced 
by the particular moment in time and the culture in which it is developed (Friestad and 
Wright 1994, p. 1); and as the product of experience, it is also expected to increase 
with age. As people get older, then, they typically become more adept at using their 
persuasion knowledge to “identify how, when, and why” persuasion attempts are 
taking place. Persuasion knowledge is active and consequential during the persuasion 
attempts, and allows targets to “adaptively respond” to them (ibid).  
Thus, the same way communicators have a plethora of persuasion tactics, so do 
individuals develop their own repertoire of persuasion coping tactics, based on their 
knowledge of: a) the agent (“beliefs about the traits, competencies, and goals of the 
persuasion agent”); b) the topic (“beliefs about the topic of the message”); and 
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crucially c) persuasion itself (Friestad and Wright 1994, p.3). This knowledge then 
“performs schemalike functions”, “guiding consumers’ attention” and allowing them to 
make inferences and predictions with regard to the persuasion attempt, its underlying 
motivation and rationale, and its potential effectiveness (Friestad and Wright 1994).  
The use of these knowledge structures can, for instance, lead agent actions 
previously perceived as innocuous, to be re-interpreted as “tactics”, leading to a 
“change of meaning”: “a significant event that fundamentally alters many things in the 
way in which a target will respond to this, and other, persuasion attempts” (Friestad 
and Wright 1994, p. 13). Thus, within the PKM persuasion attempts are not limited to 
“the message” (as defined by the persuading agent), but include “the target’s 
perceptions of how and why the agent has designed, constructed, and delivered the 
observable message(s)” (ibid, p. 2).  
Within the model, coping refers to the manner in which persuasion targets 
manage influence attempts, and in the model it is “neutral with respect to the 
direction of the target’s response” (Friestad and Wright 1994). Thus, coping does not 
necessarily imply “greater resistance”, but rather “greater control” (Obermiller and 
Spangenberg 1998, p. 163): the targets’ aim is to “maintain control of the choice of 
how to respond to persuasion attempts” (Coulter, Cotte, and Moore 1999, p. 290) in 
order to “achieve whatever mix of goals is salient to them” (Friestad and Wright 1994, 
p. 3). 
Notwithstanding this theoretical neutrality, persuasion knowledge is generally 
associated with resistance, greater scepticism and having one’s “guard up” (e.g. Boush, 
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Friestad, and Rose 1994; Goldberg et al. 2006; Williams et al. 2004). The activation of 
persuasion knowledge typically produces a greater scrutiny of the persuasion situation; 
and this is particularly likely to be the case when the situation or message is perceived 
to be restricting “control over the outcome”, or if the persuasion tactics used and/or 
the motivations inferred to lie behind them, are perceived to be inappropriate. These 
“appropriateness beliefs” (Wei et al. 2008, p. 35) relate to the moral and normative 
acceptability of the tactics used (Friestad and Wright 1994), and to whether the 
persuasion agent is resorting to “inappropriate, unfair, or manipulative means” to 
achieve her goals (Campbell 1995, p. 227). The reason is that in such situations there 
are more salient cues for the activation of persuasion knowledge. 
Consistent with this, the “underlying belief” in much of the literature, particularly 
that pertaining to covert marketing activities such as product placement, is that 
“people tend to resist attempts at persuasion when they recognise them as such” (Wei 
et al. 2008, p.35). Empirical research backs this up for sales contexts, with results 
showing that “triggering persuasion knowledge—by heightening consumers’ 
awareness that an agent is trying to influence them—negatively affects the efficacy of 
sales tactics (Brown and Krishna 2004; Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Morales 2005)” 
(ibid. p. 34).  
In fact, this negative effect may even extend beyond what would be objectively 
warranted by the situation. Main, Dahl, and Darke (2007) show the operation of 
sinister attribution errors “in consumer judgments regarding the behavior of sales 
agents” (p. 59), such that consumers “continued to distrust a compliment offered by a 
salesperson even when the ulterior motive was not plausible”; for instance, when the 
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compliment was given after the sale (ibid.). Such results are consistent with a “pattern 
of misattribution characterized by irrational distrust (Kramer, 1994)” - the sinister 
attribution error - which leads to excessive suspicion regarding ulterior motives (Main 
et al. 2007, p. 59).  
2.3.2. Persuasion Knowledge Use 
Persuasion knowledge is not necessarily used, or used to the same extent, in every 
persuasion attempt. Rather, in order to be applied, persuasion knowledge needs to be 
made accessible. Accessibility is thus key, and can vary according to the characteristics 
of the persuasion situation and/or of the persons involved - for instance, the presence 
of persuasion cues, the target’s regulatory focus, or the availability of cognitive 
resources. The more such features make persuasion knowledge salient, the greater the 
use of these knowledge structures, and typically, the lower the levels of actual 
persuasion accomplished. 
The importance of persuasion knowledge accessibility has been demonstrated by 
Williams, Fitzsimons, and Block (2004). The authors showed that the mere 
measurement effect of intention questions, whereby answering them makes people 
more likely to subsequently carry out the behaviours associated with their answers, 
results from the inaccessibility of persuasion knowledge in these situations. Because 
intention questions are perceived as benign and are not recognised as influence 
attempts, they “slip under the radar of our defences”, and fail to trigger persuasion 
knowledge (p. 540). If persuasion knowledge is made accessible, however, the mere 
measurement effect will be attenuated. 
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Thus, the authors found that in simple intention question conditions, or when the 
questions were ostensibly sponsored by an objective source, the mere measurement 
effect occurred as predicted. When the intention questions were sponsored by a self-
interested source, however, such as the Association of Dental Products Manufacturers 
for a question about flossing behaviour, the mere measurement effect was 
attenuated; demonstrating “that a correction of the mere-measurement effect can 
occur when respondents’ persuasion knowledge is activated” (Williams et al. 2004, p. 
544). The same attenuating effect was found when participants were forewarned with 
regard to the potential effects of intention questions, by reading an article abstract 
about the mere measurement effect (ibid). 
Notably, this correction of the mere measurement effect only occurred when 
participants possessed the necessary cognitive resources to access their persuasion 
knowledge. When they were made cognitively busy, the mere measurement effect 
persisted (Williams et al. 2004). This is consistent with earlier research by, Campbell 
and Kirmani (2000) which demonstrated the dependence of persuasion knowledge use 
on the availability of cognitive resources. Such resources are necessary for a 
persuasion attempt to be recognised as such and an appropriate response determined. 
When they are not available, for instance because the reader is cognitively 
constrained, persuasion knowledge will tend to remain inaccessible; unless there is a 
distinct cue to trigger its use. 
In the Campbell and Kirmani (2000) studies, participants high in cognitive 
resources made use of their persuasion knowledge independent of cue strength. For 
participants low in cognitive resources, however – for instance, because they were 
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asked to remember the order of a series of numerals (study two) - persuasion 
knowledge was only activated when they were primed with ulterior motives. That is, a 
cue needed to be available for persuasion knowledge to be accessed; whether related 
to the scenario used – a compliment by a salesperson offered before (vs. after) the sale 
was made, thus making the salesperson’s ulterior motives more salient (studies one 
and two) – or unrelated to the scenario and primed in an ostensibly distinct task, such 
as an article discussing companies’ use of charitable donations as a means of obtaining 
tax deductions and improving relations with customers (study three). Thus, cues do 
not need to be specific to the persuasion situation at hand, but simply to trigger the 
use of the “schemer schema” (Wright 1986) - consumers’ knowledge structures 
relating to persuasion. Kirmani and Zhu (2007), for instance, found that reading an 
article regarding corporate financial fraud was sufficient to prime participants with 
suspicion and thus affect the subsequent processing of advertisements for digital 
cameras.  
The critical element is, therefore, the accessibility of the relevant knowledge 
structures; and as noted above, anything that makes persuasion knowledge more 
accessible, will increase its use; for instance, a “violation of expectations” (Ahluwalia 
and Burnkrant 2004). Ahluwalia and Burnkrant (2004) show that when the use of 
rhetorical questions in persuasive messages was highly salient as a form of “artful 
deviation in the style and format of the message”, it increased persuasion knowledge 
accessibility and led recipients to attempt to “infer ‘why’ the rhetorical was included in 
the message, focusing attention on the persuasion agent to interpret this violation” (p. 
39). Consistent with this research, Briley, Danziger, and Li (2011) demonstrate how 
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entertaining promotions can also increase persuasion knowledge accessibility and use, 
in so far as they constitute a different form of violating expectations, because they do 
not “fit within consumers’ normal routines” (p. 6). Participants were both “more aware 
of being influenced” (p. 11) and sensed a “stronger influence intent when promotions 
[were] more entertaining” (p. 13). The authors also found a significant impact of level 
of self-determination, such that entertaining promotions were less effective for those 
with high levels of self-determination, i.e., “strong desires to guide their own destinies 
and, consequently, to avoid having their choices influenced” (p. 17). 
This suggests that persuasion knowledge accessibility is not only determined by 
the persuasion situation, but may also depend on individual differences. Kirmani and 
Zhu (2007), for instance, show that a prevention (vs. promotion) orientation makes the 
activation of persuasion knowledge more likely. A prevention orientation increases 
sensitivity to cues of manipulative intent, and as result increases the perceived 
diagnosticity of such cues. Because in a prevention orientation the aim is to guard 
against losses, and this focus “naturally generates vigilance”, any indication of 
manipulation in such a condition increases in salience. In a promotion focus, by 
contrast, the aim is to promote gains, therefore vigilance is only generated if suspicion 
is unambiguously primed. These effects are furthermore independent of “depth of 
processing” and thus refer to a trigger of persuasion knowledge use distinct from 
cognitive capacity (Kirmani and Zhu 2007, p. 696-7). 
In the studies by Kirmani and Zhu (2007) ambiguous cues, which made 
manipulative intent “moderately salient”, were interpreted by prevention oriented 
participants with suspicion and vigilance, and led to lower brand evaluations; whereas 
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for the promotion oriented participants, strong cues and/or an external suspicion 
prime were necessary to produce these effects. Greater persuasion knowledge 
accessibility therefore tends to be associated to lower levels of persuasion; and where 
the activation of these knowledge structures leads to perceptions of inappropriate 
persuasion tactics, it may even lead to reactance.  
Indeed, Koslow (2000) suggests that “both the schemer schema and anticipation of 
a change-of-meaning event”, i.e. persuasion knowledge, “can be thought of as types of 
psychological reactance” (p. 247). However, while reactance focuses on the 
motivational aspects resulting from exposure to a threat to freedom – the resulting 
arousal and motivated need to restore that freedom (Brehm 1966) -  persuasion 
knowledge uses a cognitive framework guided by memory principles (e.g. Wyer and 
Srull 1989). We experience and learn about persuasion over time, and as a result, 
develop knowledge structures which can be called upon in persuasion episodes. Thus, 
our response to such episodes does not only depend on our knowledge of the topic 
and the persuasion agent, but also on our knowledge regarding persuasion itself 
(Friestad and Wright 1994). 
When this knowledge is more accessible, persuasion knowledge use is greater, and 
the likelihood of persuasion smaller. At the extreme, where persuasion knowledge is 
made highly accessible, via a restriction on one’s freedom for instance, and this 
restriction is perceived as inappropriate or manipulative, persuasion knowledge use 
might plausibly even lead to shifts in the direction opposite to that intended by the 
persuasion agent – i.e. boomerang effects. 
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It would seem, then, that in order to reduce reactance to persuasive messages, it 
would be necessary to reduce the restriction of freedom (i.e., the threat contained in 
the message), lower the accessibility of persuasion knowledge, or both. The 
proposition in this research is that one way in which this may be achieved with regard 
to freedom threatening persuasive messages is by altering the individual’s 
psychological distance from that message and its recommendations; i.e. through the 
level of construal at which persuasive messages are represented and processed. The 
following sections describe construal level theory in greater detail. 
2.4. Construal Level Theory 
2.4.1. Overview 
Construal Level Theory (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2003) 
deals with psychological distance. It is concerned with the manner in which people 
“transcend the here and now” (Trope and Liberman 2003). The theory does not deal 
with actual distances, for instance between two objects, but rather with egocentric 
distances, where the self is always the point of reference (Stephan, Liberman, and 
Trope 2010). The focus is then on the manner in which these distances, be they 
temporal, spatial, social or in “hypotheticality” (ibid.), affect representations of objects 
and events, as well as the resulting interpretations, evaluations and judgments made 
of them. According to CLT, there are variations in these resulting interpretations 
between construal conditions which are both systematic and predictable: when 
psychological distance from an event is low, it is correspondingly represented in terms 
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of low level construals; and when psychological distance is large, high level construals 
are used.  
2.4.2. High vs. Low Construals and Dimensions of Distance 
The critical distinction in CLT is then between high level construals, which are 
nonfigurative and lacking in detail, and low levels of construal, which constitute more 
tangible, detail-rich representations. High level construals “consist of general, 
decontextualised features that convey the essence of information” (Trope and 
Liberman 2003). They are “abstract, coherent, and superordinate mental 
representations” which tend to be “simpler, less ambiguous, more coherent, more 
schematic, and more prototypical than concrete representations” (Trope and Liberman 
2010). Low level construals by contrast, “include more concrete, contextual, and 
incidental details” (Trope and Liberman 2003), and “lend themselves to multiple 
abstractions” (Trope and Liberman 2010, p. 441). They furthermore tend to have 
“immediate, obvious, and direct implications for behaviour”, whereas high distance 
events tend to produce more distant and indirect implications (Kardes et al. 2006, p. 
136). 
According to Trope and Liberman (2010), two criteria determine which elements of 
an event will be given greater consideration at high vs. low levels of construal: 
centrality and subordination. Centrality refers to a feature’s impact on meaning, which 
is greater for high (vs. low) level features of objects or events; and subordination refers 
to the dependence between representations, the fact that “the meaning of low-level 
features depends on high-level features more than vice versa” (ibid, p. 441). Thus, 
more distant, high level representations tend to include more central and super-
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ordinate features of objects or events, while low level representations also encompass 
less central, goal-unrelated characteristics, and subordinate categories (Eyal et al. 
2004).  
This holds regardless of the dimension of distance considered. Typically, “four 
major dimensions” have been considered – “temporal, spatial, social and certainty-
related distance” (Fiedler 2007, p. 102), with a majority of studies focusing on the 
temporal dimension. However, other dimensions have also been proposed, such as 
informational distance (“the amount of knowledge or relevant data the consumer 
possesses about the decision options”), experiential distance (related to whether the 
information possessed is first hand or not), affective distance (for instance, if the 
information is obtained in “warm” or “cold” sources) and perspective distance (related 
to the “cognitive and motivational state” experienced in later stages of decision 
making) (Fiedler 2007, p. 102). 
With regard to the main dimensions of time, space, social distance and certainty or 
hypotheticality, however, research shows that they are all inter-related. Thus, “remote 
locations should bring to mind the distant rather than the near future, other people 
rather than oneself, and unlikely rather than likely events”, while the converse holds 
for proximal locations: they are related to the near future or past, low social distance 
and expected events (Trope and Liberman 2010, p. 442). The reason is that the 
underlying construct is always the same - psychological distance; and these mental 
associations between the different dimensions of distance have over time become bi-
directional and automatic.  
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Bar-Anan et al. (2007) demonstrated this point by measuring time-latency 
reactions to a picture-word Stroop task. The authors found that participants’ response 
times were shorter when they received “distance-congruent stimuli (in which a 
spatially distant arrow contained a word that denoted temporal distance, social 
distance, or low likelihood, or a spatially proximal arrow contained a word that 
denoted temporal proximity, social proximity, or high likelihood)” than when they 
were presented with “distance-incongruent stimuli (in which a spatially distal arrow 
contained a word denoting proximity, or a spatially proximal arrow contained a word 
denoting distance)” (Trope and Liberman 2010, p. 442). Similarly, Stephan, Liberman, 
and Trope (2010) found that the use of more formal and polite language, typically 
associated with greater interpersonal distance, led participants to expect the 
communication target to be further away in both time and space, than when the 
language used was more colloquial. And vice versa: more polite language was used in 
writing when it was perceived that the target would receive the message in the distant 
versus near future.  
Parallel to these automatic associations between the different dimensions of 
distance, there is also an automatic association between distance and level of 
construal. This has developed over time as the result of overgeneralised heuristics 
(McCrea et al. 2008). Our most concrete and detailed knowledge is about the present, 
the here and now; and the further away we move from this present experience, be in 
time, space, social distance or through conjecture, the more that detail dissipates and 
knowledge becomes abstract and decontextualised (Liberman et al. 2007). Over time, 
this rule of thumb has not only been overgeneralised, but has also generated an 
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implicit association between distance and level of detail or concreteness. We continue 
to apply this heuristic even in the absence of the original reasons which produced it 
(Trope and Liberman 2003; Liberman et al. 2007; Wakslak et al. 2006); when the same 
level of information is available for different levels of distance (e.g. for the near vs. 
distant future) (Liberman et al. 2007); and often do so automatically, “without 
conscious deliberation” (Trope and Liberman 2010). 
Bar-Anan, Liberman, and Trope (2006) measured these associations using Implicit 
Association Tests, and found consistently faster response times when participants 
were presented with congruent than with incongruent pairings of words. Furthermore, 
this held for all dimensions of distance, which were examined via “the same method 
and demonstrate[d] similar results across the four dimensions” (p. 617). This results 
show that this association is not only automatic, capable of being activated “without 
conscious deliberation”, but is also “independent of any specific context or target of 
construal”.  
A different perspective on these relations is presented by Fiedler (2007). The 
author accepts the association between dimensions of distance and levels of construal, 
but questions the argument that they originate from over-generalisations, 
“overlearned distance associations, detached from any difference in stimulus 
information” (p. 105). Instead, the author proposes an alternative explanation based 
on the “inequality of information about distal and proximal objects”, arguing that even 
in situations when the objective information available (for instance, that provided by 
the experimenter) is the same, “the effective stimulus sample (...) may still differ 
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markedly, due to self-generated inferences, associations and memorised knowledge” 
(Fiedler 2007, p. 105, emphasis added). 
Independent of what gives rise to it, however, research shows that there is an 
association between distance and level of representation, that is it implicit, and also bi-
directional. Not only are more distant events and objects represented at higher levels 
of construal – in a more abstract way and focusing on the objects’ more central 
features; but at the same time, more abstract or de-contextualised descriptions of an 
object or event, focusing on central and super-ordinate features, cause it to be 
perceived as being further removed from the self. By the same token, less distant 
events tend to be represented at lower levels of construal, and lower level 
representations lead to perceptions of greater proximity (Liberman et al. 2007). 
Liberman, Trope, McCrea and Sherman (2007) empirically demonstrated this with 
regard to temporal distance, while Stephan et al. (2010) extended the finding to spatial 
and social perspectives as well. 
Of greater interest, however, is the manner in which these associations then 
operate to systematically influence the way “judgments, predictions, and choices” 
regarding objects and events are made (Trope and Liberman 2003). Trope and 
Liberman (2010) refer to these effects as the “construal mediated consequences of 
distance” – the way distance, through its impact on the level of construal at which 
objects or events are represented, affects perceptions, interpretations and decisions 
pertaining to those events.  
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2.4.3. Construal-Mediated Consequences of Distance 
There are, then, regular and predictable effects which occur by virtue of the way in 
which events are construed at different levels of psychological distance; namely, by 
the shift in focus and relative weighting of high (vs. low) level features which occurs at 
greater (vs. shorter) distances respectively. An example of these effects is the well 
documented “planning fallacy” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), the tendency to over-
predict performance, and under-predict the time required for completion, when 
considering distant future tasks. From a construal point of view, this bias can be 
understood as the result of an “over-reliance on schematic models of future 
behaviour” (Nussbaum et al. 2003). Distant events are represented in terms of high 
level construals – they are abstract and lacking in specificity – and as a result, fail to 
consider contextual details which might interfere with task completion or 
performance, which then leads to over-confidence with respect to both how well and 
how quickly tasks will be performed (Nussbaum et al. 2003; Liberman and Trope 1998). 
The planning fallacy represents an instance of the effects of distance (via construal 
level) on prediction. Another example of this effect relates to predictions of reactions 
to future events. In general, we anticipate our reactions to future events, both positive 
and negative, to be far more extreme than they actually are, because at high levels of 
construal, we underweight “the effect of diluting low-level contextual circumstances” 
(Trope and Liberman 2010). This also explains why people tend predict that their 
moods will be consistent with time of day (or day of week) stereotypes, or recall them 
as such when remembering the past, but do not follow these patterns when the 
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measure is of momentary moods actually experiences at each time of day or day of the 
week (Areni 2008; Areni and Burger 2010).  
Distant events tend to be “construed in terms of general theories, stereotypes, 
and the desirability of possible outcomes” – for instance, the notion that “moods are 
lowest on the morning and rise steadily throughout the day on workdays” (Areni and 
Burger 2010, p. 5), or day of the week stereotypes, such as the “Monday blues” or 
“TGIF - Thank God It’s Friday” (Areni 2008, p. 1229).Thus, predictions of future moods 
tend to be aligned with these stereotypical cycles, but actual moods do not necessarily 
follow the same pattern: “returning to work on Monday morning may not seem very 
promising when viewed a few days in advance, but on the morning itself, moods may 
be driven more by some specific event (i.e. an email containing good news) rather than 
the prospect of returning to work” (Areni and Burger 2010, p. 5).  
Nussbaum, Trope, and Liberman (2003) further illustrated the impact of construal 
level on predictions, through an ostensible general knowledge quiz. The authors found 
that when the quiz was to be taken on the same day, participants’ confidence in their 
predictions of their performance in the quiz was “appropriately reduced” by its level of 
difficulty (a low level aspect). When the quiz was to be taken two months later, 
however, this reduction was not observed. Participants were focusing less on this low 
level feature and instead placing more weight on the high level feature of their own 
level of personal knowledge on the different domains of the quiz, which accordingly 
constituted a better predictor of participants’ level of confidence for the distant (vs. 
near) future condition (Nussbaum et al. 2003). 
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Psychological distance can also affect behavioural intentions, self regulation, and 
of particular interest to the current study, evaluations and choices (Trope and 
Liberman 2010). This is because such choices or preference ratings are made on the 
basis of objects’ construals or representations, rather than the objects themselves 
(ibid); and as distance increases, “the weight of high-level construals becomes more 
important than the weight of low-level construals in determining preference” (Trope 
and Liberman (2000).This concept has been exemplified using different characteristics 
of high vs. low level construals, such as the centrality of object features, the emphasis 
on desirability (vs. feasibility) and the kinds of arguments considered (pro vs. con).  
With regard to centrality of features, it has been shown that goal-related, central 
features of an object or situation receive greater weighting when a decision is being 
made for the distant future, while peripheral, non-goal related features should be 
emphasised at low levels of distance and construal (e.g. the near future). For instance, 
Trope and Liberman (2000) found that over time delay, an interesting job with an 
uninteresting training period increased in attractiveness vis a vis an uninteresting job 
with an interesting training period. Similarly, given a choice between a radio with good 
sound quality but “a poor in-built clock and a radio that has poor sound but a good 
clock”, respondent’s preferences were found to be tied with the supposed moment of 
decision making, “tomorrow” vs. “a year from now”: “over time delay, the good radio 
became more attractive despite the poor clock, and the poor radio became less 
attractive despite the good clock” (Trope and Liberman 2000).  
A related shift in focus which occurs as representations move from lower to higher 
levels of construal pertains to desirability vs. feasibility considerations. Desirability 
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refers to “the valence of an action’s end state, whereas feasibility refers to the ease or 
difficulty of reaching the end state” (Liberman and Trope 1998). Desirability is a high 
level feature, pertaining to why actions are carried out, and feasibility is a subordinate 
level feature, which considers how an action will be put into effect. According to 
construal level theory, then, desirability considerations should be more heavily 
weighted at high levels of construal or psychological distance from an object, and 
feasibility concerns should be more heavily weighted when psychological distance is 
low.  
Empirical research shows this to be the case (e.g. Liberman and Trope 1998; 
Todorov et al. 2005). For instance, students selecting assignments for the near future, 
“were willing to sacrifice interest for the sake of ease”; but when choosing for the 
distant future, sacrificed “ease for the sake of interest. This shift in preferences over 
time occurred despite the fact that students had the same amount of time (one week) 
to prepare” for both assignments (Liberman and Trope 1998). The authors explain that 
“when outcomes are desirable but hard to obtain, attractiveness increases over time, 
but when outcomes are less desirable but easy to obtain, attractiveness decreases 
over time” (ibid, p. 11). In another example, pertaining to the installation of a word 
processor, this shift was reflected in participants’ stated likelihood of installing the 
software. When it was to be done in the distant (vs. near) future, the quality of the 
word processor – a desirability consideration - had a significantly greater impact on the 
decision than the associated learning time – a lower level feasibility consideration 
(Liberman and Trope 1998).  
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Psychological distance can also affect evaluations and choices through the types of 
arguments that are given primacy at high versus low levels of construal – those in 
favour (pros) and those against (cons) an action respectively. Eyal, Liberman, Trope 
and Walther (2004) propose that “cons are subordinate to pros”, and as such, 
constitute a lower level of construal. Accordingly, results across a series of studies 
showed that “pros become more salient as temporal distance from the action 
increases, whereas cons become more salient when temporal distance decreases” (p. 
781). For instance, in considering arguments in favour and against various 
interpersonal behaviours (such as spending time with a fellow student at a cafeteria or 
asking that student why she or he looked troubled), participants not only wrote down 
more pros and less cons for the distant (vs. near) future condition, but their subjective 
likelihood of performing the behaviours also increased in the distant future, an effect 
“mediated by the effect of time on the preponderance of pros” (Eyal et al. 2004).  
It is important to note that these results do not imply that options or events are 
more positively valued at greater levels of psychological distance from them. Rather, 
the predictions of CLT pertain to the salience and level of emphasis placed on high vs. 
low level construals – in this case, pro vs. con considerations - at greater vs. smaller 
distances respectively. The actual significance placed on an alternative “depends on 
the value associated with high-level and low-level construals of the option. Specifically, 
when the value associated with high-level construals is more positive than that 
associated with low-level construals, the attractiveness of an option should increase 
with temporal distance. In contrast, when the value associated with low-level 
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construals is more positive than that associated with high-level construals, the 
attractiveness of an option should decrease with temporal distance” (Eyal et al. 2004). 
With that caveat, the authors also relate the differential focus on pro versus con 
considerations over time to persuasion. They suggest that persuasive messages might 
benefit from emphasising advantages when they refer to distant future events, while 
for near future events it would be more beneficial to de-emphasise disadvantages 
(Eyal et al. 2004). From the point of view of the current research, however, the interest 
would be in understanding how the emphasis on pros or cons might impact on 
openness to freedom threatening persuasive messages. Because the presence of a 
threat to freedom alters consumers’ motivations, it is not clear what this impact might 
be. Emphasis on pros may lead consumers to give greater consideration to the 
arguments in favour of a particular action or behaviour, and so increase information 
receptivity; but their association with high levels of construal may also make the 
message appear more distant, less personally relevant and for less immediate 
consideration, thus lowering information receptivity. 
An issue that arises from these construal mediated consequences of distance is 
whether the resulting preference and choice inconsistencies can be overcome. Zhao, 
Hoeffler, and Zauberman (2007) show that this is possible through the use of mental 
simulations (outcome and process), which can serve to neutralise the impact of 
construal level.  
Outcome simulations “encourage people to think about the desirable outcome of 
fulfilling the goal”, while process simulations “encourage people to imagine the step-
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by-step process of reaching a certain goal” (Zhao et al. 2007, p. 380). In effect, these 
two types of simulation emulate the automatic prominence given to outcomes and 
goals at high levels of construal, and to processes and feasibility consideration at low 
levels of construal respectively. Thus, mentally simulating the “naturally neglected 
processing mode” can eliminate the temporal preference inconsistencies typically 
encountered in construal studies. For example, “thinking about the process of setting 
up and using a software package (in three months) ultimately led consumers to think 
as if they were choosing the software today. Thinking about the long-term benefit of 
the project (when making an immediate decision) ultimately led consumers to think 
more as if they were making a future decision” (Zhao et al. 2007).  
In addition to its impact on predictions and preferences, psychological distance can 
also affect behavioural intentions through construal level, via the same mechanism of 
shifts in focus toward high (vs. low) level features of events or behaviours as distance 
increases. Eyal, Sagristano, Trope and Chaiken (2009) found that values are better 
predictors of behavioural intentions for the distant (vs. near) future, because they are 
“abstract and de-contextualised” structures (Trope and Liberman 2010, p. 453); i.e. 
high level features, more likely to be attended to when psychological distance is 
greater. Thus, participants placing a high value on hedonism were more likely to plan 
hedonic activities for the distant future, whereas for the near future feasibility 
concerns became better predictors of intentions (Eyal et al. 2009). 
Fujita, Trope, Liberman and Levin-Sagi (2006) related level of construal to self 
control, suggesting that high level construals should lead to greater self control than 
low level construals, because they “cause high-level features to be weighed 
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preferentially in evaluations and decisions”, which in turn leads individuals “to make 
decisions and act in accordance with their primary, central objectives and not 
secondary, incidental factors” (p. 353). Their results supported this view: “shifts in the 
construal level by which individuals considered a situation had dramatic effects on 
their self-control decisions and behaviours” (Fujita et al. 2006b, p. 363). Participants 
primed with high levels of construal by being asked to consider why (rather than how) 
they engaged in actions, showed both a reduced preference for immediate (vs. 
delayed) outcomes (study one), and greater physical endurance, as measured by the 
amount of time they were able to maintain a handgrip closed (study two). Altogether, 
the results of their studies showed that participants “at a low level of construal 
became more myopic and motivated by low-level concerns, whereas those at a high 
level of construal exerted more self-control and acted in accordance to higher level 
considerations” (Fujita et al. 2006). 
Zhang, Huang, and Broniarczyk (2009) took this a step further, and showed that 
people can actually strategically alter their construal of events in order enhance self-
control and facilitate decisions consistent with long term goals. According to the 
authors, “by perceptually exaggerating the extent to which the temptations may 
undermine goal attainment, consumers are more likely to resolve the self-control 
conflict in favour of the long-term goal by avoiding the temptation” (Zhang et al. 2009).  
2.4.4. Construal Effects in Different Contexts 
In addition to the construal mediated effects of psychological distance discussed 
above, all of which could be seen to bear some implication for persuasive 
communications (discussed in the hypotheses chapter) construal level theory has also 
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been applied to a variety of other contexts and constructs. While not exhausting the 
list, some of these applications are described below, such as for instance, the impact of 
construal level on creative thinking, or the relationship between construal level and 
power. 
With regard to creativity, Forster, Friedman, and Liberman (2004) showed that 
construal level can influence insight and creative performance, such that these 
measures are enhanced at high (vs. low) levels of construal and distance. According to 
the authors, the effect results from “transfer appropriate processing shifts” (p. 179); 
i.e. a beneficial transfer of cognitive resources activated in one task to a subsequent 
one. According to the authors, the shift towards abstract mental representations (i.e. 
high level construals) which occurs when considering distant objects or events does 
not immediately dissipate, and so can transfer to subsequent tasks. This leads to 
improved performance on “creativity tasks, which require abstract thought”, but 
hinders performance for “analytical tasks which require relatively concrete processing” 
(Forster et al. 2004, p. 185). 
Smith and Trope (2006) examined the relationship between construal level and 
power. Their results indicated that those with power tend to use higher level 
construals than those without. The authors argued that “the ability to see the bigger 
picture, to plan ahead, to keep an eye on higher goals, may be prerequisites for 
obtaining power as well as requirements for maintaining it” (Smith and Trope 2006, p. 
579). Furthermore, there is a greater sense of independence and uniqueness 
associated with power, which inclines those who have it toward more distal 
perspectives. As a result, power has become automatically associated with more 
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abstract processing; and merely priming participants with high (vs. low) power proved 
sufficient to lead them to more abstract processing of information (ibid).  
Construal level theory has also been applied to feedback preferences, and the 
goals associated with personal feedback. Freitas, Salovey, and Liberman (2001) found 
that people tend to seek more accurate self evaluations at high (vs. low) levels of 
construal, when more weight is placed on the “central aim of self evaluation” (p. 420). 
When the process of self evaluation is considered for more immediate circumstances, 
however, self enhancement goals prove a greater influence on feedback preference 
than concerns over accuracy (Freitas et al. 2001).  
High level construals have also been found to be related to positive emotions: 
“independent of one’s self-esteem, one’s perceived meaning in life, and one’s focus on 
one’s goals, construing action abstractly was found to relate to experiencing positive 
affect” (Freitas, Clark, Kim and Levy 2009, p. 940-41). The reason for this appears to be 
that high construals lead to a greater perception of “concordance among one’s 
ongoing goals, such that individual, specific goals appear related to a broader, 
coherent construal of one’s self-regulatory efforts”, which has been “theorised to 
promote taking decisive action (Harmon-Jones and Harmon Jones 2008)” (Freitas et al. 
2009, p. 941) .  
Despite their positive impact on affect, however, higher level construals have also 
been shown to be associated with greater procrastination. Low levels of construal not 
only lead to a greater likelihood of performing an action and shorter enactment times 
(Gollwitzer 1999; Liberman et al. 2007) but also affect completion times, with no 
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mediation “by the perceived importance, attractiveness, or difficulty of the task” 
(McCrea et al. 2008, p. 1313). McCrea, Liberman, Trope, and Sherman (2008) thus 
conclude that “forming a concrete representation of a task will reduce procrastination, 
independently of any effects of planning or understanding of the task” (p. 1308). 
Finally, it is also worth noting that there also individual and cultural level 
differences in mental representations of objects and events (Kim and John 2008; Briley 
2009). Kim and John (2008) note that construal level can “vary at the individual level, 
with individuals having a chronic tendency toward different levels of construal” (p. 
117). Those with “a chronic tendency to construe their environment in a more 
concrete way” (ibid.) tend to operate “primarily at the level of details” and “approach 
action with its mechanistic components in mind” (Vallacher and Wegner 1989, p. 661). 
Consumers with a chronic tendency toward abstract representation, on the other 
hand, tend to view their actions in “terms of causal effects, social meanings, and self-
descriptive implications” (ibid.).  
With respect to cultural differences, it has been found that while North Americans 
tend to represent psychologically distant events in more abstract and de-
contextualised terms, as predicted by CLT, East Asians’ representations of distal time 
frames are often lower level construals (Briley 2009). In comparison to their Western 
counterparts, East Asians tend to be “more in touch with the past” and “more sensitive 
to the future”; they also have a “more complex, nuanced view of causal relationships” 
and expect more change and instability over time (Briley 2009, p. 314), all of which 
relate to lower levels of representation. Culture can therefore influence the salience of 
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temporally distant events, and in this manner impact the time period that people draw 
upon when making decisions (ibid).  
2.4.5. Construal Level Theory, Persuasion Knowledge Accessibility and Reactance 
The argument in this research is that the shifts in representation at different levels 
of construal can impact on the cognitive structures brought to bear in persuasion 
situations, those involving threats to freedom in particular. High level representations 
tend to reflect a more global perspective of object and events, and lead to the 
consideration of fewer details; while at low levels of construal more details and 
contextual features are taken into account. To the extent that these differences affect 
the level of persuasion knowledge used, they are so likely to produce a significant 
impact on the levels of reactance experienced toward freedom threatening persuasive 
messages.  
When this type of communication is represented at low levels of construal, such 
that more of its details are taken into consideration, persuasion knowledge is more 
likely to be activated. The consideration of a greater number of message features 
increases the salience of the threat to freedom, and this in turn serves as a cue to the 
activation of persuasion knowledge. While persuasion knowledge use does not 
necessarily lead to increased resistance, it typically does. To the extent that imposing a 
restriction on readers’ freedom is perceived to be an inappropriate form of persuasion 
– an unfair or manipulative one - it will produce a motivation to restore that freedom, 
i.e. reactance; the easiest way of doing so being to close oneself off from the 
persuasive message. 
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At high levels of construal, by contrast, fewer elements of the freedom threatening 
persuasive message are likely to be considered. The message is construed in higher 
level, more holistic and de-contextualised terms. Persuasion knowledge is less likely to 
be activated, and as result, reactance effects are diminished; which should be reflected 
in a greater openness to the message information. The expectation in this research is 
therefore that consumers will experience greater levels of reactance at low levels of 
construal (high detail, high persuasion knowledge use), than at high levels of construal 
(low detail, low persuasion knowledge use). The next chapter develops the 
hypotheses, as well as competing explanations for the relationships proposed. 
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3. Hypotheses 
As the literature review shows, reactance effects have been well documented in a 
variety of contexts; and the applications of construal level theory have similarly been 
diverse, and extended even to persuasive messages. The relationship between the 
two, however, i.e. the application of construal level theory to persuasive messages 
containing threats to freedom, has been left largely unexplored. Furthermore, it is 
hard to conclude from the existing literature what form this relationship will take, and 
how construal level will impact on consumers’ responses to freedom threatening 
communications, their experience of reactance in particular.  
3.1. Aim and Previous Research 
Restrictions to freedom alter motivations, through the onset of reactance, and as a 
result, they increase the intricacy of the analysis of persuasion under different levels of 
construal. The issue ceases to be solely related to the effect of high vs. low level 
representations on the extent of persuasion, but must also take into account the 
impact of the motivated need to restore freedom on consumers’ perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviours towards persuasive messages and their recommendations. 
Restrictions to freedom also create ambiguity as to the direction of the responses to a 
persuasion event – given the presence of a threat to freedom in a persuasive message, 
it the impact of processing at different levels of construal on consumers’ openness to 
information contained therein ceases to be linear. 
Fujita, Eyal, Chaiken, Trope and Liberman (2008), for instance, applied the concept 
of construal level to the context of persuasive messages (without a threat to freedom). 
 68 
 
Their research showed that given strong and positive arguments, persuasion was 
greater at low levels of construal when arguments relating to low level features of the 
issue were used; and at high levels of construal when arguments relating to high level 
features were used. According to the authors, arguments should therefore be 
“matched” to consumers’ psychological distance from them, or to the level of 
construal at which they are processing; because “when a person’s mental construal of 
an object changes as a function of time, arguments that highlight information that 
matches or is consistent with that construal receive preferential attention in 
evaluation” (p. 568). 
It is unclear what will happen, however, if these arguments also contain a threat to 
freedom. If the “preferential attention” afforded construal-consistent arguments also 
increases consumers’ focus on the restriction being imposed on their freedom, it might 
actually accentuate feelings of reactance and reduce information receptivity. Fujita et 
al. (2008) specifically note that in order to increase persuasion, the construal-
consistent arguments need to be strong and positive; and presumably also threat-free.  
From another perspective, one might expect low levels of construal to increase 
information receptivity, because they make persuasive messages appear “closer”, and 
so possibly also more real and personally relevant. Chandran and Menon (2004) found, 
consistent with this argument, that presenting health information at low (vs. high) 
levels of construal reduced consumers’ tendencies to perceive themselves as “less 
prone to negative events”, such as illness or accidents, for instance (p. 377). It also 
helped overcome resistance to difficult prevention behaviours, “by making the health 
hazard seem more threatening” (p. 385). 
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If the low level of construal also makes the imposition on freedom appear “more 
threatening”, however, it is not clear that the benefits noted above will result. Indeed, 
to the extent that consumers will become motivated to restore their threatened 
freedom, information receptivity may actually decrease. The aim in this research was 
therefore to directly analyse the impact of construal level on reactance to persuasive 
messages containing a threat to freedom; in particular, as measured by consumers’ 
openness or receptivity to the message information. 
Persuasive communications, and public service announcements in particular, 
frequently rely on their informational content to achieve their persuasion related 
goals. Weiss and Tschirhart (1994) point out that such communications are in fact 
“unusual” in this respect, in particular in comparison with other policy instruments, 
because “they attempt to produce policy results without altering incentives or 
authority systems. They aim to work through ideas (Weiss 1990), information (Hood 
1986), or learning (Schneider and Ingram 1990): the provision of information, the 
persuasiveness of argument, the heightening of attention, the arousal of emotion and 
values attached to policy, the framing of issues and solutions” (p. 83). Furthermore, 
they note, “as citizens and consumers we are bombarded with [these] official 
government appeals to behave” (p. 82). 
Altering one’s openness to message information, then – one’s willingness to 
consider and believe message claims - constitutes an important and readily available 
form of freedom restoration. It is also a consequential form of restoration, because 
such openness is a necessary pre-requisite for any subsequent changes in attitudes, 
emotions or behaviours with respect to the issue at hand. Krugman, Fox, and Fischer 
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(1999) point to existence of a process toward behavioural change, such that “conative” 
(i.e., action related/behavioural) ambitions are unlikely to be reached “without first 
achieving cognitive and affective goals” (ibid, p. 101), and this requires that the 
message information be openly considered and believed. 
There is thus a critical distinction between information provision, and its actual 
impact (Krugman et al. 1999). In the absence of information receptivity, the 
information cannot have any real impact, and neither persuasion nor any 
accompanying shifts in attitudes or behaviour can occur. This is consistent with Brock’s 
(1964) theory of persuasion, in which credibility of the communicator relates 
multiplicatively with receptivity, defined as “an eagerness to expose oneself to 
information” (Brock and Becker 1965, p. 658). Together, these two elements 
determine “the effectiveness of propaganda”; and because they relate multiplicatively, 
“as receptivity approaches zero, differences in credibility, however great, have 
decreasing influence on propaganda effectiveness” (ibid, p. 658).  
In the present research, communicator credibility was subsumed as one 
component of receptivity; however, the implications remain the same. Even an 
emotionally appealing communication, aiming principally at affective changes, is 
unlikely to see these achieved if there is not an initial openness to the message 
information, and a belief that it is true and from an expert source. A threat to freedom, 
however, has a significant potential to cause this openness to be reduced. At the same 
time, altering the level of construal at which the message is being processed may 
significantly impact on these reactance induced changes in openness. The next section 
examines how. 
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3.2. Propositions 
That the presence of a threat to freedom in a persuasive message produces a 
motivation to restore that freedom has been widely demonstrated in the literature. 
Indeed, “organizations risk rejection by consumers if the arousal of intense or negative 
emotions”, such as that created by the imposition of restrictions on consumers’ 
freedom, “is not justified or well managed”; and care has to be taken that such threats 
do not “arouse emotional reactions that produce negative attitudes and possibly 
negative behavioral responses” (Hibbert et al. 2007).The expectation in this research 
was that these effects would interact with level of construal. Specifically, that a high 
level of construal would be able to mitigate reactance effects, and as such ameliorate 
the negative impact of threats to freedom on receptivity to high threat message 
information. The reason for this expectation is bound with the association between 
levels of construal and detail, and the subsequent effect on the accessibility and use of 
persuasion knowledge.  
Because low level representations are more concrete, they include more object  
details (in this case, details regarding the persuasive message); and because they are 
contextualised, they take into account not only the content of the persuasive 
communication, but also its background, source and reason for being. Such 
considerations can be expected to increase the accessibility of persuasion knowledge, 
and accordingly result in higher levels of reactance, reflected in a lower receptivity to 
the message information. 
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Friestad and Wright (1994) note that “experienced consumers are able to use 
tactic-recognition heuristics, effectiveness heuristics, and appropriateness heuristics to 
generate agent or topic attitudes when they want to invest only limited resources in 
processing the message” (p. 11). The greater accessibility of persuasion knowledge at 
low levels of construal allows these heuristics to be used, and so results in lower levels 
of openness to information. This is also consistent with research on warnings which 
shows that “people often cut short attention to the mandated warnings”, being aware 
of their existence but not necessarily of their content, nor “understanding the specific 
dangers contained in the warning” (Krugman et al. 1999, p. 98), as might be expected if 
receptivity is low. 
Thus, “the way in which meaning is constructed is influenced by an individual’s 
knowledge structures (Meline 1996)” (Hibbert et al. 2007, p. 726); and this in turn, 
depends on the level of construal at which consumers’ are processing, and the extent 
to which their persuasion knowledge is made accessible. We propose that at high 
levels of construal (or low levels of detail) persuasion knowledge is less accessible, and 
therefore high threat persuasive messages are less likely to result in reactance from 
the use of such knowledge structures in this condition (vis a vis a low construal 
condition). 
High level of construal representations are abstract and de-contextualised, 
focusing on the central, goal related features of objects and events. With respect to 
persuasive messages, this suggests an emphasis on content over context, likely to 
increase information receptivity. There will be less focus on the threat to freedom, a 
potentially powerful cue of persuasion knowledge, and less consideration of ulterior 
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motives or contextual aspects of the message likely to activate persuasion knowledge. 
With the emphasis on informational content, reactance is likely to be reduced, as 
receptivity to this content increases. It is thus proposed that: 
H1: When consumers are exposed to a persuasive message containing a 
threat to freedom, they will be more receptive to the information presented in 
it if they process at a high, rather than low, level of construal. 
This effect of level of construal on information receptivity would not be expected, 
however, where the persuasive message does not contain a threat to freedom. Absent 
a threat to freedom to serve as a cue to persuasion knowledge use, we do not expect 
level of construal to significantly impact consumers’ openness to the persuasive 
message. To the extent that there is an influence of construal level in the low level of 
threat conditions, however, it is likely that an interaction effect might emerge between 
these two variables, such that the impact of level of construal on information 
receptivity depends on the extent to which the message poses a restriction to one’s 
freedom of choice. 
An impact on openness to information is also expected for level of detail. High 
level of construal representations take an overall perspective of things and selectively 
“exclude irrelevant features of objects and events” (Fujita et al. 2006, p. 352). Low 
level construals, on the other hand, are associated with more detailed representations; 
they are concrete and contextualised, consider peripheral event or object features, 
and lead to a perception of these features as “unique and specific” (ibid). As a result of 
this link, the same relationship with threat to freedom is expected to hold for level of 
detail as for construal level, albeit in reverse. 
 74 
 
That is, information receptivity should be higher at low, rather than high, levels of 
detail. Considering the message at high levels of detail is likely to enhance the impact 
of the threat; whereas at low levels of detail, the restriction on freedom is given less 
attention and so is less likely to serve as a cue to persuasion knowledge use and/or 
produce reactance. Contextual message features are less focused upon, and with the 
emphasis on message content and getting an overall view of the message instead, 
information receptivity is likely to increase: 
H2: When consumers are exposed to a persuasive message containing a 
threat to freedom, they will be more receptive to the information presented in 
it if they process at a low, rather than high, level of detail. 
Parallel to the relationship between level of construal and threat to freedom, there 
is no expectation that level of detail should produce a similar impact of significance if 
the persuasive message does not contain a threat to freedom to serve as a cue to 
persuasion knowledge use. It is plausible, however, that there will be an interactive 
effect of level of construal and threat to freedom on information receptivity.  
These relationships between construal level and threats to freedom, or detail level 
and threats to freedom, and their resulting impact on information receptivity, are 
proposed in this research to stem from differences in the use of persuasion 
knowledge. More specifically, from the greater use of persuasion knowledge at low 
levels of construal, where the high threat message is considered in more detail; and 
the lower use of persuasion knowledge at high levels of construal, where fewer high 
threat message details are taken into account.  
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Because persuasion knowledge is not typically readily accessible or “top of mind”, 
the extent to which it is used depends critically on the characteristics of the persuasion 
situation, and the extent to which this makes persuasion knowledge salient and/or 
provides consumers with a cue to its use. Highly accessible constructs or attitudes - 
those more frequently activated in day to day activities - tend to be “automatically 
activated in the presence of attitude objects, without conscious, intentional cognitive 
processing” (Eagly and Chaiken 1993); but for constructs which are less frequently 
activated, this is not the case. Faced with a decision making or evaluation situation, 
people “do not normally use all of the relevant information or previously acquired 
knowledge they have available. Rather, they consider only a subset of this information 
and knowledge that comes to mind most quickly and easily” (Wyer and Adaval 2009). 
Therefore, less accessible constructs such as persuasion knowledge require greater 
deliberation and/or the presence of a cue in order to come into play.  
As noted in the literature review, when persuasion knowledge accessibility is low - 
for instance due to cognitive overload (Campbell and Kirmani 2000), because of 
“disruptions of the verbal component of working memory” through fast paced music 
(Bosmans and Warlop 2005), or because the persuasion situation is not recognised as 
such in an apparently benign context (Williams et al. 2004) - then persuasion 
knowledge becomes less likely to be used. If cues of persuasion knowledge are 
provided, however, these constraints on its use are typically overcome. For instance, 
contexts in which ulterior motives are made salient (Campbell and Kirmani 2000); or in 
which the use of persuasion tactics is perceived as inappropriate, i.e. outside of “the 
boundaries of the ‘rules of the game’” and so seemingly not “normatively acceptable” 
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(Friestad and Wright 1994, p. 10); or even still, contexts containing elements disruptive 
of normal consumer routines, such as promotions which fall outside “standard, 
expected formats” (e.g. those containing an entertainment component (Briley et al. 
2011) - any of these can trigger persuasion knowledge, and increase its use. 
The argument made here is that the consideration of a freedom threatening 
persuasive message at a high level of detail (or at a low level of construal) constitutes 
another such instance where persuasion knowledge becomes more likely to come into 
play. For most persuasive message formats, threats to freedom can be considered to 
fall outside of “consumers’ normal routines” (Briley et al. 2011, p. 3) - particularly in 
advertising, they are neither typical nor likely to be anticipated before exposure to the 
communication. They also make the persuasive intent more overt, and are likely to 
raise issues with regard to the appropriateness - the “fairness, manipulativeness, 
respectfulness” (Friestad and Wright 1994, p. 14) – of the persuasion tactics used. As 
such, threats to freedom can constitute a cue to persuasion knowledge, the more so 
the more they are perceived to “symbolise a violation of expectations” (Ahluwalia and 
Burnkrant 2004, p. 27). 
As a result, anything within the persuasion context that draws attention to, or 
allows attention to be focused on, the threat to freedom, is likely to increase 
persuasion knowledge use. A low construal, more detailed consideration of a 
persuasive message, for instance, implies that contextual aspects of that message, 
such as a threat to freedom will also be focused upon. This, in turn, can be expected to 
activate persuasion knowledge use, triggering reactance effects, such that receptivity 
to message information will drop. 
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At high levels of construal, in contrast, fewer details are considered and 
representations of information are more schematic. Approaching a high threat 
persuasive message in this manner is therefore expected to reduce the emphasis 
placed on the threat to freedom in favour of more central message characteristics, 
such as the content itself. The threat to freedom thus becomes unlikely to serve as a 
cue to persuasion knowledge – these structures remain unused and information 
receptivity increases.  
Although the emphasis placed on a threat to freedom in a persuasive message may 
also in part depend on the intensity of that threat; that emphasis is expected to be 
diminished at high levels of construal, independent of that intensity. At high levels of 
construal, the emphasis on more central message features leads to a greater focus on 
the actual message being conveyed, rather than peripheral aspects relating to how it is 
being conveyed, expected to trigger persuasion knowledge.  
The underlying assumption is that a greater use of persuasion knowledge will lead 
to a more acute experience of reactance, and lower receptivity to message 
information. This seems reasonable, since although persuasion knowledge is 
theoretically neutral, aiming at goal advancement rather than to produce resistance 
(Friestad and Wright 1994), in practice it often results in greater barriers to persuasion 
and generally causes people to have their “guard up” (Friestad and Wright 
1994;Campbell 1999; Campbell 1995). Hence the expectation that receptivity to high 
threat message information will vary inversely to the use of persuasion knowledge. 
With a greater use of persuasion knowledge, at a high detail/low construal level of 
message consideration, consumers are likely raise their guard and be more vigilant of 
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the message, thus becoming less open to its informational content. When persuasion 
knowledge is not activated, however, at high levels of construal or low detail, 
participants will have their guard down, and subject the message to less scrutiny, thus 
appearing more open to its content. It is therefore proposed that:  
H3: When consumers are exposed to a persuasive message containing a 
threat to freedom, they will make greater use of their persuasion knowledge if 
they process at a low, rather than high, level of detail. 
Once more, this effect is not expected for low threat messages, because in the 
absence of a cue, persuasion knowledge will tend to be less accessible and used. 
3.3. Alternative Explanations 
There are two alternative mechanisms which could also explain the relationship 
between level of construal and threat to freedom, and the manner in which these 
variables are proposed to interact to influence information receptivity. The first relates 
to perceptions of risk, closeness and personal relevance of the persuasive message. It 
has already been demonstrated that low levels of construal increase perceptions of 
personal risk and attitudes toward risky behaviour exposed in health related 
persuasive communications Chandran and Menon (2004). To the extent that such 
feelings of closeness extend to the threat to freedom and make it appear more 
personally directed, it seems plausible that this condition would lead to a more acute 
level of reactance, and reduce openness to the message information. At high levels of 
construal, in contrast, the message would be viewed as more remote and less 
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personally relevant; allowing for greater attention to its informational content, with 
fewer feelings of personal threat. 
The second alternative explanation relates to the shifts in emphasis which occur 
between high and low levels of construal, in particular with respect to desirability vs. 
feasibility concerns, and pro vs. con considerations. High levels of construal lead to a 
greater relative emphasis on desirability and goals, as well as on arguments in favour 
of an action than their low construal counterparts. Low level construals place the focus 
on feasibility, processes and the arguments against (rather than pro) a certain action. 
This difference has for instance, been shown to produce distinct levels of self-control. 
By focusing attention on end goals, a high level of construal has been shown to 
surmount depletion effects and so allow consumers to exert greater levels of self-
control (Agrawal and Wan 2009). Because “higher level construals emphasise goals and 
dilute the focus on resources (...) they are unlikely to impair self-control” (ibid, p. 459).  
It seems reasonable to presume that a high level of construal, and the subsequent 
attention on desirability and end goals, might likewise be sufficient to overcome the 
reactance effects resulting from a threat to freedom, and thus increase information 
receptivity. In a persuasive message context, a high level of construal is likely to lead to 
a greater emphasis on the desirability of the promoted position, and reasons in favour 
of carrying it out, rather than on the arguments against it, or the feasibility issues 
involved in achieving the proposed outcomes. This seems a particularly plausible 
alternative explanation where public service announcements are concerned, since 
these communications typically propose advantageous end goals (e.g. quitting 
smoking), which nevertheless require high effort activities in order to be achieved. 
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High level construals would tend to focus attention on those beneficial outcomes, 
while low level construals would put the spotlight on the costly processes of achieving 
those outcomes.  
The studies undertaken in this research thus aimed not only to test for the 
hypotheses developed above, but also to distinguish between the persuasion 
knowledge based explanation proposed in H3 and these competing explanations for 
the relationship between construal level and threats to freedom. The next section 
presents an overview of these studies. 
3.4. Overview of Studies 
Three studies were carried out to test for the hypothesised interaction between 
construal level and threat to freedom. Study one sought to establish the basic pattern 
and determine whether changes in participants’ construal levels indeed affected their 
receptiveness to information communicated in threatening messages. Study two 
sought to build upon the first experiment, replicating its results using a different 
persuasive message context and a construal level prime; and study three tested the 
proposed mechanism of detail level, as well as its association with persuasion 
knowledge use.  
In all three studies, a condition in which the message was not threatening – i.e. did 
not restrict freedom of choice or action - was included as a control. Although it was 
expected that consumers would be more receptive to information included in 
threatening messages at high (vs. low) levels of construal, this difference was not 
expected to occur with respect to receptivity to non-freedom restricting messages. In 
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the absence of a threat to freedom, this could not serve a cue for the activation of 
persuasion knowledge, and reactance effects in the form of lower information 
receptivity would be less likely to occur. The following sections provide a brief 
description of the three studies and their main results. 
As the standard in both the reactance and the construal level theory research (e.g. 
Brehm et al. 1966; Bushman and Stack 1996; Fujita et al. 2008; Trope and Liberman 
2000), an experimental method was adopted, and the different treatments tested 
under controlled conditions (Keppel and Wickens 1982). Because “no single indicator 
can capture the meaning of construct completely” and “any indicator can represent 
many constructs”, experimental testing requires “convergence procedures”. 
Convergence is sought through recourse to various indicators, which can all represent 
the construct under study, but at the same time “differ in as many other respects as 
possible” (Sternthal, Tybout and Calder 1987, p. 123). 
Thus, in the present research, peripheral features of the experimental designs vary 
from one study to the other. For instance, in study one, the target message is a PSA, 
while in study two it is a newspaper article, which constitutes a very different context 
and type of message. Both, however, pose a constraint to consumers’ freedom of 
choice; and in both, different levels of threat to freedom are juxtaposed with high and 
low levels of construal. The manipulations thus tap into the same underlying 
constructs; and by achieving the same pattern of results, help eliminate alternative 
explanations. This, in turn, constitutes “an appropriate means of achieveing 
convergence” (Sternthal et al. 1987, p. 123).  
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3.4.1. Study One 
Study one followed a 2 (threat to freedom: high, low) X 2 (construal level: high, 
low) between subjects design. The target message was an alcohol public service 
announcement directed at young people. It highlighted the potential risks of excessive 
drinking and promoted greater moderation in alcohol intake, either as a matter of fact 
regarding which there was no choice, using definitive language and overt demands 
(high threat condition), or as a recommendation worthy of consideration, but which 
devolved the decision to the consumer (low threat condition).  
The construal manipulation was also contained in the target message, through the 
framing of the negative effects of alcohol in low level, concrete terms, as something 
which occurs “every day” (low construal condition) vs. framing these effects in high 
level terms, as something which occurs “every year” (high construal condition). Both 
the threat and the construal manipulations were adapted from previous research. 
The results of study one conformed to prediction: participants showed greater 
openness to information when the high threat message was framed in high (vs. low) 
construal terms, and there was a significant interaction between threat to freedom 
and level of construal for information receptivity. Study one furthermore offers 
evidence inconsistent with an explanation of results based on the personal relevance 
of the message. A measure of perceptions of personal risk of contracting alcohol 
related illnesses was taken, and contrary to what might be expected if the greater 
information receptivity stemmed from lower perceived message relevance, this 
measure displayed a similar pattern of results to the information receptivity measure. 
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For participants in the high threat condition, perceptions of risk were actually greater 
(marginal significance) at high (vs. low) levels of construal. 
Study one thus established the basic effect and ruled out one of the alternative 
explanations for the relationship between level of construal and threat to freedom. 
Study two replicated and extended these results. 
3.4.2. Study Two 
A 2 (threat to freedom: high, low) X 2 (construal level: high, low) between subjects 
design was once again used, but with an ostensible newspaper article as the target 
message. The article described a university level election, and the two candidates 
running in it. This represented a marked shift in context – moving away from both the 
public service announcement format and health risk content; and also more narrowly 
circumscribed the scope of the threat. In study two, the message did not impose on 
threat to self integrity more generally, but impacted only on participants’ freedom of 
choice – the ability to decide on the relative merits of the candidates for themselves 
(since the high threat condition concluded the clear superiority of one in relation to 
the other).  
The context of study two also provided a test for the explanation of results based 
on shifts in focus between construal conditions - from feasibility to desirability or from 
cons to pros. The message entailed no such considerations; therefore, if the same 
pattern of relationship between threat to freedom and construal level uncovered in 
study one were to be replicated in study two, it would indicate that the underlying 
mechanism was not related to such shifts in focus. 
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Study two also used a different construal manipulation, non-consciously priming 
the concept in an ostensibly unrelated exercise prior to exposure to the message. This 
constituted an important addition, because it provided even stronger evidence that 
the effects on information receptivity were being caused by the shifts in level of 
construal. The results of study two replicated the pattern found in study one, and 
participants displayed significantly greater receptivity to the high threat message 
information when they were primed with high (vs. low) levels of construal.  
3.4.3. Study Three 
Study three used a design similar to that of study one, but substituting the 
construal level manipulation with one that shifted the level of detail considered during 
message processing. If the same pattern of results could be replicated using detail level 
instead of construal, it would constitute a strong indication that detail level was the 
underlying mechanism to the interaction as hypothesised. 
The design was a 2 (threat to freedom: high vs. low) X 2 (detail level: high vs. low) 
between subjects experiment, and the target message was a public service 
announcement about the negative effects for mental health of excessive coffee 
consumption. The idea was to return to a public service announcement context, but 
with a largely unfamiliar topic, toward which participants were unlikely to have any 
pre-conceived ideas or very strong feelings. 
Threat to freedom was manipulated within the message, through the concluding 
paragraph which either asked readers to consider (low threat), or by contrast 
commanded them (high threat) to limit their coffee consumption. Level of detail was 
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manipulated through the instructions, and led participants to take either an overall 
picture of the message or consider it more attentively and in greater detail. 
The results replicated those of construal level: there was greater receptivity to the 
information in the high threat message when it was considered at low levels of detail 
(i.e. high construal), than when greater levels of detail were taken into account (i.e. 
low construal). Furthermore, a similar pattern was observed with respect to 
persuasion knowledge use. Faced with the high threat message, participants made 
greater use of their persuasion knowledge at high levels of detail (i.e. low construal), 
than when they considered the message in less detail (i.e. high construal). Plausibly, 
taking a big picture view in the low detail condition meant persuasion knowledge was 
left untapped, while a more detailed consideration of the message in the high detail 
condition led to the use of a greater variety of knowledge sources, including 
persuasion knowledge. The next chapters discuss each of the three studies in greater 
detail, both in terms of design, findings and implications. 
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4. Study One 
Hypothesis H1 proposed that given a high threat to freedom message, receptivity 
to message information would be greater at high (vs. low) levels of construal; while no 
increase in information receptivity was expected for the high construal condition when 
the message was not threatening, because in the absence of a threat to freedom, 
reactance effects would likewise be absent. There would therefore be no motivation to 
restore freedom by closing oneself off from message information.  
Study one therefore aimed to provide a test for H1 and show the basic relationship 
proposed between construal level and threat to freedom. It did so using a Public 
Service Announcement (PSA) style message about moderation in alcohol consumption. 
Not only are reactance effects particularly relevant in PSA contexts, as discussed in the 
literature review (section 2.2.3), but from a practical point of view this comprised a 
realistic context for testing reactance effects. PSAs are typically one sided and 
directive, often making recourse to scare tactics and/or forceful language, and as such 
provided a space where freedom limiting statements could be used without seeming 
out of place or arousing suspicion. In addition, using a PSA context had the further 
benefit of providing. In addition, using a PSA context had the further benefit of 
providing practical insights relevant to this important context. 
The alcohol topic was chosen not only because it is a common subject matter in 
public service announcements, but also due to its assumed relevance to the 
experimental sample (students at the University of Sydney). Drinking is a big part of 
student culture in Australia, and this age group comprises a realistic target of 
responsible drinking messages. According to the International Centre for Alcohol 
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Policies, “the potential for alcohol-related harm is higher for younger people (those 
under the age of 25), who are more likely than adults to: drink “excessively”; engage in 
“aggressive and asocial behaviours and experience injuries and accidents (especially 
road traffic crashes)”; be involved “in both excessive alcohol consumption and risky 
sexual behaviour” (http://www.icap.org , accessed August 2011). 
In addition, a review of public transportation and billboard advertising at the time 
of data collection, showed that there were no government-authorised alcohol 
prevention campaigns being carried out in Sydney at the time of data collection, other 
than one relating specifically to Random Breath Testing on the roads. A message 
promoting responsible alcohol consumption among young adults was therefore 
developed as the experimental stimuli, based on information from the Government 
website www.alcohol.gov.au.  
4.1. Design and Participants 
Study one followed a 2 (level of threat to freedom: high vs. low) X 2 (construal 
level: high vs. low), between subjects design, where both independent variables were 
manipulated via the target message. One hundred and fifty four students participated 
in the study, in exchange for either course credit (two credit points) or a payment of 
$15. Participants were Undergraduate and Honours students from the University of 
Sydney. Ages ranged from 18 to 45, with an average respondent age of 22 (median = 
21). Just over 50% of the participants were female - 78 female, 74 male, with two 
participants failing to answer this question.  
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Five respondents were excluded from the analyses, because they deduced that the 
study was related to “unpleasant” or “strongly worded” messages; and in addition, 
only participants who were alcohol drinkers were included in the analyses, as non-
drinkers were not expected to experience reactance to “anti”-drinking messages. For 
those who did not drink, or did so only very occasionally, even the high threat version 
of the message would not have been putting a cherished freedom at risk. Furthermore, 
research has shown a strong link between defensiveness and involvement, whereby 
greater personal relevance is associated with “increased defensiveness and reduced 
acceptance of important health messages” (Sherman et al. p. 1047).  
Bensley and Wu (1991) note the same pattern with regard to boomerang effects to 
dogmatic messages – which tend to be more likely with those recipients most at risk of 
the target behaviour. This effect of involvement further extends to perceptions of 
advertisements; such as for example, in smokers’ and non-smokers’ understandings of 
anti-smoking advertisements and their effectiveness (Wolburg 2006). In Wolburg's 
(2006) study, low involvement non-smokers perceived the ads to be well made and 
effective; while high involvement participants, i.e. smokers, thought they added 
nothing new, and even had feelings of defiance towards them.  
In study one, drinking behaviour in the week prior to the study was used as a proxy 
for involvement. Participants were asked to indicate the number of beers, glasses of 
wine and spirits they had consumed in the past week. The question was formulated in 
this specific manner to induce participants to carefully think about their alcohol 
consumption, rather than just “throw out” an estimate. Those who indicated they had 
not consumed any alcohol in the previous week were excluded from the analyses. 
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Given the gender and cultural differences in drinking behaviours (see preliminary 
analyses below), this meant slightly more women than men, and more Asian than 
Western participants were excluded. The final sample thus included 92 participants, 45 
men and 46 women (one participant failed to answer this question); 51 nationals of 
Western countries and 40 from Asian countries. 
4.2. Target Message and Independent Variable Manipulations 
The target public service announcement was developed in the form of a print 
message. It contained a series of factual statements regarding the costs and 
consequences of alcohol misuse, including hospitalisations and deaths, and 
emphasised their particular relevance to young adults. The message also contained a 
small image, specifying the number of “standard drinks” contained in different types of 
alcoholic beverages. All of the information was taken, most of it textually, from the 
Australian Government’s Department for Health and Ageing website regarding alcohol 
consumption, www.alcohol.gov.au.  
Threat to freedom and level of construal constituted the independent variables, 
and were both manipulated within the text. The threat level treatments were achieved 
by changing the concluding statements of the message. In the high threat condition, 
the communication ended asserting that “As any sensible person can see, there is 
really no choice when it comes to university students drinking: you simply have to 
moderate your drinking” and a final reminder that “you must limit your drinking! No 
more than 4 standard drinks a day on average for men, and no more than 2 standard 
drinks a day on average for women”.  
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This manipulation was adapted from Bensley and Wu (1991), and restricted 
freedom by forcefully exhorting readers to a single acceptable course of action – that 
of limiting alcohol consumption. The corresponding statements in the low threat 
condition (also adapted from Bensley and Wu 1991) were that “It seems a sensible 
conclusion to say that when it comes to university students drinking, you may want to 
consider moderating your drinking”, with a reminder of “the current guidelines” for 
alcohol consumption as stated above: “no more than 4 standard drinks a day on 
average for men, and no more than 2 standard drinks a day on average for women”.  
It is important to note that this manipulation was aimed at affecting perceptions of 
threat to freedom - in this case, the freedom to decide how much alcohol one should 
consume given the information presented – rather than constitute a more general 
threat to self regard. Previous research has demonstrated reader sensitivity to health 
risk information such as that presented in the target message of study one, particularly 
when it is of high relevance, because it jeopardizes people’s perceptions of themselves 
as “healthy and adaptive” individuals, i.e. their self image (Sherman and Cohen 2002, 
p. 121).  
Self image consists of “important relationships, values, experiences, and 
behaviours” (Sherman et al. 2000, p. 1047); and it is a flexible system, such that 
“failures in one aspect” of people’s lives can be compensated for “by emphasizing 
successes in other domains” (Sherman and Cohen 2006, p. 188). A threat to freedom 
generally constitutes a threat to self, because it affects one of its domains: autonomy, 
which is a basic human need (Ryan and Deci 2000) and as such an important part of 
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global self integrity. The converse, however, need not hold – threats to global self 
esteem do not typically affect one’s sense of freedom.  
Although the target message in study one did contain a threat to global self regard, 
this need not have affected perceived freedom of choice, and was furthermore 
maintained constant across conditions. What was different across conditions was 
threat to freedom – readers’ ability to decide for themselves how much alcohol they 
should consume. In the high threat condition, this freedom was greatly restricted, 
where as in the low threat condition, it was not imposed upon.  
The second manipulated variable in study one was construal level, which was 
altered by changing the temporal and spatial concreteness of aspects of the message. 
In the high construal condition, alcohol related problems were framed as occurring 
“every year” and without reference to a specific geographical location; in the low 
construal condition, the same problems were framed as occurring “every day, in 
Sydney”. These time and space references appeared five times throughout the 
message, and the time references were underlined. 
This manipulation follows the work of Chandran and Menon (2004), and is slightly 
different from the more commonly used manipulations of construal level, which 
typically contrast two levels of psychological distance – for instance in temporal terms, 
a near versus distant future event (e.g. “in a few days” vs. “in a year”). However, 
Chandran and Menon (2004) show that the “objectively neutral reference periods of 
day and year evoke different perceptions of proximity and concreteness” in much the 
same way as temporal distance treatments. Indeed, in their studies they show that 
“temporal framing of events set in the present mimic processes by which temporal 
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distance effects manifest (as per CLT; Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 
2000). When people see health-related information in a day (vs. a year) format, their 
construals evoke concreteness and proximity” (Chandran and Menon 2004). This 
similarity between the two forms of construal manipulation was found with respect to 
“individuals’ risk perceptions, attitudes, intentions, emotions, and message 
effectiveness” (Chandran and Menon 2004), suggesting that the same perception of 
psychological distance, and resulting construal-mediated consequences for decision 
and judgments can be obtained with either manipulation. Figure 4.1 shows an example 
of the target message, in its high threat – high construal condition. 
 
There are 40 150 alcohol related hospitalisations every year. 
 
Alcohol is a drug that can lead to intoxication and dependence; it can also impair motor 
skills and judgement, cause illness and death and have other harmful effects on our social, 
economic and living environments 
A person does not have to be drunk, or drink heavily before they become ill, are injured or 
die from an illness or injury caused by alcohol. 
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The cost to the community of alcohol related social problems is around $7.6 billion 
each year. 
There are 40.150 alcohol related hospitalisations every year. 
There are 1.400 alcohol related deaths every year. 
Every year, alcohol is causing harms such as sleep disorders, violence, stroke, liver 
disease and stroke in significant numbers of people.  
 
Young adults are more likely than older people to experience alcohol-related harm. Young 
adults have the highest consumption rates and the highest risk of alcohol-related injury, 
including road trauma, violence, sexual coercion, falls, accidental death and suicide. 
 
As any sensible person can see, there is really no choice when it comes to university 
students drinking: you simply have to moderate your drinking.  
 
Remember: you must limit your drinking! No more than 4 standard drinks a day on average 
for men, and no more than 2 standard drinks a day on average for women 
Figure 4.1 - Example of Study One Target Message (High Threat -High Construal 
Condition) 
 
4.3. Procedure and Dependent Variables  
Participants signed up for what they were told was a study on “Communication 
Styles”. Upon arrival, they were asked whether they would be willing to also fill out a 
short survey for a different study on “Health and Lifestyles”, being carried out by the 
Health Sciences Department, which all agreed to do. They were then given information 
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statements and consent forms to sign, followed by the instructions for the two 
questionnaires, which both pertained to the present study.  
Sessions were conducted in computer labs, in groups of up to 12 participants 
seated separately, at independent desks. The first questionnaire, on “Communication 
Styles”, was completed on the computer. Participants were led to believe that they 
would be randomly assigned to one of a series of different communications, on a 
variety of topics, aimed at final consumers; and asked to comment on it. In fact, 
everyone received the target message on responsible alcohol consumption in one of 
its four different versions, followed by the measures of the main dependent variables 
(information receptivity and alcohol risk), items relating to process and outcome 
thoughts, and then the manipulation checks. 
The second questionnaire was done in paper and pencil, to further increase its 
distinctiveness from the first. Built into it were questions regarding habitual drinking 
patterns, as well as demographics. The alcohol questions were embedded amongst a 
series of other health and lifestyle questions regarding eating, exercising and smoking 
habits; and participants were assured of the anonymity of their responses. The two 
questionnaires together took between 35-40 minutes to complete, and none of the 
participants reported suspicion of a link between the two studies. 
The main dependent variable was receptivity to message information. Health 
communications, and public service announcements more generally, typically use 
“informational strategies” to achieve their aims of persuading people toward a 
particular attitude and/or behaviour (Sherman and Cohen 2002, p. 121). They present 
people with the facts, and depend on the information presented being believed and 
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perceived as expert to produce some movement toward change. As a result, 
receptivity to message information is one of the most crucial elements to guarantee 
that such persuasive messages will be effective.  
Scammon, Mayer, and Smith (1991), for instance, examined the impact of alcohol 
warnings on beverages. They found that while the labels had been successful in 
creating awareness – they had been noticed and could be recalled by respondents – 
they had not yet led to changes in perceptions of risk or behaviour. The expectation, 
however, was that such changes in perceptions and behaviour might eventually follow 
on from the cognitive effects obtained, since “almost all information disclosure 
requirements work in stages, beginning with changes in awareness and knowledge, 
followed by changes in attitudes and intentions, and culminating, for a small number 
of people, in changes of behaviour” (Scammon et al. 1991, p. 226).  
But if the initial stages of “awareness and knowledge” fail to occur, because 
consumers are not receptive to message information, for instance, or because they are 
discounting it, affective and conative goals cannot be achieved. Exposure to a message 
is not alone sufficient; rather, readers need to be open and receptive to its claims, if it 
is to be of any effect. When a message is not believed or its expertise is questioned, 
this receptivity is compromised – cognitive changes cannot occur, nor lead the way to 
further changes in attitudes and behaviours. Such direct mental forms of restoration 
(Brehm 1972), however, constitute easily available strategies to overcome feelings of 
threatened freedom.  
In study one, a measure of receptivity to message information was used which 
reflected participants’ acceptance of both the message and its source. Participants 
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were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement on a seven point likert scale, 
ranging from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “completely agree”, with statements affirming that 
“the message was credible” and “trustworthy”, and that its source was “expert” and 
“qualified” (α = .582). This measure was used across all three studies; and to guard 
against pre-existing attitudes about the source, the target messages used did not 
specify their author. This was important, since as noted before, reactant responses to a 
message source can carry over to subsequent messages on other topics by the same 
source (Miller et al. 2007). 
Next, a measure was taken of participants’ reported outcome vs. process thoughts 
while reading the message, as an initial test of an explanation of the relationship 
between level of construal and threat to freedom based on shifts in emphasis between 
these considerations. According to this argument, the higher levels of information 
receptivity at high (vs. low) levels of construal would be a reflection of the greater 
emphasis on the desirable outcome proposed in the message, in this condition. 
Whereas in the low construal condition, information receptivity would be lower, 
because the focus would be on the process or feasibility issues involved in achieving 
the proposed goal. In study one, the desirable goal was the moderation of alcohol 
consumption, and resulting avoidance of the negative consequences associated with 
excessive drinking; whereas the feasibility considerations pertained to the potentially 
difficult process of actually reducing alcohol consumption. 
Participants were asked the extent to which they had held either type of 
consideration while reading the message, on a 7 point scale where 1 = not at all, and 7 
= thought about it a lot. For instance, how much they had thought about “avoiding 
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alcohol related health problems” or “being healthy” (outcome), versus the steps they 
would need to take in order to reduce their drinking or how others would react if they 
changed their drinking patterns (process). Five items relating to outcomes and three 
items relating to process were combined to create a measure of outcome thoughts (α 
= .735) and process thoughts (α = .681) respectively. 
Subsequent to these measures, checks were carried out for the manipulated 
variables. Perceived level of threat to freedom was measured by asking participants to 
indicate the extent to which they thought the message was “dogmatic”, “tried to 
manipulate” them, and “tried to pressure” them, on a seven point scale where 1 = not 
at all and 7 = completely agree (α =.592) Level of construal was measured by asking 
participants the extent to which the message discussed alcohol problems as they occur 
daily (manipulation check for the low construal condition) or annually (manipulation 
check for the high construal condition). Agreement with these statements was 
measured on the same seven point scale. 
Although these measures do not tap into the level of construal at which subjects 
were processing the information, they serve as a proxy measure of construal level, and 
indicate that subjects noted and were able to recall the information relevant to the 
construal manipulation, which previous research has shown to be effective in 
producing high and low construal representations (Chandran and Menon 2004). 
After completing the first questionnaire, participants moved on to the second task, 
and filled in the “Health and Lifestyle” questionnaire, which compiled information 
regarding drinking patterns. Participants were asked with regard to their alcohol 
consumption in the week prior to the data collection (number of beers, glasses of wine 
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and spirits consumed); as well as to estimate their future alcohol consumption. This 
was an average of participants’ estimate of the number of alcoholic drinks they would 
consume during “the next week” and on their “next night out”. 
The second questionnaire also tried to gauge how personally relevant participants 
perceived the message to be, as a test of this explanation for the predicted 
relationship between construal level and threat to freedom. According to this 
argument, receptivity to the high threat message information would be greater at high 
(vs. low) levels of construal, because at this more abstract level, the message would 
appear more distant and less personally relevant and threatening. At low levels of 
construal, on the other hand, the message would be perceived as “closer to the self” 
and its restriction on freedom as more threatening, resulting in a need to restore that 
freedom by lowering one’s receptivity to information. 
A measure of participants’ perceptions of their personal risk of contracting an 
alcohol related illness was thus taken. This not only served as a form of gauging 
personal relevance, but also constituted a measure of the effectiveness of the 
persuasive message. Public Service Announcements, and those relating to health 
issues in particular, often aim to increase readers’ perceptions of their levels of 
personal risk from engaging in the behaviour(s) in question, as a further means of 
motivating behavioural change (Sherman et al. 2000). The underlying assumption is 
that the more consumers perceive themselves to be at personal risk of incurring the 
negative consequences of a behaviour, the more inclined they will be to take steps 
towards changing that behaviour. If the message also contains a threat to freedom, 
however, the need to restore that freedom might manifest itself through discounting 
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of the personal relevance of the health risk behaviour. In this case, the increase in 
perceptions of risk and accompanying changes in attitudes or behaviour would fail to 
occur or appear mitigated.  
As a measure of personal risk, then, participants were asked to rate their likelihood 
of contracting “an alcohol related illness”, on a scale of one to seven, where 1 = not at 
all and 7 = very likely. Like the other alcohol related questions, this was included in the 
ostensibly distinct “Health and Lifestyle Questionnaire”, and embedded amongst a 
series of other health related issues. If personal relevance was the mechanism 
underlying the relationship between construal level and threats to freedom, then 
perceptions of risk would be higher at low (vs. high) levels of construal. 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Preliminary Analyses: Drinking Patterns of Participants 
An initial analysis was carried with regard to participants’ drinking patterns by 
gender and nationality, given the importance of involvement in contexts involving 
persuasive messages and threats to freedom in particular. In study one, involvement 
was basically tied to drinking habits: the more alcohol participants consumed, the 
more relevant and freedom threatening the message’s alcohol recommendations 
would have appeared to them.  
The data showed significant differences in drinking patterns between men and 
women, both in terms of the number of drinks consumed in the previous week, and in 
their estimates of alcohol consumption for the following week and their next night out. 
Among drinkers, men reported having consumed considerably more drinks in the 
 100 
 
previous week (M = 3.89) than women (M = 1.52; diff = 2.37, F (1, 89) = 14.62, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .14) and also intended to drink significantly more in the future (Mmale = 8.06 vs. 
Mfemale = 3.56; diff = 4.5, F (1, 87) = 8.69, p < .005 ηp
2 = .09). The pattern and levels of 
significance were similar when non drinkers were included in the analysis. There were 
slightly more female than male non-drinkers: women represented 52.7% of those who 
had not consumed any alcohol in the previous week.  
There were also significant differences in alcohol consumption by nationality. The 
sample was comprised of 51 “Eastern/Asian” participants, most of them Chinese, but 
also including Taiwanese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Korean, Thai and Malaysian 
respondents; and 40 respondents who were nationals of “Western” countries: mostly 
Australians, but also including Europeans and North Americans (one participant failed 
to answer this question). In terms of ethnicity, there were more participants of Asian 
descent than of “Western”/Anglo background, but 15 did not respond to the cultural 
background question. Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of participants and their 
average alcohol consumption by gender, nationality and background. 
The two groups (as measured by nationality) were significantly different in terms 
of their drinking patterns, even when considering only drinkers: respondents from 
western countries had not only consumed more alcohol in the past week (M = 3.84 
drinks) than their Eastern counterparts (M = 1.23 drinks; diff = 2.61, F (1,89) = 18.13, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .17), but also intended to consume more alcohol in the following week (M 
= 8.10 vs. M = 2.68; diff = 5.42, F (1, 87) = 12.91, p < .005, ηp
2 = .13),. Amongst the 
participants who reported they had not consumed any alcohol in the previous week, 
 101 
 
74.5% were Asian; with the percentage increasing to 84.3% when ethnicity, rather than 
nationality, was considered. 
 Eastern 
Participants 
(Nationality) 
Western 
Participants 
(Nationality) 
Eastern 
Participants 
(Ethnic 
Background) 
Western 
Participants 
(Ethnic 
Background) 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Number of 
participants 
23 17 23 28 21 20 15 21 
Average number 
of drinks 
consumed past 
week 
1.07 1.44 1.97 5.37 1.45 3.37 1.76 4.71 
Average number 
of estimated 
future drinks 
(next week and 
next night out) 
2.82 3.22 4.78 10.83 2.63 5.08 5.00 11.54 
Table 4.1 – Participants’ Reported Drinking Patterns (by Nationality, Ethnic 
Background and Gender) 
 
For the purposes of the current study, however, these gender and nationality 
differences in drinking behaviours were mostly relevant in terms of the involvement 
they signified; as such, the analyses reported below included only drinkers. 
4.4.2. Manipulation Checks 
Checks were carried out for the two manipulated variables - construal level and 
threat to freedom. A one way ANOVA confirmed that participants were more likely to 
agree that the message specified the number of alcohol related problems that occur 
daily when they read the low (M = 5.87) vs. high construal message (M = 2.98); diff = 
2.89, F (1, 87) = 73.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = .46). Conversely, they were significantly more 
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likely to agree that the message talked about the number of alcohol related problems 
that happen every year when they were assigned to the high construal condition (M = 
5.96) than when they were in the low construal group (M = 3.49; diff = 2.47, F (1, 89), p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .37). 
With regard to threat to freedom, the data confirmed that participants in the high 
(vs. low) threat condition perceived the message to be more forceful (marginal 
significance), expressing higher levels of agreement that the message was dogmatic, 
and trying to manipulate and pressure them (M = 4.19) than those in the low threat 
condition (M = 3.76; diff = .43, F(1, 88) = 3.84, p = .068, ηp
2 = .01).  
4.4.3. Information Receptivity 
A full model ANOVA (2 x 2) was run for the measure of participants’ receptivity to 
the message information. This revealed a significant interaction between threat to 
freedom and construal level (F(1, 87) = 6.94, p < .05, ηp
2 = .07)1. Furthermore, 
consistent with hypothesis H1, openness to information in the high threat condition 
was greater when the message was framed at a high (M = 4.73) vs. low (M = 4.26) level 
of construal (F(1,87) = 4.95, p < .05, ηp
2 = .05); but there was no significant impact of 
construal level on the low threat message (Mlc = 4.59 vs. Mhc = 4.25. F(1,87) = 2.31, p > 
.1). There were no main effects of either construal level (F(1,87) = .18, p > .2) or threat 
to freedom (F(1,87) = .22, p > .2) on information receptivity (see appendix one for the 
table of ANOVA results). 
                                                           
1
 At low levels of construal, the low threat message induced (non-significantly) higher levels of 
information receptivity than the high threat message (Mlt = 4.59 vs. Mht = 4.26; F(1, 87) = 2.38, p > .1), 
but the pattern was significantly reversed when the communication was framed at a high level of 
construal (Mlt = 4.25 vs. Mht = 4.73; F(1, 87) = 4.77., p < .05, ηp
2
 = .05). 
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Figure 4.2 – Study One Estimated Marginal Means of Receptivity to Message 
Information 
 
4.4.4. Risk of Illness 
A full-model ANOVA (2 x 2) was also run on perceived risk of contracting an alcohol 
related illness. The results largely paralleled those of the information receptivity 
measure, and showed a marginally significant interaction between construal level and 
threat to freedom (F(1, 87) = 3.31; p =.08, ηp
2 = .04)2. Contrary to what would be 
expected if personal relevance was the underlying mechanism to this interaction, 
                                                           
2
 At low levels of construal, the low threat message generated marginally significant higher perceptions 
of personal risk than its high threat counterpart (Mlt =2.30 vs. Mht = 1.70; diff = .68, F(1, 87) = 2.96, p = 
.09, ηp
2
 = .04), but the difference was rendered non-significant when the message was framed at a high 
level of construal (Mlt = 2.1 vs. Mht = 2.38; diff = .28, F(1, 87) = .61, p > .2). 
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however, the perception of personal risk of contracting an alcohol related disease was 
higher when the high threat message was framed at a high (M = 2.38) vs. a low (M = 
1.70) level of construal. This effect was just short of significance (diff = .68; F(1,87) = 
3.77, p = .056, ηp
2 = .04); while the impact of construal level on perceptions of risk in 
the low threat condition did not reach significance (Mlc = 2.3 vs. Mhc = 2.1; diff = .2, F(1, 
87) = .33, p > .2). There were no main effects of either construal level (F(1,87) = .87, p > 
.2) or threat to freedom (F(1,87) = .43, p > .2) (see appendix two for the table of 
ANOVA results). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Study One Estimated Marginal Means of Perceptions of Personal Risk of 
Contracting an Alcohol-Related Illness 
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4.4.5. Process vs. Outcome Thoughts 
The measure of process thoughts and that of outcome thoughts were both 
subjected to a full-model ANOVA (2 x 2) analysis. The results showed no significant 
impact of level of construal or threat to freedom on either measure (all ps > .2), nor 
were there any significant interactions to report (see appendices three and four for 
ANOVA tables).  
4.5. Discussion 
4.5.1. Receptivity to Message Information 
The results of study one provided support for hypothesis H1, which predicted 
greater openness to high threat message information at high (vs. low) levels of 
construal; while no effect of construal level was observed for the low threat, control 
message. In high threat condition, the target message restricted participants’ 
previously held freedom of deciding how much alcohol to consume. As a result, those 
who received the message in its low construal form became motivated to ameliorate 
the ensuing feelings of discomfort, and did so by lowering their willingness to accept 
the information presented in the message. When the high threat message was framed 
at high levels of construal, however, this effect did not occur. It was in fact reversed, 
and participants became more receptive to the message information.  
According to the argument suggested in this research, these results would be 
linked to differences in persuasion knowledge activation and use at high vs. low levels 
of construal. A greater use of these knowledge structures at low levels of construal, 
activated by the presence of the threat to freedom as a cue of persuasion knowledge, 
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would lead to increased feelings of reactance, and a need to restore freedom by 
reducing one’s openness to the message information. At high levels of construal, on 
the other hand, and with a lower use of persuasion knowledge, there would be 
reduced feelings of reactance and a greater willingness to accept message information. 
4.5.2. Alternative Explanations 
An alternative explanation for the results, however, could lie in the apparent 
importance of the message to the self. A high level of construal, given its association 
with greater distances and more abstract representations, could be argued to reduce 
the perceived personal relevance of a freedom restricting message, thus diluting the 
strength of the threat and reducing reactant feelings - an effect which would be 
reflected in higher levels of information receptivity, as observed in study one. A low 
level of construal, conversely, would make the message appear “closer” and so more 
pertinent to the self. The restriction on freedom would similarly appear more 
threatening, and so openness to the message information would be reduced.  
The results of study one, however, did not support this view. Rather than reduce 
the perceived personal relevance of the high threat message, framing it at a high level 
of construal increased it. Participants rated themselves as significantly more at risk of 
contracting an alcohol related illness when the high threat message was framed at 
high, rather than low, levels of construal. If the observed interaction between level of 
construal and threat to freedom, and the significant impact of construal in the high 
threat condition, were a result of differences in perceptions of closeness or relevance, 
though, the opposite pattern should have emerged. Instead, the results for personal 
risk essentially replicated those for information receptivity. 
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Thus, the results not only ruled out an explanation of the results based on 
relevance, they also provided additional evidence in support of interaction between 
threat to freedom and construal level. Namely, the role of high levels of construal in 
ameliorating reactance effects to high threat messages. In study one, this reduction in 
reactance was evident in both an increased openness to the message information, and 
a rise in perceptions of personal risk. 
Faced with an imposition on their freedom (in the high threat message), 
participants in the low construal condition became motivated to restore their freedom, 
and did so by becoming less open to the message information, and as a result, also to 
the possibility that they themselves might suffer the consequences of excessive 
alcohol consumption. This was consistent with both reactance, and research showing 
defensiveness and discounting among high involvement participants in the face of 
messages which threaten their self-integrity (Sherman, Nelson, and Steele 2000; 
Burgoon et al. 2002). 
At high levels of construal, in contrast, both information receptivity and willingness 
to accept the personal relevance of the high threat message were higher. Although 
their freedom was still imposed upon, participants appeared less reactant – they were 
more open to the message information, and accordingly, also more willing to accept 
that the negative health consequences described in the message could apply to them; 
as reflected in their higher estimates of the likelihood of contracting an alcohol related 
illness.  
The results of study one also fail to provide support to an explanation of the 
interaction between threat to freedom and construal level based on shifts in emphasis 
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between construal conditions. According to this argument, high levels of construal 
would lead to greater message openness by putting the focus on the desirable goals 
and outcomes presented in the message, whereas low levels of construal would 
reduce receptivity by shifting emphasis onto the potentially difficult feasibility issues 
surrounding the process of achieving those outcomes. Furthermore, this effect would 
be present for both levels of threat. 
In reality, however, this pattern only held for the high threat message, toward 
which there were indeed greater levels of receptivity at high (vs. low) levels of 
construal. For the low threat message, the impact of construal level did not reach 
significance, and the trend was in the opposite direction (i.e. greater openness at low 
vs. high levels of construal).Furthermore, the measures of process and outcome 
considerations taken also failed to show any significant changes between construal 
conditions, for either level of threat to freedom. These results tend to suggest that 
shifts in emphasis between desirability and feasibility considerations, or outcome and 
process thoughts, do not underlie the interaction between threat to freedom and 
construal level. In order to fully rule out this explanation, however, study two was 
designed so as not to contain any desirability or feasibility issues, in order to verify 
whether the same results would hold in the absence of such considerations. 
4.5.3. The Low Threat Message 
The impact of construal level for the low threat message failed to reach 
significance, for both information receptivity and perceptions of personal risk of 
contracting an alcohol related illness. This was consistent with prediction, and lent 
further support to the notion that the interaction between construal level and threat 
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to freedom does not result from shifts in emphasis or changes in perceptions of 
personal risk, but rather from changes in the activation and use of persuasion 
knowledge. As a freedom of action was not imposed upon in the low threat condition, 
there was no obvious cue to activate persuasion knowledge and produce feelings of 
reactance at either level of construal. Given the absence of reactance effects, there 
were also no differences in receptivity or perceptions of risk between the construal 
conditions.  
Indeed, if there were to be an effect of construal level on the low threat 
conditions, it would likely be one of greater information receptivity and perceptions of 
risk at low (vs. high) levels of construal. At low levels of construal the message would 
tend to appear closer and possibly more relevant to the self, without however, 
activating persuasion knowledge by making the threat to freedom more salient. At 
high levels of construal, on the other hand, the message would tend to appear more 
distant, and less personally relevant. This is consistent with the results of study one – 
although the impact of construal level on the low threat message did not reach 
significance, the pattern was indeed one of greater receptivity and estimates of risk 
when the low threat message was framed at low (vs. high) levels of construal. 
The results for the low threat condition also cast doubt on the explanation based 
on the shifts in emphasis which have been shown to occur between levels of construal, 
because such reversals in focus between higher and lower order message features or 
considerations (for instance, between desirability and feasibility concerns) would be 
expected to hold in a similar manner independently of level of threat present in the 
message.  
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5. Study 2 
Study one provided initial evidence for the predicted pattern of results: the data 
showed interactive effects between threat to freedom and level of construal, and as 
envisaged in H1, there was greater receptivity to the high threat message information 
at high (vs. low) levels of construal. Study two aimed to both replicate and extend 
these results. The design was similar to that of study one, but both the context (the 
message medium and its topic) and the construal level manipulation were altered in 
meaningful ways. The objective was to see whether the same pattern of results would 
hold with the introduction of these changes.  
With respect to the construal manipulation, in study two this was removed from 
the target message, and instead primed prior to message exposure, in an ostensibly 
unrelated exercise. As noted before, not all of one’s knowledge or related information 
is brought to bear in any given decision making or evaluation situation (Wyer and 
Adaval 2009). Rather, a subset of that knowledge is used - that which is most 
accessible in memory; either because frequency of use has made it chronically 
accessible in memory, or because it has been recently activated (ibid; cf. Bargh 1997; 
Wyer and Srull 1989). Thus, a person’s response to any given situation depends on the 
cognitions which are accessible to her at that point in time; and this accessibility, in 
turn, depends on the frequency and/or recency with which that cognition has been 
used. This means that even “objectively irrelevant experiences”, or experiences which 
have occurred outside of conscious awareness, can influence the accessibility of 
knowledge structures, and cause them to be used in making a judgment or evaluation 
(ibid, p. 25). 
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Priming “refers to the incidental activation of knowledge structures, such as trait 
concepts and stereotypes, by the current situational context” (Bargh et al. 1996, p. 
230). Any given construct is “linked in memory to a host of characteristics and 
behavioural tendencies”, and as such, independently of whether it is activated through 
“actual experience” or by “mere exposure to [related] cues”, the “same associated 
concepts and tendencies” will be activated (Smith and Trope 2006, p. 580). By using 
prompts to increase the accessibility of a particular construct or category in one’s 
memory, priming makes that construct more likely to be used. The effectiveness of 
such procedures has been shown in a variety of contexts, revealing “the capacity to 
automatically process stimuli to relatively deep levels of meaning”, and in the absence 
of conscious perception (Klinger et al. 2000, p. 442). 
Furthermore, priming allows any “issues of conscious awareness and intent” to be 
removed, and at the same time functions “in the same manner as actually 
experiencing” a concept (Smith and Trope 2006, p. 580). Bargh et al. (2001), for 
instance, show that “primed information processing goals produce the same outcomes 
as goals that have been activated by a conscious act of will” (p. 1015). Research has 
also shown primed levels of construal to lead to the same changes in processing, 
preferences and evaluations as when construal levels are altered within the message 
or in the experimental instructions (Fujita et al. 2006).  
It was therefore expected that this would hold in study two, and that a pattern of 
results similar to that of study one would emerge when construal level was primed, 
rather than manipulated in the message framing. Specifically, it was expected that 
there would be an interaction between threat to freedom and the primed level of 
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construal, and that participants would be more open to message information when 
primed with high (vs. low) levels of construal. Replicating the results of study one using 
a prime would extend those results by more clearly pointing to the role of construal 
level in causing the observed shifts in information receptivity. 
The second major change in study two was that of context - the target message 
referred to university level elections and was presented as an extract from an 
independent newspaper. This added to the findings of study one, in terms of the 
expectations held with regard to the message, and the test of construal level effects on 
reactance to high threat communications thus provided. Specifically, it is possible that 
the target message used in study one may have created an unusually high tolerance 
for the restriction imposed on readers’ freedom, by virtue of its topic and the format 
of the communication.  
Public service announcements, such as that used in study one, typically present a 
single acceptable course of action and frequently make use of strong and directive 
language. These characteristics may therefore have been perceived as routine and as 
less threatening than if they had appeared in a different context. Furthermore, 
participants may have considered such forcefulness more acceptable or even 
necessary, due to the message topic – that of moderating alcohol consumption – an 
issue potentially perceived as being for the “greater good”. Participants may therefore 
have understood the imposition on freedom as a “situational requirement” (Worchel 
and Andreoli 1974, p. 244), which has been shown to reduce the experience of 
reactance (ibid). 
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In study two, however, with a newspaper article on university level elections as the 
target message, there would have been neither an expectation of forcefulness, nor the 
perception that such forcefulness might be acceptable due to the topic at hand. In fact, 
in this respect, the study two message could be seen as lying at the other extreme of 
the continuum from that used in study one - forcefulness is not expected, considered 
justified or likely to be tolerated in a presumably impartial newspaper article. To the 
extent that this resulted in stronger reactance effects, it allowed study two to provide 
a stronger test of the impact of construal on openness to freedom threatening 
messages. 
The change in context in study two also more narrowly defined the type of threat 
under scrutiny. Specifically, interest in this research lay in threats to freedom of action 
or choice, and not threats to global self-integrity (Steele 1988; Sherman and Cohen 
2002). The target message in study one, however, in addition to the threat to freedom, 
contained health risk information related to the consequences of excessive alcohol 
consumption. As such, it is likely to have also imposed on participants’ perceptions of 
themselves as “healthy and adaptive” individuals (Sherman and Cohen 2002, p. 121); 
i.e. on a part of their self-integrity, their “perception of themselves as globally moral, 
adequate and efficacious” (Sherman et al. 2009, p. 745). 
In study two a restriction was placed on participants’ autonomy to decide on the 
relative merits of two candidates for themselves. Participants’ degree of freedom of 
choice was altered by either imposing the suitability of one candidate over another in 
the high threat condition, or not in the low threat condition; but the message 
contained no threats to self-integrity more generally. Thus, study two allowed for a 
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more clear delineation of construct boundaries, and narrower focus on threats to 
freedom.  
Study two also aimed to provide further insight as to the underlying mechanism to 
the observed relationship between level of construal and threat to freedom. It did so 
by trying to exclude an explanation based on desirability-feasibility focus (which could 
have been argued to underlie the results of study one); as well as by providing initial 
evidence for an explanation based on level of detail and persuasion knowledge use, 
through a measure of perceived message neutrality.  
One of the most well-established findings of the construal level literature pertains 
to the observed changes in emphasis between levels of construal. At high levels of 
construal, there tends to be a greater relative focus on higher order features, “primary, 
essential characteristics”, whereas at low levels of construal, greater weight is placed 
on lower order features, and “secondary, peripheral characteristics” as the “basis for 
evaluation” (Trope et al. 2007, p.83). For instance, desirability considerations outweigh 
feasibility concerns at high (vs. low) levels of construal, pros outweigh cons and central 
features are focused over peripheral ones (Trope and Liberman 2010).  
Thus, an argument based on these shifts in relative emphasis would be plausible 
for study one. The greater focus on the ultimate goal and the desirability of 
moderating alcohol consumption at high levels of construal would have made 
participants more open to the high threat message information in that condition. At 
low levels of construal, in contrast, greater weight would have been placed on 
feasibility issues, and the potentially difficult steps involved in achieving the goal of 
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moderating alcohol consumption, such that information receptivity would likely be 
lower. 
The context of study two, however, involved no feasibility or desirability issues, 
nor the consideration of pros vs. cons. The message did not require participants to 
change their behaviour, nor consider any particular course of action. It merely 
depicted an election scenario and the candidates within it. Therefore, if the same 
pattern of results from study one was to occur in study two, it would appear to rule 
out an explanation based on feasibility-desirability considerations. 
Finally, study two also included a new dependent measure, related to perceptions 
of message neutrality, as an initial indicator of a process explanation based on level of 
detail and persuasion knowledge use. It is possible that rather than increasing 
persuasion knowledge use as argued in the hypotheses, a higher level of construal 
directly changed participants’ attitudes with regard to threats to freedom; for instance, 
by making them more laid back with respect to manipulative tactics. If this was the 
case, then study two should display no differences in levels of perceived message 
neutrality between construal conditions.  
If there are shifts in persuasion knowledge use between construal conditions, 
however, this should be reflected in the levels of perceived of message neutrality. 
Specifically, message neutrality should be lower at low levels of construal, when more 
message details are considered and persuasion knowledge is activated; and greater at 
high levels of construal, when fewer message details are considered and persuasion 
knowledge remains inaccessible. Persuasion knowledge increases message scrutiny 
and makes both its one-sidedness, and the threat to freedom as a persuasion tactic, 
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more apparent than if persuasion knowledge is not being applied. The expectation was 
therefore of greater perceptions of high threat message neutrality at high (vs. low) 
levels of construal.  
5.1. Design and Participants  
Study two also followed a 2 (level of threat to freedom: high vs. low) X 2(construal 
level: high vs. low), between subjects design. Undergraduate students from the 
University of Sydney participated in exchange for either two course credit points, or a 
payment of up to $20. Those receiving course credit were recruited through a student 
subject pool, while those receiving payment volunteered in response to ads placed in 
the University computer labs.  
176 students participated, 91 women and the average respondent age was 22 (12 
participants failed to answer these questions). Data points from one session, 
composed of 10 participants, were discarded, because circumstances outside of the 
control of the researcher meant that the experimental environment could not be 
controlled with respect to noise levels and the avoidance of interruptions, which would 
have interfered negatively with the quality of the data. Four further participants were 
dropped from the analysis for failing to follow instructions. In addition, because the 
construal manipulation was highly dependent on language skills, participants were 
only included in the analyses if English was their first language. For 79 of the 
participants, it was not. 
Screening procedures were not used at the outset, because the aim was to collect 
as many data points as possible, in addition to interest in potential cultural differences 
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among respondents. In practice, however, it soon became apparent that due to its 
dependence on language skills, the manipulation used for priming construal level 
would not be effective for those whose first language was not English; as reflected in 
the high number of questions in the priming exercise left unanswered, as well the 
amount of time required to carry out the priming tasks, which in many cases for non-
native speakers exceeded that required for the main study.Finally, participants were 
screened with respect to their perceptions of how realistic the message was. This was 
deemed necessary in order to ensure the quality of the results, because of the context 
of study two. The target message in this study was presented as coming from a local 
newspaper, but it was not (in the high threat condition) unbiased, as newspaper 
articles presumably ought to be. If the message was not perceived as genuine, this 
could have affected receptivity to its content, independent of the effects of threat and 
construal level. The final sample was thus composed of 63 participants (32 female), 
with ages ranging from 18 to 38, and a mean age of 22. 
5.2. Target Message and Independent Variable Manipulations 
Study two used an electoral context, and participants were asked to imagine it was 
time to elect their University Student Union Board Director, at a particularly critical 
time due to proposed changes in the University’s fees and examinations systems. The 
target message was an ostensible newspaper article, describing the two main 
candidates to this position: James Smith and Richard Jones. It mentioned their age, 
degree, course average, experience and where they were born, all of which were 
broadly equivalent. For example, where one was studying mechanical engineering, the 
other was studying civil engineering (see fig 5.1). 
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"... While such elections would normally go unnoticed outside of student circles, the proposed 
changes to  Universities' fee and examinations systems have put this particular election, and its 
contenders, in the spotlight: 
Candidate 1 
Name:      James Smith 
Age:       21     
Born in:   South Australia 
Degree:    Mechanical Engineering 
Course average (thus far):   73 
Experience: gap year working as a team leader 
in a Non-Governmental Organisation 
 
Candidate 2 
Name:     Richard Jones 
Age:      22  
Born in:   Victoria 
Degree:    Civil Engineering 
Course average (thus far):   71 
Experience: President of the Engineering 
Undergraduate Association 
 
There is no doubt that both candidates have the background and experience required to be 
successful as Union President at this critical juncture in the University's history. 
Figure 5.1 - Example of Study Two Target Message (Low Threat Condition) 
 
The threat manipulation was contained within the message. Although the 
candidates were actually very similar, in the high threat to freedom condition, the 
article concluded stating that “there is no doubt that James Smith has the background 
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and experience required to be successful as Union President at this critical juncture in 
the University's history”. The low threat version indicated that “there is no doubt that 
both candidates have the background and experience required to be successful as 
Union President at this critical juncture in the University's history” (emphases added).  
It is worth noting that this was a rather subtle manipulation; for the sake of 
realism, subjects were not instructed to vote for one candidate or another, nor was the 
language used particularly forceful. However, given the support for reactance effects 
in the literature, it was hoped that even such a slight manipulation would be 
considered threatening enough to produce the desired effects. By making a strong 
statement in favour of one candidate over the other, the message was effectively 
hampering readers’ freedom to reach their own conclusions with regard to candidate 
suitability. In this regard, it has previously been proposed that “any directive phrase is 
a threat to the hearer’s freedom, being perceived as an external force that is meant to 
influence choice” (Kronrod et al. 2009). 
The construal level prime was taken from Fujita et al. (2006), studies 3a and 3b). 
Participants were given a list of 40 words, such as “king”, “pasta” and “soap”, and were 
asked to indicate either what group the words belonged to, i.e. their “super-ordinate 
category”; or to provide an example (indicate a “subordinate exemplar”) of each one. 
For instance: “King is an example of what?” for generating categories (high construal) 
vs. “An example of King is what?” for generating exemplars (low construal).  
The expectation was that generating super-ordinate categories, by directing 
people toward greater abstraction, would lead them to process at higher levels of 
construal; while producing exemplars meant thinking more concretely, in terms of 
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lower level subordinate categories, and so would trigger lower level representations. 
In the Fujita et al. (2006) studies, participants who generated category labels had 
significantly more abstract responses than those providing subordinate exemplars. 
5.3. Procedure and Dependent Variables 
Sessions were run in computer labs in groups of up to 12 participants, seated in 
front of individual computers. After viewing the information statement and signing the 
consent form, participants were asked to complete an ostensible unrelated “creative 
expression exercise”, pertaining to objects and their categories. This was carried out in 
paper and pencil and constituted the construal manipulation described above. Once 
they had completed the priming exercise, participants moved on to the second task, 
carried out on individual computers.  
This was presented as an “Impression Formation Study”, purportedly examining 
how people form impressions of others based on limited information. Participants 
were asked to read a short text, which briefly described two people – the candidates 
to the position of Student Union Board Director - and then answer some questions, 
regarding both the candidates and the text itself. None of the participants expressed 
suspicion of a link between the two tasks, nor indeed that there was any pattern to the 
first exercise, i.e. that it was a prime.  
The questions which followed the target message contained the main dependent 
variables, as well as the manipulation checks. The same measure of receptivity to 
message information was used as in study one, composed of four items relating to the 
credibility, trustworthiness, expertise and qualification of the message and its source 
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(α = .65). A measure of perceptions of message neutrality was also included, and was 
composed of three items gauging participants’ level of agreement on a seven point 
scale (where 1 = not at all and 7 = completely agree) with statements regarding the 
“accuracy”, “fairness” and “neutrality” of the message (α = .73). 
Finally, the manipulation check for threat was the same as in study one. 
Participants were asked to what extent they agreed that the message was “dogmatic”, 
“tried to manipulate” them, and “tried to pressure” them, on a seven point scale 
where 1 = not at all and 7 = completely agree (α = .74).  
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Manipulation Checks 
A one way ANOVA was carried out for threat to freedom, and the results 
confirmed that participants in the high threat condition perceived the message to be 
significantly more restrictive of their autonomy (M = 4.39) than those in the low threat 
condition (M = 2.38; diff = 2.01, F(1, 61) = 34,24; p < .001, ηp
2 = .36). 
5.4.2. Information Receptivity  
A full model (2 x 2) ANOVA was carried out for receptivity to message information. 
The results showed a significant interaction between threat to freedom and construal 
level (F(1, 59) = 7.12; p < .05, ηp
2 = .11)3. Furthermore, as predicted in H1, and 
                                                           
3
 Participants primed with low levels of construal were significantly more open to the information 
contained in the low (M = 4.20) vs. high threat message (M = 3.07; diff = 1.13, F(1, 59) = 15.90; p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .21); but this difference became non-significant (F(1, 59) = .03, p > .2) when participants were 
primed with a high level of construal (Mlt = 3.85 vs. Mht = 3.91; diff = .06). 
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consistent with the results of study one, there was also a significant effect of construal 
level on information receptivity in the high threat condition. Participants were 
significantly more receptive to the information contained in the high threat message 
when they were primed with a high (M = 3.91) rather than a low level of construal (M = 
3.07; diff = .84, F(1, 59) = 6.49; p < .05, ηp
2 = .01). The impact of construal level on the 
low threat condition was not significant (Mhc = 3.91 vs. Mlc = 4.2; diff = .29, F (1, 59) 
=1.35; p > .2). Finally, the results also showed a main effect of threat, such that 
participants were more receptive to the information contained in the low (M = 4.1) vs. 
high (M = 3.5) threat message (F(1, 59) = 5.85; p < .05, ηp
2 = .09) (see appendix five for 
table of ANOVA results). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Study Two Estimated Marginal Means of Receptivity to Message 
Information 
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5.4.3. Message Neutrality 
A full model (2 X 2) ANOVA was also run for message neutrality. This revealed a 
marginally significant interaction between construal level and threat to freedom (F(1, 
59) = 3.27, p = .076, ηp
2 = .05), parallel to the interaction found for information 
receptivity. As expected, participants perceived the high threat message to be more 
neutral (i.e. less biased) at high levels of construal (M = 3.52) than at low levels of 
construal (M = 2.70; diff = .82, F(1, 59) = 3.24; p = .077, ηp
2 = .06). Although marginal, 
this result is supportive of greater persuasion knowledge use at low (vs. high) levels of 
construal.  
There was no significant impact of construal level (Mhc = 4.47 vs. Mlc = 4.75; diff = 
.28, F(1, 59) = .50, p > .2); but there was a predictable main effect of threat to freedom, 
such that the low threat message (M = 4.61) was perceived as significantly more 
neutral than its high threat (M = 3.11) counterpart (diff = 1.5, F(1, 59) = 24.41, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .29) (see appendix six for table of ANOVA results). 
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Figure 5.3 –Study Two Estimated Marginal Means of Message Neutrality 
 
5.5. Discussion 
5.5.1. Receptivity to Message Information 
Study two replicated the main outcomes of study one. Construal level interacted 
with threat to freedom to influence openness to message information, and in further 
support of hypothesis H1, participants showed greater receptivity to the high threat 
message information at high (vs. low) levels of construal. This is once more suggestive 
of an ameliorating effect of level of construal on reactance to freedom threatening 
messages.  
Faced with restrictions on their freedom, consumers become motivated to reduce 
the resulting feelings of arousal, and restore the threatened freedom (Brehm 1966). 
When the threat appears in a persuasive message in particular, an easy way to proceed 
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with this restoration is to close oneself off from the message content. In study two, 
however, as in study one, participants apparently felt less need to do so at high (v. low) 
levels of construal, whether this was achieved via message framing or through non-
conscious priming. This was reflected in the higher levels of information receptivity for 
the high threat message at high (vs. low) levels of construal. 
In addition to replicating the pattern of results from study one, further supporting 
the existence of a relationship between threats to freedom and level of construal, 
study two also more clearly defined the boundaries of this interaction. Specifically, 
study two used a threat which imposed solely on participants’ freedom, and so 
clarified the nature of the threats under analysis – those impacting on freedom of 
action or choice, rather than on readers’ sense of self-integrity more generally. In 
addition, using a construal level prime provided further evidence that this variable was 
indeed at the root of the observed changes in openness to high threat message 
information.  
5.5.2. Underlying mechanism 
Study two also provided further insight into how construal level impacts on 
receptivity to high threat message information – its design aimed to rule out an 
explanation (that based on desirability-feasibility focus) and provide initial evidence for 
another (that based on the role of persuasion knowledge). Contrary to study one, 
where the target message asked participants to consider a particular course of action, 
and implied behavioural changes (in the amount of alcohol consumed), study two did 
not entail any consequences for participants’ behaviour. As such, whereas in study one 
participants would have considered the desirability and feasibility issues involved in 
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changing their behaviour, in study two, there were no such concerns. The fact that the 
same pattern of results was replicated in the absence of desirability-feasibility (or pro-
con) concerns suggests that this cannot, therefore, constitute the process whereby 
level of construal affects consumers’ openness to high threat message information.  
In addition to clarifying the role of desirability-feasibility concerns, study two also 
provided initial evidence regarding the potential influence of persuasion knowledge in 
the relationship between threats to freedom and levels of construal. Specifically, study 
two revealed significant differences in perceptions of message neutrality between 
construal conditions: participants rated the same high threat message as more neutral 
when they were primed with high (vs. low) levels of construal. This pattern is 
consistent with the notion that the message was being considered in greater detail, 
and its characteristics more carefully scrutinised, at low levels of construal - leading its 
persuasion tactics and one-sidedness to be recognised and “called out”.  
A competing perspective would be to consider the differences in information 
receptivity as a reflection of a generally more “laid back” or careless attitude at high 
(vs. low) levels of construal. However, had that been the case, we would not expect to 
see changes in perceived message neutrality – effects driven by such changes in 
attitude should be reflected directly on information openness, without implying 
greater levels of message scrutiny or attention to its detail and persuasion tactics; i.e. 
without being reflected in perceptions of message neutrality.  
When a consumer accesses persuasion knowledge, on the other hand, because she 
is considering the message at a greater level of detail, she is also more likely to focus 
on its lack of neutrality and to report this fact. Indeed, one-sided communication has 
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been noted as a particularly strong source of reactance, especially when consumers 
“expect to hear both sides of an issue” (Clee and Wicklund 1980, p. 401). A consumer 
who does not access persuasion knowledge, due to high construal processing and so 
consideration of fewer message details, by contrast, might overlook the lack of 
neutrality of high threat messages. 
The results for the measure of message neutrality support this view; in particular 
since the differences in perceptions of neutrality across construal conditions occur for 
the high (but not the low) threat message. In the absence of a threat to freedom, there 
is no trigger for persuasion knowledge use, and issues of message neutrality are less 
likely to be noticed or reported. On the other hand, if the shifts in information 
openness had stemmed from general attitudinal differences between levels of 
construal, this should have been manifest for both levels of threat.  
5.5.3. The Low Threat Message 
As noted above, the impact of construal level on the low threat message did not 
reach significance, for either perceptions of message neutrality or openness to 
message information. This is consistent with both prediction and the findings of study 
one, and lends support to a perspective of the interaction between level of construal 
and threat to freedom based on differences in the considerations of details and 
persuasion knowledge use. The impact of construal level appears to be at the level of 
the motivation to restore threatened freedoms, such that absent a restriction on 
freedom, there are no differences in information receptivity, or perceived message 
neutrality, between levels of construal. 
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The results of study two are also suggestive of an important role of context in the 
occurrence of reactance effects. This study used a newspaper context, in which a 
threat to freedom would clearly fall outside of normal consumer routines (Briley et al. 
2011), making persuasive intent more salient and leading consumers to question the 
fairness and manipulative intent of the message (Friestad and Wright 1994). As a 
result, it also produced significant differences in levels of information receptivity and 
perceived message neutrality between threat conditions despite using a relatively 
subtle manipulation of this variable.  
The fact that participants were both more open to the information contained in 
the low, rather than the high, threat message, and perceived it to be more neutral is 
consistent with reactance theory and attests to the ease with which such effects can 
be aroused. The high threat message in study two neither gave participants a direct 
order, nor used forceful language. Nonetheless, by merely removing from them the 
opportunity to reach their own conclusions with regard to the relative merits of the 
two candidates, it produced significant changes in perceptions. 
Study three returned to a public service announcement type message, albeit with 
a stronger manipulations of threat, and a considerably less well publicised topic (coffee 
consumption – also used in Liberman and Chaiken 1992 and Sherman et al. 2000). 
More importantly, it aimed to more directly test for level of detail as the underlying 
mechanism for the influence of construal level on information receptiveness.  
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6. Study Three 
The results of the first two studies provided a consistent pattern of results, 
whereby participants were more receptive to the information contained in freedom 
threatening messages at high (vs. low) levels of construal. This established the basic 
effect, and suggests consumers’ feelings of reactance to freedom limiting persuasive 
messages can be mitigated by the level of construal at which they process such 
messages, such that doing so at high levels of construal makes them more open to 
message information. This is an important pre-requisite for the achievement of other 
message objectives, such as attitudinal or behavioural changes. 
The main objective of study three, however, was to examine how this effect was 
taking place; specifically, to test for the role of detail level, and associated use of 
persuasion knowledge, as its underlying mechanisms. Alternative explanations based 
on desirability-feasibility (study two), or on the perceived personal relevance of the 
message information (study one) failed to find support in the preceding studies. In 
addition, study two presented initial evidence of greater persuasion knowledge use at 
low (vs. high) levels of construal, reflected in lower perceptions of message neutrality 
in that condition. Study three thus proposed to not only once more replicate the main 
pattern of results – i.e. an interaction between level of construal and threat to 
freedom, and a greater receptivity to high threat message information at high (vs. low) 
levels of construal - but also provide a test of level of detail as the mechanism 
underlying that result.  
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With regard to detail, it is important to note that although fewer details are 
considered at high (vs. low) levels of construal, this greater abstraction does not imply 
less thorough or detailed processing of the information (Smith and Trope 2006). The 
distinction is not “about stages of perception”, but rather about the “perceptual 
analysis of whatever is attended to (Navon, 1977, p. 355)” (Smith and Trope 2006, p. 
580). Indeed, extracting the gist of something can sometimes be “even more effortful 
than simply absorbing the details” (ibid, p. 580). Nonetheless, the fact remains that 
lower level construals do include more details, and are typically more contextualised 
than their schematic, high construal counterparts (Fujita et al. 2006). 
Indeed, as one moves toward higher levels of construal or abstraction, certain 
object or event features get left out; namely those details which are considered 
irrelevant or “inconsistent with the chosen abstract representation”, and which are 
either omitted from, or assimilated into, the chosen representation (Liberman et al. 
2002, p. 524). Thus, “for example, in replacing ‘waving the hand’ with the more 
abstract construal ‘showing friendliness,’ the fact that one used one’s hand is omitted 
(Semin & Fiedler, 1988)” (ibid). 
These differences in detail level are not without consequence. They explain the 
differences between predicted and actual moods at different times of the day or days 
of the week described in the literature review, for instance. Because “events on the 
immediate horizon are conceived in terms of specific details and the ease of 
implementation”, one’s actual mood on a Monday morning, for example, may be 
driven by such details (e.g. “an email containing good news”), and so greatly surpass 
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the mood predicted for that day when considering “the prospect of returning to work” 
(Areni and Burger 2010, p. 5). 
Kardes, Cronley, and Kim (2006) note the impact of these differences in contextual 
details on product representations and evaluations; in particular with respect to 
whether or not products are physically present. When they are, “lower-level construals 
containing greater contextual details and greater imagination-provoking properties are 
formed”; whereas when products are absent, it is difficult to imagine their use, and 
“product evaluation is likely to be difficult and susceptible to measurement effects” 
(Kardes et al. 2006, p. 138). 
In the context of persuasive messages, the difference in levels of detail is likely to 
be reflected in the number and kinds of message characteristics noted and considered 
when evaluating the message. Low level, more detailed representations will tend to 
include a greater number of message features, including more peripheral aspects; 
whereas high level representations will omit or subsume certain details, focusing more 
on the message’s central characteristics. Thus, at high levels of construal, the emphasis 
is likely to be on the message content and what it is trying to communicate; while at 
low levels of construal, additional aspects, such as the tone of the message, its format, 
or contextual details regarding who it was written by and for what reason, might also 
be considered.  
Such considerations, in turn, can be expected to impact on the level of persuasion 
knowledge used, because there is more elaboration on the message – its 
“appropriateness (fairness, manipulativeness, respectfulness)” (Friestad and Wright 
1994, p. 14) – as well as on it source and the ulterior motives behind it – “the 
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appropriateness of an agent’s actions” (ibid, p. 5). When the message contains a threat 
to freedom, a low level of construal and so greater consideration of detail, is also likely 
to increase the salience of that threat. The threat becomes more likely to be noticed 
and considered, and as such is more likely to serve as a cue to persuasion knowledge 
use. This is the more so, the more ‘out of place’ and disruptive of routine the threat 
appears (Briley et al. 2011).  
At high levels of construal, in contrast, because fewer message details are 
considered, it is less likely that the threat to freedom will be noted and taken into 
account. Because it is less salient, the threat is also less likely to activate persuasion 
knowledge, or lead consumers to reflect on the fairness/appropriateness of the 
persuasive techniques used. As a result, it is also less probable that it will lead to 
feelings of reactance and the associated need to restore the threatened freedom. The 
greater use of persuasion knowledge at low levels of detail, on the other hand, is 
expected to lead consumers’ to “raise their guard”, and reduce information receptivity. 
Persuasion knowledge, in this latter case, leads to a “change of meaning”, significantly 
affecting the manner in which events are interpreted and responded to (Friestad and 
Wright 1994).  
6.1. Design and Participants 
In order to test for the role of detail level, study three aimed to replicate the 
results of study one using a similar design, but substituting level of detail for level of 
construal. The study thus followed a two (threat level: high vs. low) by two (detail 
level: high vs. low) between subjects design. Presumably, if detail level underlies the 
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observed effect of construal level on information openness, directly manipulating this 
variable should affect receptivity in the same way that manipulating construal level 
does. This form of “determining the underlying psychological process” has been 
argued to be “as reliable as using the statistical mediation analysis” (Rim et al. 2009; cf. 
Spencer et al. 2005).  
Seventy-two undergraduate students from the University of Sydney participated in 
the study, in exchange for either course credit (two credit points), if they were 
recruited through the participant pool, or a payment of $15, if they were answering 
ads. Ten participants were excluded from the main analysis - eight because they 
expressed suspicion about the purpose of the study, its relation to directive messages 
in particular; one because she suspected a link between the two parts of the study; 
and one because she was much younger than the group average (16) and not yet 
enrolled in the University. This left a total of 62 participants, of which 38 were female. 
Ages ranged from 18 to 38, and the average age was 21.5.  
6.2. Target Message and Independent Variable Manipulations 
The target message was introduced as a Public Service Announcement, and related 
to the potential negative effects of excessive coffee consumption on mental health. 
Coffee related health messages have been used in past research (Liberman and 
Chaiken 1992; Sherman et al. 2000), in which participants were presented with articles 
linking coffee consumption to breast cancer/fibrocystic disease. Because such 
information would only be relevant, and so reactance producing, for coffee drinking 
women, the message was adapted to refer to more wide reaching consequences of 
excessive coffee consumption. 
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It was reasoned that a coffee related message would be relevant to most 
participants, but constitute a less familiar topic than the alcohol consumption message 
of study one. At the same type, it allowed a return to a Public Service type message 
format. The information presented was taken from various websites regarding the 
possible consequences of excessive coffee consumption, but did not quantify what 
“excessive” means, so as not to reduce relevance to participants4. 
The threat manipulation was included in the message, through its concluding 
statement. After stating the potential negative consequences of excessive caffeine 
consumption, the high threat condition message told participants to “preserve your 
mental health: don’t drink coffee”; whereas the low threat message stated that “in the 
interests of your health, you may want to moderate your coffee intake”.  
                                                           
4 Gilliland and Bullock (1984) note the difficulty of determining “exactly what level of caffeine 
consumption constitutes abuse”; in particular due to the “wide individual variation in response 
to caffeine” (p. 54). Notwithstanding, “in general, an intake of 500 to 600 mg of caffeine per 
day (approximately 7 to 9 cups of tea or 4 to 7 cups of coffee) is regarded as representing a 
significant health risk” (James and Stirling 1983, p. 251). 
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Figure 6.1 -   Example of Study Three Target Message (High Threat Condition) 
 
 
Coffee is a drug 
 
 
 
 
 
As a small, lipid-soluble molecule (like alcohol and nicotine), caffeine is one of the few 
substances capable of penetrating the blood-brain barrier, critical to maintaining cerebral 
homeostasis.  
 
 
Nearly 80% of the world's population uses caffeine, and 25% of the population is diagnosed 
with a mental disorder. Clinical studies indicate that there may be significant overlap between 
those figures. 
 
 
• A significant number of people over-ingest coffee and suffer the physical 
and/or psychological effects of caffeine poisoning 
• People experience intensified stress and psychotic experiences due to 
excessive caffeine consumption. 
• People increase their risk of experiencing hallucinations as well other 
psychoses such as delirium, manic depression, schizophrenia, or anxiety 
syndrome by consuming too much caffeine 
 
 
 
Because self-awareness is one of the first casualties of a toxic brain, caffeinism victims may not 
even suspect they are ill or (if they do) that caffeine is at the root of their symptoms. 
 
Preserve your mental health: don’t drink coffee! 
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Detail level was manipulated in the instructions, following a procedure similar to 
that used in Briley and Aaker (2006). Although participants were all given the same 
amount of time to read the message (one and a half minutes), the instructions 
manipulated the amount of time pressure and consequently the thoroughness with 
which they did so. Participants in the high detail condition were told that most people 
take one minute to read the message and come to a clear evaluation, and thus were 
led to believe that they had plenty of time to read the message. They were also asked 
to read the message “as carefully and in as much detail” as they could. Those in the 
low detail condition, on the other hand, were told that most people take two minutes 
to read and evaluate the message, and thus were led to believe they would have little 
time to do so. They were instructed to get “an overall picture” of the message 
contents. In both conditions, the instructions included the pretext that the study was 
interested in understanding how people evaluate messages in real life, day to day 
situations.  
6.3. Procedure and Dependent Variables 
The sessions were run in computer labs in groups of up to ten. After participants’ 
had read the information statements and signed the consent forms, the purported aim 
of the research was explained: to collect university students’ impressions on different 
topical issues, as well as how interesting and relevant they found them to be. 
Participants were led to believe that target messages covered a range of different 
topics, of which they would be randomly assigned one; although in fact all received the 
target message in either its low or high threat format. Participants were then asked 
whether, since they were there, they would also be willing to fill in a separate survey 
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on drinks and brand of drink preferences. All the participants agreed to do so, with 
only one suspecting a link between the two studies (as noted above, this participant 
was excluded from the analyses). Embedded in this second questionnaire were 
questions regarding participants’ typical coffee consumption, and liking of coffee. 
Once the studies had been explained, participants were then given the 
experimental booklet, the cover page of which contained the instructions and detail 
manipulation. Once the experimenter had ensured everyone had read the instructions, 
participants were told they could turn the page to the target message. They were given 
a minute and a half to read the message, which proved sufficient for all the 
participants to do so, and then proceeded to answer questions relating to the 
dependent variables, and manipulation checks. Once they had completed the first 
questionnaire, they were then given the second survey, which contained the coffee 
consumption related questions. 
As per studies one and two, information receptivity constituted the main 
dependent variable, and was composed of the same four items relating to the 
“credibility” of the message, its “trustworthiness”, the “expertise” of its source and 
how “qualified” that source appeared to be. All the items were measured on a seven 
point likert scale, ranging from 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “completely agree” (α = 81).  
Additionally, a measure of persuasion knowledge use was also included in study 
three. This contained items from both the persuasion knowledge scale, which tries to 
tap into individual differences in levels of persuasion knowledge (Bearden et al. 2001); 
and items from the Obermiller and Spangenberg (1998) scale, which measures 
attitudes and scepticism toward advertising - a manifestation of persuasion knowledge 
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use - in particular. All the items were measured on a five point scale, where 1 = 
strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. They were: “Advertising is generally truthful”, 
“Advertising is a reliable source of information about the quality and performance of 
products”, “I know when an offer is ‘too good to be true’”, and “I have no trouble 
understanding the sales tactics used by salespeople” (α = .56).  
The expectation was that for the high threat message, persuasion knowledge use 
would be significantly greater at high (vs. low) levels of detail. For the low threat 
message, no difference was expected between detail conditions, because in the 
absence of a threat to freedom, there would be no salient cue of persuasion 
knowledge, nor a disruption of routine, to increase the use of these knowledge 
structures.  
After these measures had been taken, participants also responded to checks on 
the manipulations used. The manipulation check for threat to freedom was the same 
as in the first two studies, and gauged participants’ perceptions of how “dogmatic”, 
“manipulative” and “pressuring” the message was on a 7 point scale (where 1 = not at 
all and 7 = completely agree; α = .65). 
The detail manipulation check consisted of four items pertaining to both the detail 
in which participants considered the message and the extent to which they felt “close” 
to the message (α = .69). The measure of closeness was deemed important due to the 
link between levels of detail and levels of construal, and the association of this 
measure with perceived distances from the self. As construal level increases - and so 
fewer message details are considered – so does the perceived distance from an 
attitude object.  
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Participants were asked to indicate on a scale of one to five (where 1 = strongly 
disagree and 5 = strongly agree) the degree to which they considered the message in 
“as much detail” as they could, tried solely to get “an overall idea” of the message 
(reverse coded), felt that the message was close to them, and considered that it 
contained recommendations for the immediate future. 
Once they had completed the first questionnaire, participants moved on to the 
second one on drinks and brands of drinks, in which were included questions regarding 
coffee consumption and liking. Participants were asked whether they typically 
consume coffee (“yes” or “no”); and to indicate on a seven point scale how much they 
like this beverage (where 1 = not at all and 7 = like it a lot). 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Manipulation Checks 
The data confirmed that the high threat message (M = 4.56) was perceived as 
marginally more freedom limiting than the low threat message (M = 4.01; diff = .55, 
F(1,60) = 3.31; p = .07, ηp
2 = .05); and in concordance with reactance theory, the 
effects became more pronounced when only high involvement participants, i.e. those 
who stated they typically drink coffee, were considered (F(1, 31) = 6.19; p < .05, ηp
2 = 
.17).  
This is also consistent with the literature pertaining to threats to self integrity, and 
the defensiveness that results therefrom (e.g. Sherman and Cohen 2006). In the health 
domain, for instance, it has been found that greater message relevance to the self 
leads to greater message scrutiny (Kunda 1987), such that “individuals who have the 
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most to gain from health communications are often the least likely to accept them” 
(Sherman and Cohen 2002, p. 120). It is worth noting that defensive reactions in 
general can be adaptive, “in the sense of protecting or enhancing an individual’s self-
integrity” (Sherman and Cohen 2006, p. 184). The problem arises, however, when they 
become “maladaptive” and “forestall learning from important, though threatening, 
experiences and information” (ibid. p. 184-5). 
There was also a marginally significant effect of threat on coffee liking: coffee 
drinking participants who read the high threat message said they liked coffee more 
(marginal significance) than those who received the low threat version (Mht = 5.94 vs. 
Mlt = 5.25, diff = .69 F(1, 31) = 3.22; p = .08, ηp
2 = .09). Although this was not a 
manipulation check per se, the pattern suggests that the manipulation was indeed 
effective. It is also consistent with reactance theory, to the extent that the high 
involvement participants who saw their freedom reduced displayed a sort of 
boomerang effect in their reported liking of coffee, which was higher in the high (vs. 
low) threat condition.. 
With regard to the manipulation check for level of detail, the results showed a 
marginally significant effect, such that that those in the high detail condition 
considered the message in greater detail,  felt that it was closer to them and was for 
more immediate consideration (M = 3.41) than those in the low detail condition (M = 
3.07; diff = .34, F(1, 31 = 3.15; p = .09, ηp
2 = .09). It seems likely that the detail 
manipulation check could not pick up the full impact of the shift in consideration of 
details across conditions, however, because participants would not have been 
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completely aware of the influence of the manipulation, which was subtle, on their level 
of processing. 
6.4.2. Information Receptivity 
A full model (2 X 2) ANOVA was run for information receptivity, and revealed a 
significant interaction between detail level and threat to freedom (F(1, 58) = 5.52; p < 
.05, ηp
2 = .09)5. There was also the anticipated significant effect of detail level for the 
high threat condition: participants were more receptive to the message information 
when asked to consider the high threat message at low (M = 4.49) rather than high (M 
= 3.69) levels of detail (diff = .8, F (1, 58) = 3.94; p = .05, ηp
2 = .06). The effect of detail 
level on the low threat message did not reach significance (Mhd = 4.31 vs. Mld = 3.69; 
diff = .62, F(1, 58) = 1.9, p > .1), nor were there any main effects of either threat (F(1, 
58) = .94, p > .2) or detail (F(1, 58) = .94, p > .2) (see appendix seven for table of 
ANOVA results) 
It is worth noting that to the extent that high levels of construal are associated 
with more schematic and less detailed representations, and low level construals with 
more contextualised and detail-rich representations, these results constitute a 
replication of the pattern found in studies one and two.  
 
                                                           
5
 At high levels of detail, participants were more receptive to the low (4.31) vs. high threat (M = 3.69) 
message information (F(1, 58) = 1.89; p > .1, ns), but this pattern was reversed (marginal significance) 
when the message was considered at low levels of detail (Mlt = 3.69 vs. Mht = 4.49; F(1, 58) = 3.94; p = 
.05, ηp
2
 = .06). 
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Figure 6.2 – Study Three Estimated Marginal Means of Receptivity to Message 
Information 
 
6.4.3. Persuasion Knowledge Use 
A full model (2 X 2) ANOVA was also carried out for persuasion knowledge use. 
There was a marginally significant two-way interaction between threat to freedom and 
level of detail (F(1, 58) = 2.72; p = .10, ηp
2 = .05), and the overall pattern paralleled that 
found for information receptivity6. More important, there was a marginally significant 
effect of detail level for the high threat message condition. Participants presented with 
the high threat message made greater use of persuasion knowledge in the high (vs. 
low) detail condition (Mhd = 3.92 vs. Mld = 3.50; diff = .42, F(1, 58) = 3.35; p = .07, ηp
2 = 
                                                           
6
 Processing at low levels of detail led to greater persuasion knowledge use in the low (M = 3.81) vs. high 
threat condition (M = 3.50; diff = .31, F (1, 58) = 1.84; p > .1, ns); but when participants were considering 
the message high levels of detail, there was a greater use of persuasion knowledge associated with the 
high threat (vs. the low threat) message (Mht = 3.92 vs. Mlt = 3.68; diff = .24, F (1, 58) = .99 ; p > .2, ns). 
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.05). As expected, there was no effect of detail level for the low threat message (Mhd = 
3.67 vs. Mld = 3.81; diff = .14, F(1, 58) = .324, p > .2, nor any main effects of threat to 
freedom (F(1, 58) = .028, p > .2) or level of detail (F(1, 58) = .642, p > .2) (see appendix 
eight for table of ANOVA results).  
 
 
Figure 6.3 – Study Three Estimated Marginal Means of Persuasion Knowledge Use 
 
6.5. Discussion 
6.5.1. Receptivity to Message Information 
In order to test the proposition that the greater receptivity to high threat message 
information at high (vs. low) levels of construal was being driven by the different levels 
of detail associated with each level of construal, study three aimed to replicate the 
pattern of results from the first two studies using detail level rather than construal. 
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Thus, the expectation was that there would be greater receptivity to the high threat 
message information at low levels of detail (high construal) than at high levels of detail 
(low construal). 
This was indeed the case. Consistent with hypothesis H2, when participants in high 
threat conditions perceived that they had limited time to read the high threat 
message, and aimed only to get an overall perspective of its contents, receptivity to 
the message information increased. When they believed they had more time and 
considered the message in greater detail, on the other hand, they became less 
receptive to its informational content. Given the association between levels of 
construal and detail, this result replicated the pattern from the first two studies, 
whereby participants were more open to information contained in a high threat to 
freedom message at high (vs. low) levels of construal. It also suggests that that 
interaction between construal level and threats to freedom was indeed driven by the 
level of detail at which the message was considered at different levels of construal. 
6.5.2. Persuasion knowledge use 
The impact of level of detail on information receptivity had been proposed to 
result from the differences in persuasion knowledge use at high (vs. low) levels of 
detail. Specifically, at high levels of detail more message features are considered, 
including less central elements such as the persuasion tactic used. Furthermore, in 
such conditions (high detail/low construal), there is a greater perception of objects as 
“unique and specific” (Fujita et al. 2006). As a result, a threat to freedom is not only 
more likely to be noticed when participants are considering the message at high levels 
of detail, but will also tend to appear more distinctive and personally directed. With 
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the threat to freedom assuming such a salient and routine disrupting form, persuasion 
knowledge is more likely to be activated and used.  
At low levels of detail, on the other hand, fewer message features are considered; 
and as such, characteristics such as the persuasion tactics used or the threat to 
freedom, are less likely to be noticed and taken into account. With the focus on 
message content, then, the threat to freedom is expected to be less salient and less 
likely to serve as a cue to persuasion knowledge use. Thus, it had been anticipated (H3) 
that persuasion knowledge use would be higher when participants considered the high 
threat message at high vs. low levels of detail.  
The results provided some support for this proposition. There was a marginally 
significant effect of detail level on persuasion knowledge use in study three, such that 
the use of these knowledge structures was greater at high (vs. low) levels of detail. This 
pattern furthermore corresponded to the reduced receptivity to information at low 
(vs. high) levels of detail described above. Plausibly, making greater use of one’s 
persuasion knowledge led to a greater scrutiny of the message, consideration of its 
ulterior motives, and a general raising of one’s guard; which in turn, was manifest in 
reactance effects – a need to restore the threatened freedom by closing oneself off 
from the message information. 
This argument dovetails on previous research findings, for instance, relating to 
memory and attitudes towards product placements in television programs. Russell 
(2002) showed that while memory for a product placement improved when the 
modality of that placement (whether it was visual or auditory) was incongruent with 
the plot connection (“the degree to which the brand is integrated in the plot of the 
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story (Russell 1998)” - Russell 2002, p. 307); persuasion was enhanced when these 
features were congruent. This was because incongruent placements appeared 
“unnatural” and were “therefore discounted” (Russell 2002, p. 313). 
Critically in terms of the current research, the author attributed this discounting to 
higher levels of persuasion knowledge use. “When a brand’s modality of presentation 
is not congruent with its level of plot connection, viewers tend to think about the 
reason for the brand’s presence in the show and raise their cognitive defenses 
(Friestad and Wright 1995). For instance, in the case of higher plot visual placements, 
an expectedly peripheral stimulus becomes a focal point of attention and the obvious 
focus on it makes it seem obtrusive and prompts counter argumentation. In contrast, 
when the modality and plot connection match, the placement seems more natural and 
less effort is spent on analysing why it is there, thereby making access to persuasion 
knowledge less likely (Campbell and Kirmani 2000)” (Russell 2002, p. 314). 
The argument made here with regard to the impact of detail on the extent of 
persuasion knowledge use, and the resulting level of reactance experienced, parallels 
that described above. At high levels of detail, the emphasis on the threat to freedom 
played the same role as modality-plot incongruence in the research described above: it 
activated persuasion knowledge, and raised participants’ “cognitive defenses” (Russell 
2002, p. 314), such that they experienced higher levels of reactance, reflected in a 
lower openness to message information. At low levels of detail, in contrast, as in the 
case of congruence, less energy was spent trying to analyse why the threat was there, 
and “access to persuasion knowledge” became “less likely” (ibid, p. 314). 
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6.5.3. The Low Threat Message 
According to the argument presented, the differences in persuasion knowledge 
use for the high threat message at high (vs. low) levels of detail were bound to 
attention to the threat to freedom and its ability to activate persuasion knowledge and 
so raise participants’ guard. If this was indeed the case, then absent a threat to 
freedom to serve as a cue, persuasion knowledge would be less likely to be activated 
and used; and should not vary according to the level of message detail considered. 
Lending further support to the explanation presented above, the results conform: the 
impact of level of detail on persuasion knowledge use in the low threat condition was 
non-significant; as was its impact on information receptivity in that condition.  
Absent a threat to freedom, there was little room for either persuasion knowledge 
use, or reactance effects, which would have been reflected in lower information 
receptivity. Indeed, absent a threat to freedom one might even expect greater 
persuasion knowledge use, and lower information receptivity at low (rather than high) 
levels of detail, since the message is being more closely considered and may be 
perceived as closer to the self. While not reaching significance, the results for the low 
threat message do reveal this pattern, for both persuasion knowledge use and 
information receptivity. 
Finally, it is worth noting that despite the effectiveness of the threat manipulation 
in creating greater perceptions of pressure and manipulation, similar to study one, 
there were no main effects of threat in study three. This lends support to the notion 
that reactance effects in part depend on context, such that impositions on freedom are 
more readily accepted in certain contexts – for instance Public Service Announcements 
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– than others. Presumably, in such contexts, the threat to freedom is partly attributed 
to “environmental reasons” (Worchel and Andreoli 1974), and as such produces less 
feelings of reactance. 
The next section reviews and integrates the findings of the three studies, and 
considers their implications for both theory and practice. 
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7. General Discussion 
The focus of this research was on persuasive communications which rather than 
enhancing, restrict consumers’ freedom. Specifically, the aim was to examine how 
threats to freedom, and the ensuing reactance effects they produce, relate to 
consumers’ perceived distance from those threats, i.e. the level of construal at which 
they process the freedom threatening message.  
7.1. Main findings 
Across three studies, the results showed an interactive relationship between 
threat to freedom and level of construal. This held when construal level was 
manipulated in the message framing (study one), when it was non-consciously primed 
prior to exposure to the target message (study two), as well when level of detail, 
rather than construal per se, was manipulated (study three). The interaction was 
reflected in the levels of reactance experienced by participants, as measured by the 
extent to which they were open to the message information.  
Given the arousal which results from restrictions to freedom, and the concomitant 
motivation to restore one’s threatened autonomy, openness to message information 
should vary inversely to the intensity of that motivation – i.e. the greater (lower) the 
reactance experienced, the lower (greater) consumers’ receptivity to message 
information. Information receptivity constituted an important measure of reactance, 
both because it is an easy way to regain a sense of control, and due to its role as a 
precursor to other effects – such as attitudinal or behavioural changes - with regard to 
the message topic. 
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The results also displayed a consistent effect of level of construal on receptivity to 
information contained in the high threat message. Participants were more receptive to 
the information contained in a freedom restricting persuasive message when the 
message was framed at a high (vs. low) level of construal (study one), when they were 
primed with a high (vs. low) level of construal, and when they were directed to 
consider the message at low (vs. high) levels of detail. Hypotheses H1 and H3, which 
predicted this relationship between level of construal and threat to freedom and level 
of detail and threat to freedom, were thus supported by the results. 
7.2. Process 
The results of the three studies also shed light as to the process whereby construal 
level impacted on information receptivity, and were supportive of an explanation 
based on the level of message detail considered, and its associated use of persuasion 
knowledge. In study two participants perceived the high threat message as more 
neutral when they were primed with a high (vs. low) level of construal. This suggests a 
lower use of persuasion knowledge in that condition, since when such knowledge 
structures are used, message bias is more likely to be noticed and reported. 
Study three further demonstrated that the pattern of interaction between threat 
to freedom and level of construal could be replicated with level of detail. Moreover, 
the impact of detail level on the high threat message paralleled that of construal - 
participants were more open to information when they considered the message in less 
(rather than more) detail. This was indicative that the differences in information 
receptivity between levels of construal stemmed from the greater number of details 
associated to with high (vs. low) level representations. Furthermore, there was also a 
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difference between levels of detail in the extent to which persuasion knowledge was 
used. Specifically, higher levels of detail (low construal) were associated with greater 
persuasion knowledge use and lower information receptivity; while persuasion 
knowledge use was lower at low levels of detail (high construal), when information 
receptivity was higher. 
According to this argument, then, threats to freedom can serve as an important 
cue to persuasion knowledge use. They are not only susceptible to creating automatic 
reactance effects, but can intensify these feelings of resistance by activating 
persuasion knowledge, and leading consumers to consider the persuasion tactics used, 
the authors’ ulterior motives, and the overall appropriateness of the persuasive 
attempt. Low level representations incorporate more message details, such that the 
threat is more likely to be noticed, taken into consideration, and serve as a cue to 
persuasion knowledge use. At high levels of construal, in contrast, fewer message 
details are considered, including the threat to freedom, which then becomes less likely 
to trigger persuasion knowledge use. 
Not only were the study results supportive of this proposition, but they failed to 
support alternative explanations based on feasibility-desirability considerations (study 
two), or the closeness and perceived personal relevance of the freedom threatening 
message (study one). Study two contained no feasibility-desirability issues, but still 
managed to replicate the same pattern of results; and in study one, participants’ 
perceptions of personal risk were taken subsequent to exposure to an alcohol related 
message. Contrary to what would have been expected if the effect of construal on 
information receptivity was bound with perceived relevance, participants perceived 
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themselves as more at risk of contracting an alcohol related illness at high (vs. low) 
levels of construal. 
7.3. Theoretical Contributions 
7.3.1. Reactance and Level of Construal 
The results reported above help further our understanding of the constructs and 
theories under study, as well as the relationships between them. The pattern from the 
first two studies, in particular, points to a hitherto unexplored relationship between 
threats to freedom – and the reactance effects that result therefrom– and levels of 
construal. The nature of this interactive relationship allows for a better understanding 
of the conditions for the occurrence of reactance to freedom threatening persuasive 
messages, as well as the circumstances in which such effects might be reduced.  
As long as the removal of a freedom does not appear irreversible, which with 
threats to attitudinal freedom is always the case, eliminating or threatening to 
eliminate a previously held freedom produces reactance, i.e. a motivation toward its 
restoration (Burgoon et al. 2002). The results of studies one and two, however, suggest 
that level of construal might constitute a boundary condition for the occurrence of 
these reactance effects: the motivation to restore a threatened freedom is greatly 
mitigated at high (vs. low) levels of construal – regardless of whether the message is 
framed in this way, or consumers have been primed to process at higher levels of 
representation.  
A further implication of this finding may be the existence of culture-based 
differences in levels of reactance and information receptivity to high threat messages. 
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Asian cultures have been found to make greater use of low level representations of 
distant objects and events (Briley 2009; Nussbaum et al. 2003). This typically entails a 
more detailed consideration of the persuasive message, and according to the results 
presented, may make persuasion knowledge activation more likely – leading 
consumers’ to increase their defences and lower their openness to the message 
information. 
Interestingly, this would suggest a pattern of greater reactance to high threat 
messages for Asian consumers; which is counter to the perception that reactance 
effects tend to be stronger in Western, more individualistic cultures, as well as for 
individuals with the “personality characteristics” associated with such cultures, “such 
as autonomy, dominance and independence” (Jonas et al. 2009, p. 1069). Imajo 
(2002), for instance, found that American students in Japan both perceived themselves 
as having more choices, and attributed greater personal importance to those choices 
than their Japanese counterparts. 
Indeed, despite the importance attributed to freedom of choice in the Western 
world, it “is not a natural unit of behavior that has the same significance for everyone” 
(Markus and Schwartz 2010, p. 346). Rather, “the meaning and significance of choice 
varies with the cultural context and with what it means to be a normatively good actor 
in that context (Markus and Kitayama 2003; Snibbe and Markus 2005; Stephens, 
Markus, and Townsend 2007)” (ibid, p. 346). The same way notions of independence 
and self-determination are central to both the definition of self, and to the“systems of 
government, law, finance, and health care” in the US, “ideas of interdependence” are 
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“reflected and distributed by a variety of institutional practices and polices” in East 
Asia (Markus and Schwartz 2010, p. 346, emphasis added). 
It would be of interest, therefore, to examine these cultural differences; not only 
with respect to experiences of reactance more generally, but in particular with respect 
to differences in the activation and use of persuasion knowledge in Western vs. 
Eastern cultures. It is plausible, for instance, that reactance effects might be stronger 
among Western (vs. Eastern) consumers at low levels of construal, because of the 
greater cultural emphasis on autonomy and self-determination (Markus and Schwartz 
2010; Ryan and Deci 2000); but that at high levels of construal, the pattern will be 
reversed.  
At a high level of construal, Western consumers are expected to take a less 
detailed view of the message, and persuasion knowledge is less likely to be activated. 
For consumers from Eastern cultures, in contrast, because they tend to use lower level 
representations even for distant objects or events, it is more likely that persuasion 
knowledge will be accessed and used.  
Furthermore, there might be differences according to dimensions implicated in the 
restriction to freedom – whether they refer to purely individual freedoms, or by 
contrast, in-group freedoms. Jonas et al. (2009) note that “even if collectivists might be 
willing to give up individual freedoms, they might still be reluctant to give up freedoms 
of their in-group”; and to the extent that this is so, “culturally specific differences in 
the emergence of reactance should be observable” (Jonas et al. 2009, p. 1070).  
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A related topic of study might examine differences in the content, activation and 
use of persuasion knowledge across cultures. Friestad and Wright (1994) note that 
persuasion knowledge is bound to time and culture, such that “each generation's and 
culture's thinking may differ somewhat from that of past generations and other 
cultures” (p. 1). These differences in persuasion knowledge suggest there are likely to 
be differences across cultures in what is considered an appropriate or inappropriate 
persuasion tactic; and so also variations in what serves to activate this persuasion 
knowledge. 
7.3.2. Construal Level and Persuasion Knowledge Use 
The results also highlight the relationship between construal level and persuasion 
knowledge use, and the role of threats to freedom in activating such knowledge 
structures in particular. As noted in the literature review, persuasion knowledge is not 
typically top of mind: its use requires the availability of cognitive resources, the 
presence of a cue, or a prevention orientation (chronic or induced) in order to be 
activated (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Ahluwalia and Burnkrant 2004; Kirmani and Zhu 
2007). Going back even further, at the most basic level, a persuasion situation needs to 
be recognised as such in order for persuasion knowledge to become accessible.  
Intention questions, for instance, influence behaviour by failing to be recognised 
as persuasion attempts - persuasion knowledge remains unused, and a mere 
measurement effect results (Williams et al. 2004). Indeed, for this effect to be 
attenuated it must either be explained to consumers, in order that they may recognise 
the intention questions as persuasion attempts; or their persuasion knowledge must 
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be triggered, for instance, by making salient ulterior motives as a cue to persuasion 
knowledge use. 
The present research suggests another route to increasing persuasion knowledge 
accessibility, in the form of lower level representations of the persuasive message. At 
low levels of construal, more message details are considered, and this greater scrutiny 
increases the likelihood that a particular message feature may serve as a cue to 
persuasion knowledge use. In the current research, this feature was the restriction 
imposed on consumers’ freedom in the high threat conditions. It seems plausible, 
however, that a more detailed message consideration, or processing at low levels of 
construal, might produce the same effect even in the absence of such a threat. For 
instance, by shifting attention to stylistic features of the message, the tone used or 
even the ulterior motives guiding it, provided these are salient enough to serve as a 
cue. Ironically, there appears to be a deliberate intention in designing persuasive 
messages, to seek ways to encourage more detailed message consideration – which 
may actually hurt persuasiveness.  
The role of threat to freedom in activating persuasion knowledge use is also 
noteworthy. Restrictions on freedom are typically analysed from a reactance 
perspective, and not necessarily in terms of their related impact on persuasion 
knowledge use. While persuasion knowledge use can produce reactance, and in the 
current studies was indeed associated with lower levels of information receptivity, it is 
possible that it may have other, more positive effects as well. 
Russell (2002), for instance, found that the use of incongruent modality-plot 
product placements, although reducing persuasion (because they were perceived as 
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unusual and so led consumers to raise their guard), improved memory for the 
placements at hand. It is possible that the same may occur with threat to freedom; i.e., 
despite their ability to produce reactance effect, as reflected in levels of information 
receptivity for instance, in particular at low levels of construal, threats to freedom may 
also increase memory for particular persuasive communication. If this is the case, the 
extent to which restrictions on freedom are imposed in persuasive messages may need 
to be adapted to the objectives at hand – namely, whether the aim is for the message 
to be attended to, to achieve some form of attitudinal or behavioural change, or 
merely for it to be remembered. 
7.3.3. Construal Level and Level of Detail 
Low level representations are by definition more detailed, inclusive of peripheral 
characteristics, specific and exclusive; while low level of construal representations tend 
to be de-contextualised and schematic, based on central features and so considering 
fewer details. In study three, this distinction was used to show that the same pattern 
of results could therefore be obtained by manipulating the level of detail at which 
participants considered the message, as when they were primed with different levels 
of construal. 
This suggests an additional manner in which level of construal can be manipulated 
– by altering the level of time pressure participants perceive in a given situation, and 
so the extent to which they consider the details associated with the object or event at 
hand. It would be of interest to examine whether this manipulation works in contexts 
other than persuasive messages; and whether the effects extend to other “construal 
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mediated consequences of distance”, such as those pertaining to predictions or 
judgments (Trope and Liberman 2010). 
7.3.4. Construal Effects 
The results of this research also appear to have implications from a construal level 
point of view, in that the impact of level of construal on openness to the message 
information was partly dependent on whether or not a threat to freedom was present. 
Construal level significantly influenced reactions to the high threat, but not to the low 
threat message; and as a result, there were no main effects of construal level on 
information receptivity in any of the three studies presented. 
This is somewhat surprising, given the well documented “shifts in representation, 
prediction, evaluation, and behaviour” (Trope et al. 2007, p. 84) which occur between 
levels of construal. The fact that these only occurred in the high threat condition 
suggests that a change in a single feature of an object or event can be sufficient to 
alter the way in which construal level impacts on representations, evaluations and 
reactions to that object or event. It would be of interest, therefore, to examine what 
other kinds of features might produce these shifts in the impact of construal level. On 
the basis of the current results, it would appear that they would have to be 
consequential features, able to produce a competing effects, as is the case with threats 
to freedom and resulting reactance. 
Although the effect of construal was not significant for the low threat message, a 
pattern did emerge for this condition. In all three studies, but more markedly so for 
the first and third, there was greater receptivity to the low threat message information 
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at low (vs. high) levels of construal (studies one and two), and at high (vs. low) levels of 
detail (study three). This pattern is consistent with research by Chandran and Menon 
(2004), who found a lower positivity bias and higher perceptions of risk when health 
risk messages were framed at low vs. high levels of construal, due to the greater 
concreteness and perceived as psychologically closeness of the messages at low levels 
of construal. In the Chandran and Menon (2004) studies, much as in the low threat 
condition of study one, the messages contained a threat to self-esteem, but not to 
freedom of action or choice.  
It is not clear, however, why these effects failed to reach significance in the studies 
reported here, and in particular with respect to the measure of perceptions of 
personal risk of contracting an alcohol related illness of study one. It is possible, for 
instance, that this effect depends on the strength of the arguments used, and that had 
they been stronger, the impact of construal level on information receptivity or 
perceptions of risk would have reached significance. Indeed, in research by Fujita et al. 
(2008) the impact of construal level on persuasion – namely, the higher levels of 
persuasion found when arguments matched participants’ psychological distance from 
the message – was dependent on both the availability of cognitive resources, and the 
presence of strong positive arguments.  
7.4. Practical Implications 
The results presented are also of consequence on a practical level, for persuasion 
situations in general, and those in which threats to freedom are more typical or even 
inevitable, in particular. For instance, Public Service Announcement contexts in which 
the latitude for two-sided, non-directive messages is often very limited. Concern has 
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been expressed with regard to the vast amount of money spent on such 
communications, and in particular, with regard to whether or not such investment 
results in the intended results. Burgoon et al. (2002) note the possibility that such 
communications may not only be failing to produce the desired effects, at worst they 
might create changes in attitudes and behaviours in the direction opposite to that 
intended. 
The present studies, however, indicate that while concern over potential negative 
effects of threats to freedom on persuasion needs to be held, merely altering the 
framing of the message, or otherwise shifting the level of construal at which 
consumers process the persuasive message, can ameliorate reactance effects and 
increase openness to information in particular. This is important, because such 
openness is one necessary pre-requisite to subsequent changes with regard to 
message topic, be they in attitudes and/or in behaviour (Krugman et al. 1999) 
The role of threats to freedom in activating persuasion knowledge use is also 
worth noting, as an additional point to consider in crafting persuasive messages. Given 
that threats to freedom can apparently serve as a cue to persuasion knowledge use, 
such characteristics would best be used in conjunction with high levels of construal, a 
heavy imposition on cognitive resources, or a promotion orientation, for instance. The 
aim would be to lower the probability that the threat might indeed trigger persuasion 
knowledge.  
Similar care must be taken with regard to other message features, and the 
possibility that they may unintentionally trigger persuasion knowledge use, as well. 
The more unusual a characteristic is perceived to be in a given persuasion context, the 
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more it will fall outside of consumers’ routines, making persuasive intent more salient, 
and persuasion knowledge use more likely (Briley et al. 2011). Indeed, this can explain 
the differences in the intensity of threat effects uncovered between the three studies.  
In particular, it seems plausible that the lower intensity of reactance in the studies 
which used Public Service Announcements (studies one and three), vis a vis the one 
which used an ostensible newspaper article (study two), is connected to the lower 
level of disruption caused by a threat to freedom in the former (PSA) rather than latter 
(newspaper) message format. This argument is also consistent with the notion of 
“attributing causality” as a means of mitigating reactance effects. When a threat to 
freedom can be attributed to contextual factors outside of the threateners’ control, it 
tends to elicit less intense feelings of reactance, or even fail to produce them 
altogether (Worchel and Andreoli 1974). If this is indeed the case for Public Service 
Announcements, it may suggest that some of the concern over the use of threats to 
freedom in such contexts can be relaxed.  
Another issue which needs to be considered is whether different levels of 
construal might be more appropriate at different stages of the behavioural change 
process. The studies described here focused on information receptivity, and for this 
stage, processing at a high level of construal (or low level of detail) was clearly more 
beneficial. Furthermore, without this initial openness, consumers cannot move onto 
the next stages. When they have already done so, however, and in particular where 
the aim is to produce a change in behaviours, it is possible that low level construals 
might be more effective.  
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This is consistent with the notion of “implementation intentions”, low level 
representations which “specify the how, when and where of responses leading to goal 
attainment, and which have been shown to promote the achievement of the goal with 
regard to which an intention was created (Gollwitzer 1999, p. 494). It may be then, 
that although a high level of construal promotes greater openness to information in 
high threat messages, it will not necessarily lead to greater levels of action or change, 
when this is the specific aim of the persuasive message. Message framing therefore 
needs to be adapted to the persuasion objective held, as well as the stage in change at 
which target consumers find themselves. 
A related consideration is that noted above with regard to non-persuasion related 
objectives, such as for instance, increased memory for a message. While persuasion 
knowledge activating characteristics such as a threat to freedom may not be beneficial 
in terms of information receptivity, it is possible that the disruption caused by such 
features, has a positive effect on consumers’ ability to remember the message.  
The next chapter draws the major conclusions from the study, as well as pointing 
to its limitations and avenues for further research. 
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8. Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research 
This research brings together and contributes to existing research on reactance, 
construal level theory and the persuasion knowledge model. The focus has been on 
persuasive messages which constrain consumers’ freedom of choice. This is a topical 
issue - Markus and Schwartz (2010) argue that “in the past few decades, freedom has 
come to mean, almost exclusively, freedom of choice” (p. 345). And while the authors 
question the validity of the longstanding perception in Western cultures of a link 
between choice and well-being, the fact remains that in Western contexts this 
association still holds, is culturally engrained and taught from an early age (e.g. Markus 
and Schwartz 2010; Sherman et al. 2004). Thus, when a freedom is restricted, 
reactance ensues.  
This was to an extent patent in the current research, in those conditions in which 
participants reduced their openness to the message information as a means of 
restoring their threatened freedom. More importantly, however, the studies 
presented indicate the existence of a two way interaction between construal level and 
threats to freedom. In addition, they show a significant impact of level of construal on 
receptivity to high threat message information - the negative effects of restrictions on 
freedom on openness can apparently be ameliorated by the level of construal at which 
the message is framed or being considered.  
As noted above, these findings have both theoretical and practical implications. 
They add to our understanding of these constructs, but also offer practical 
considerations of the formulation of freedom limiting persuasive communications, 
such as public service announcements. Study one, in particular, showed that where 
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health communications are at stake, the impact of level of construal appears to be not 
only on receptivity to the information, but also on consumers’ perceptions of their 
personal risk of experiencing the negative consequences of a particular behaviour. 
Participants in study one considered themselves at a lower risk of contracting an 
alcohol related illness when the (high threat) alcohol message they read (proposing 
moderation in consumption) was framed at high (vs. low) levels of construal. 
Given the practical relevance of the relationship between construal and threat, it 
would be of interest to take investigations outside of laboratory, and examine 
reactions in field settings – for instance, to actual public service communications. 
Although such research is unable to achieve the same level of control across conditions 
as laboratory experiments, it can be an important complement to such research, 
providing new insights and higher levels of ecological validity. 
Also of practical relevance is the indication in the data that the impact of construal 
on information receptivity was due to the level of detail considered at high vs. low 
levels of representation. Indeed, study three was able to replicate the same pattern of 
results as the first two studies by influencing the degree of thoroughness and detail 
with which the message was considered. Receptivity to the message information was 
greater at low (vs. high) levels of detail. 
Thus, while it might intuitively seem preferable that consumers consider 
persuasive messages in greater detail, for messages which restrict freedom, such detail 
may actually be detrimental to persuasion. Indeed, past research has noted such 
“negative outcomes associated with increases in processing attention” – for instance, 
irritation, counter-arguing or as noted before, diminished persuasion (Campbell 1995, 
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p. 226). The results of the current research suggest that greater levels of openness to 
the (high threat) message information might be obtained through the use of high level 
of construal representations, creating a high perceived distance from the issue at 
hand, or a cursory examination of the persuasive message.  
While this is the case for information receptivity, however, it is not clear whether it 
will also be the case with respect to attitudes, or crucially, behaviour. Information 
receptivity is a crucial first step, without which changes in attitudes or behaviours are 
unlikely to occur; however, it is only one step, and behavioural changes in particular 
are the result of a process and many different influencing factors (Krugman et al. 
1999). Thus, it may be that different levels of representation (or detail) are better 
suited for different communication aims.  
For example, a high level of construal may assist in creating an initial openness to 
message content, but where actual change in one’s actions or behaviours is required, it 
may be that low level construals prove more effective. This would be consistent with 
the concept of implementation intentions – the notion that elaborating on the specific 
steps required to achieve the desired goal can be an effective way of creating 
compliance.  
This points to both a limitation of the current research and an avenue for further 
research. The present studies focused only on openness, and did not examine other 
forms of restoration bound with changes in attitudes and/or behaviours. It would be of 
interest, then, to examine the impact of different levels of construal, distance or detail 
according to the specific goals of the message, using measures relating to attitudes 
towards the behaviours in question, affective responses to the message and its 
 166 
 
proposed course of action, as well as intentions and actual behaviours. For instance, a 
design similar to study three could be used, but with additional measures of 
behaviour; such that after being presented with a message relating to the potential 
negative consequences of excessive coffee consumption, participants are given the 
opportunity to choose between different hot drinks - coffee included. The choice of 
coffee (vs. other hot drinks containing less or no caffeine) and the quantities 
consumed would provide a measure of reactance; and following the results of the 
current studies, the expectation would be that participants would choose to consume 
more coffee at low (vs. high) levels of construal in the high threat condition.  
From a construal level theory perspective, the most interesting result of this 
research is the one-sided impact of construal level, which was significant for the high 
(but not the low) threat condition. Indeed, the pattern of results for the measures of 
information receptivity, perceptions of personal risk, and perceptions of message 
neutrality were consistently different for the two threat conditions. For the high threat 
messages, the pattern was of greater information receptivity, perceptions of message 
neutrality, and perceptions of personal risk at high (vs. low) levels. For low threat 
messages, there was no significant impact of level of construal (despite an apparent 
pattern in the opposite direction – i.e. of greater information receptivity at low vs. high 
levels of construal). 
Thus, construal level effects appear to be affected by, and vary on the basis of 
other important message features, in particular those that can produce arousal or a 
motivation to pursue specific goals – in the case of the present study, the restoration 
of freedom. It would be of interest to see if other message or object features which 
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produce such consequences similarly result in differences in the impact of construal 
level. For instance, would the same pattern emerge for fear appeals, or highly one-
sided messages, but without a threat to freedom? Future research may want to 
examine whether openness to, and attitudes toward, such communications will vary 
between levels of construal. For instance, will information receptivity toward fear 
appeals be greater at high (vs. low) levels of construal when the fear appeal is strong, 
but more positive at low (vs. high) levels of construal when a weaker fear appeal is 
used? Similarly, it may be of interest to examine if consumers will react differently to 
situations of cognitive dissonance according to their perceived distance from the 
object or event causing that dissonance, and whether the impact of distance or 
construal level will be different for different levels of dissonance. 
Another relationship worth noting is that between level of construal or detail and 
persuasion knowledge use. The results presented point to an increased use of 
persuasion knowledge when messages containing a cue to such contexts are examined 
at high (vs. low) levels of detail. While this is intuitive, it might be of interest to 
investigate what other elements might be able to activate persuasion knowledge when 
consumers are processing at higher levels of detail, and how strong such cues have to 
be.  
The low threat to freedom message in study three, although not imposing a 
restriction on freedom of choice, still contained a threat to self-regard, because it was 
a health risk message. However, this was not alone sufficient to trigger greater 
persuasion knowledge use when the message was scrutinised in greater (vs. less) 
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detail. It seems likely that other message features, however, may do so. Features such 
as message tone, level of bias, or the fairness of the message, for instance. 
It would also be of interest to examine whether a low level of detail (or high 
construal) would be sufficient to mitigate the impact of known persuasion knowledge 
triggers, such as ulterior motives or a prevention orientation. For instance, using the 
scenario from Campbell and Kirmani (2000), would participants primed with a high 
level of construal make more positive evaluations of the salesperson, despite salient 
ulterior motives, than those primed with a low level of construal? The results of the 
current study suggest that they would. On the other hand, if consumers’ cognitive 
resources are limited, because a load is imposed, even a low construal - high detailed 
consideration may fail to trigger persuasion knowledge use. 
These issues are important, not only in terms of overcoming resistance to 
important messages, such as health communications or other freedom restricting 
persuasive messages; but in terms of persuasion knowledge use more generally. Such 
knowledge structures can be an important means for consumers to protect themselves 
against unfair or undue persuasion attempts. Goldberg, Niedermeier, Bechtel, and 
Gorn (2006), for instance, show the impact of persuasion knowledge in helping 
adolescents protect themselves against alcohol advertising. 
As promotions branch out from traditional advertising to more diverse and subtle 
promotional forms, such as product placements or sponsors, and television series and 
movies become an “influential source through which consumers acquire knowledge 
and learn social behaviours” (Russell and Russell 2008, p. 459), so it becomes 
increasingly important that consumers learn to recognise these situations as 
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persuasion events and use persuasion knowledge to respond according to a manner 
congruent with their goals. In terms of research, and especially from a social marketing 
perspective, this suggests a pressing need to increase our understanding of persuasion 
knowledge, and the conditions for its activation and use with respect to these different 
forms of influence in particular. 
Finally, the studies presented also raise questions with regard to the impact of 
context on the experience of reactance in the face of threats to freedom. In the 
current research, the effects of threat to freedom appeared considerably stronger in a 
newspaper context, than a Public Service Announcement one. The results were 
suggestive of context effects, but it would be of interest to examine the issue more 
systematically, with respect to message topic, type, the medium of communication, 
the expectations held toward these features, and the extent to which the threat to 
freedom can be attributed to environmental constraints. Future research may well find 
these characteristics to constitute further boundary conditions to the experience of 
reactance to persuasive communications.  
It would also be of interest, however, to distinguish these effects from a mere lack 
of interest or desensitisation to highly directive and freedom constraining Public 
Service Announcements. It could be that consumers have learned, or are learning to, 
“block out” threats to freedom, as a result of repeated exposure. From a practitioner 
point of view, this distinction would be of particular interest, because it would mark 
the difference between a “permit” to continue the use of directive messages, at least 
in Public Service Announcement contexts, and a clear indication that such an approach 
is no longer being heeded to by consumers. 
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10. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – Study One ANOVA for Receptivity to Message Information 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Receptivity to Message 
Information 
   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 4,031a 3 1,344 2,487 ,066 
Intercept 1801,532 1 1801,532 3,335E3 ,000 
Threat ,120 1 ,120 ,221 ,639 
Construal ,098 1 ,098 ,181 ,672 
Threat * Construal 3,748 1 3,748 6,938 ,010 
Error 47,001 87 ,540   
Total 1861,674 91    
Corrected Total 51,033 90    
a. R Squared = ,079 (Adjusted R Squared = .047)   
Table 10.1 – Study One Table of ANOVA Results for Receptivity to Message 
Information 
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Appendix 2 – Study One ANOVA for Perception of Alcohol Risk 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Likelihood of Contracting an 
Alcohol Related Illness 
   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 6,497a 3 2,166 1,505 ,219 
Intercept 407,081 1 407,081 282,936 ,000 
Threat ,614 1 ,614 ,427 ,515 
Construal 1,255 1 1,255 ,872 ,353 
Threat * Construal 4,479 1 4,479 3,113 ,081 
Error 125,174 87 1,439   
Total 541,000 91    
Corrected Total 131,670 90    
a. R Squared = ,049 (Adjusted R Squared = ,017)   
Table 10.2 –  Study One Table of ANOVA Results for Perceptions of Personal Risk of 
Contracting an Alcohol Related Illness 
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Appendix 3 - Study One ANOVA for Outcome Thoughts 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Outcome Thoughts     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3,084a 3 1,028 ,952 ,419 
Intercept 1714,055 1 1714,055 1587,278 ,000 
Threat ,124 1 ,124 ,115 ,735 
Construal 1,441 1 1,441 1,335 ,251 
Threat * Construal 1,336 1 1,336 1,237 ,269 
Error 91,789 85 1,080   
Total 1810,880 89    
Corrected Total      
a. R Squared = ,033 (Adjusted R Squared = -,002)   
Table 10.3 – Study One Table of ANOVA Results for Outcome Thoughts 
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Appendix 4 - Study One ANOVA for Process Thoughts 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Process Thoughts     
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 5,454a 3 1,818 ,840 ,476 
Intercept 1020,135 1 1020,135 471,255 ,000 
Threat 2,393 1 2,393 1,105 ,296 
Construal 1,557 1 1,557 ,719 ,399 
Threat * Construal 1,673 1 1,673 ,773 ,382 
Error 184,001 85 2,165   
Total 1207,444 89    
Corrected Total 189,456 88    
a. R Squared = ,029 (Adjusted R Squared = -,005)   
Table 10.4 – Study One Table of ANOVA Results for Process Thoughts 
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Appendix 5 - Study Two ANOVA for Receptivity to Message Information 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Receptivity to Message 
Information 
   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 12,688a 3 4,229 5,663 ,002 
Intercept 849,906 1 849,906 1,138E3 ,000 
Threat ,925 1 ,925 1,238 ,270 
Construal 4,369 1 4,369 5,850 ,019 
Threat * Construal 5,320 1 5,320 7,123 ,010 
Error 44,066 59 ,747   
Total 939,320 63    
Corrected Total 56,754 62    
a. R Squared = ,224 (Adjusted R Squared = ,184)   
Table 10.5 – Study Two Table of ANOVA Results for Receptivity to Message 
Information 
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Appendix 6 - Study Two ANOVA for Message Neutrality 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Message Neutrality    
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 46.059a 3 15.353 11.050 .000 
Intercept 897.005 1 897.005 645.591 .000 
Threat 1.032 1 1.032 .743 .392 
Construal 33.914 1 33.914 24.409 .000 
Threat * Construal 4.546 1 4.546 3.272 .076 
Error 81.977 59 1.389 
  
Total 1078.222 63 
   
Corrected Total 128.035 62 
   
a. R Squared = .360 (Adjusted R Squared = .327)   
Table 10.6 – Study Two Table of ANOVA Results for Perceptions of Message 
Neutrality 
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Appendix 7 - Study Three ANOVA for Receptivity to Message Information 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Receptivity to Message 
Information 
   
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 8,479a 3 2,826 2,039 ,118 
Intercept 990,988 1 990,988 714,963 ,000 
Threat ,130 1 ,130 ,094 ,761 
Construal ,130 1 ,130 ,094 ,761 
Threat * Construal 7,655 1 7,655 5,523 ,022 
Error 80,392 58 1,386 
  
Total 1100,972 62 
   
Corrected Total 88,871 61 
   
a. R Squared = ,095 (Adjusted R Squared = ,049)   
Table 10.7 – Study Three Table of ANOVA Results for Receptivity to Message 
Information 
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Appendix 8 - Study Three ANOVA for Persuasion Knowledge Use 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Persuasion Knowledge Use    
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 1,694a 3 ,565 1,256 ,298 
Intercept 841,419 1 841,419 1,872E3 ,000 
Threat ,012 1    ,012 ,028 ,868 
Construal ,289 1 ,289 ,642 ,426 
Threat * Construal 1,221 1 1,221 2,717 ,105 
Error 26,069 58 ,449 
  
Total 886,562 62 
   
Corrected Total 27,763 61 
   
a. R Squared = ,061 (Adjusted R Squared = ,012)   
Table 10.8 - Table of ANOVA Results for Persuasion Knowledge Use 
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Appendix 9 – Study One Main Questionnaire (First Task) (High Threat – High Construal 
Condition) 
Note: This task was actually carried out on the computer, in excel form. Participants 
pressed “next” at the end of each page to move to the next. 
 
 
Communication Styles Study 
Thank you for your participation! 
We are interested in people’s perceptions and evaluations of consumer communications. We 
have chosen a series of different communications on a wide range of topics and using a variety 
of styles to be analysed. One of these has been randomly assigned to you.  
We ask that you read the communication carefully, and then proceed to answer the questions 
accurately as you can. There are no right or wrong answers - we simply want to know your 
thoughts and feelings on the message.  
STUDENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: ______________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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There are 40 150 alcohol related hospitalisations every year. 
 
Alcohol is a drug that can lead to intoxication and dependence; it can also impair motor skills 
and judgement, cause illness and death and have other harmful effects on our social, 
economic and living environments 
A person does not have to be drunk, or drink heavily before they become ill, are injured or die 
from an illness or injury caused by alcohol. 
The cost to the community of alcohol related social problems is around $7.6 billion each 
year. 
 
There are 40 150 alcohol related hospitalisations every year. 
 
There are 1 400 alcohol related deaths every year. 
 
Every year, alcohol is causing harms such as sleep disorders, violence, stroke, liver disease 
and stroke in significant numbers of people.  
 
Young adults are more likely than older people to experience alcohol-related harm. Young 
adults have the highest consumption rates and the highest risk of alcohol-related injury, 
including road trauma, violence, sexual coercion, falls, accidental death and suicide. 
As any sensible person can see, there is really no choice when it comes to university students 
drinking: you simply have to moderate your drinking.  
Remember: you must limit your drinking! No more than 4 standard drinks a day on average for 
men, and no more than 2 standard drinks a day on average for women 
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1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the message 
you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree): 
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
The message was informative        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was clear and easy to understand        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was accurate        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was unbelievable        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was precise        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was useful         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was inexact        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was instructive        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was credible        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was trustworthy        1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
 
2. To what extent do you think the following characteristics describe the source of the 
message you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree).  
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
Expert         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Unqualified         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Honest         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Sincere          1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Selfish         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Unintelligent         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Broad         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Virtuous         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Good 1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
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3. To what extent did you experience the following emotions while you were reading 
the message (1 = not at all; 7 = a lot): 
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
Interested         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Irritated         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Pleased         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Annoyed         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Hostile         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Angry         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Calm         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Happy 1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
 
4. When you read the message, did you think about… 
 
 Not at all                                 Thought about it a lot 
Being healthy         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Avoiding alcohol related health problems         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Steps you would need to take in order to reduce 
your drinking 
        1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Your life goals          1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The intrinsic importance of being healthy         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
How much you will drink next time you go out with 
your friends 
        1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
Avoiding alcohol related accidents         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
How others will react if you change your drinking 
habits 
1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
 
 
 
5. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the message 
you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree): 
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 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
The message was dogmatic         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The message was fun         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The message tried to make a decision for me         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The message tried to manipulate me         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The message was interesting and novel         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The message tried to keep me engaged         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The message tried to pressure me         1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The message mentioned the number of alcohol related 
problems that occur annually 
        1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
The message mentioned the number of alcohol related 
problems that occur daily 
        1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
  
According to the message, alcohol related problems 
are a serious issue for young adults 
1         2         3         4          5        6         7 
 
6. Please list the thoughts and feelings you experienced when reading the message: 
 
1.  
 
 
 
2.  
 
 
 
3.  
 
 
 
4.  
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7. Please answer the following questions: 
 
a. Did you find the message easy to understand? 
Yes     No  
 
b. Did you find the message realistic? 
Yes     No  
 
c. Were there any questions you found difficult to understand? 
Yes     No  
 
d. Were there any questions you found difficult to answer? 
Yes     No  
 
e. What do you think is the purpose of this study? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you 
 196 
 
Appendix 10 – Study One - Health and Lifestyle Questionnaire (Second Task)  
 
Health and Lifestyle questionnaire 
We are currently conducting a survey of university students’ health and life-styles. Below are 
a series of questions on your life-style, with regard to eating and exercise behaviours. Please 
take a moment to complete the questionnaire as accurately as you can. The questionnaire 
takes around 15 minutes to fill out, and your answers will remain anonymous. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
STUDENT ID NO: ______________________________________ 
 
 
1.  On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 = not at all healthy and 10 = very healthy, how would 
you describe your: 
 
 Not at all healthy                                                               Very healthy 
General level of health            1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
  
General life style            1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
  
Eating habits            1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
  
Exercise habits            1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
  
Drinking habits            1        2        3        4        5        6        7        8        9        10 
 
2. Current recommendations are that one should eat 2 serves of fruit and 5 of vegetables 
a day. 
a) In a typical week, on how many days do you usually do this? __________________ 
b) In the past week specifically, on how many days did you do this? _______________ 
 
3. How often do you eat “junk food” (hamburgers, pizza, etc.) 
 
Never  
3-4 times a year  
3-4 times a month  
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2-3 times a week  
4-5 times a week  
5+ times a week  
 
4. How often do you exercise? 
 
Never  
A few times a month  
Once a week  
2-3 times a week  
3+ times a week  
 
5. In the last week specifically, how many days did you exercise? ___________________ 
 
6. What kind of exercise do you do? 
______________________________________________________ 
 
7. How much do you intend to exercise in the coming week? ___________________ 
 
8. Have you ever smoked? 
Yes     No  
 
(if no, please go to question 10) 
For how long did you smoke? ___________________________________________ 
 
9. Do you currently smoke? __________________________________________ 
On average, how many cigarettes a day? _________________________________ 
Are you trying to quit? ________________________________________________ 
How much do you intend to smoke in the coming week? _______________________ 
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10. How often do you drink alcohol? (please check a box) 
 
Never  
At least once a year   
At least once a month,  
At least once a week  
Almost every day  
 
11. In the past week specifically, how many: 
a) Beers did you have? ____________________ 
b) Glasses of wine did you have? ____________ 
c) Spirits did you have?  ____________________ 
 
Was this a typical week for you in terms of alcohol consumption?   
 
Yes     No  
 
12. Estimate the total number of drinks you intend to have in the coming week? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Estimate the total number of drinks you intend to have on your next night out?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. On a scale of 1-7 (1= not at all likely; 7= very likely), how likely do you think you are to: 
 
 Not at all                                           Very likely 
Contract an alcohol-related illness        1        2        3        4         5       6       7 
  
Suffer an alcohol related injury        1        2        3        4         5       6       7 
  
Suffer an alcohol related accident        1        2        3        4         5       6       7 
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15. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (1 = 
strongly disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
 
 Strongly disagree                  Strongly agree 
Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I find contradicting others stimulating            1          2          3           4          5 
  
When something is prohibited, I usually think 
“that’s exactly what I am going to do” 
           1          2          3           4          5 
  
I consider advice form others to be an intrusion            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I become frustrated when I am unable to make free 
and independent decisions 
           1          2          3           4          5 
  
It irritates me when someone points out things 
which are obvious to me 
           1          2          3           4          5 
  
I become angry when my freedom of choice is 
restricted 
           1          2          3           4          5 
  
Advice and recommendations usually induce me to 
do just the opposite 
           1          2          3           4          5 
  
I resist the attempts of others to influence me            1          2          3           4          5 
  
It makes me angry when another person is held up 
as a role model for me to follow 
           1          2          3           4          5 
  
When someone forces me to do something, I feel 
like doing the opposite 
           1          2          3           4          5 
 
 
16. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (1 = 
strongly disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = strongly agree)* 
 
 Strongly disagree               Strongly agree 
I know when an offer is “too good to be true”            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I can tell when an offer has strings attached            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I have no trouble understanding the sales tactics 
used by salespeople 
           1          2          3           4          5 
  
I know when a marketer is pressuring me to buy            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I can see through sales gimmicks used to get 
consumers to buy 
           1          2          3           4          5 
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I can separate fact from fantasy in advertising            1          2          3           4          5 
 
 
17. Please indicate: 
 
a) your age: _________________ 
b) sex: _____________________ 
c) nationality: _____________________________ 
d) cultural/ethnic background: _____________________ 
e) religion: _______________________________ 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix 11 – Study Two - Construal Level Priming Exercises (First Task) 
High Level of Construal Prime: 
Creative Expression Exercise 
We are interested to see how people categorise objects. For this purpose, you will be given a 
list of 40 items and asked to indicate a category in which they might belong. For each word, 
you will be asked what it is an example of. E.g.: “Singer is an example of what?” – artist. You 
may use the same category for more than one item.  
 
1. KING is an example of what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
2. PASTA is an example of what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
3. BAG is an example of what? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
4. SOAP is an example of what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
5. PAINTER is an example of what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
6. SOUP is an example of what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
7. SPOON is an example of what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
8. WATER is an example of what? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
9. NECKLACE is an example of what? 
____________________________________________________________ 
10. PEN is an example of what? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
11. SADNESS is an example of what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
12. MINISTER is an example of what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
13. CAMERA is an example of what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
14. JOY is an example of what? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
15. NOTEBOOK is an example of what? 
___________________________________________________________ 
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16. FRUIT is an example of what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
17. SHOP is an example of what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
18. BLOG is an example of what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
19. PAINTING is an example of what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
20. RUNNING SHOES are an example of what? 
_____________________________________________________ 
21. FLOWER is an example of what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
22. CAR is an example of what? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
23. SCHOOL is an example of what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
24. BRIDGE is an example of what? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
25. CHURCH is an example of what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
26. TELEPHONE is an example of what? 
___________________________________________________________ 
27. BLUE is an example of what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
28. RUNNING is an example of what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
29. FISH is an example of what? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
30. NEWSPAPER is an example of what? 
__________________________________________________________ 
31. DOCTOR is an example of what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
32. FILM is an example of what? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
33. DOLL is an example of what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
34. EXERCISE is an example of what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
35. FATHER is an example of what? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
36. DEMOCRACY is an example of what? 
__________________________________________________________ 
37. COMEDY is an example of what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
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38. CHAIR is an example of what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
39. GAMBLING is an example of what? 
____________________________________________________________ 
40. PRESIDENT is an example of what? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Low Level of Construal Prime: 
Creative Expression Exercise 
We are interested to see how people categorise objects. For this purpose, you will be given a 
list of 40 items and asked to indicate an example of an item which belongs to that group. For 
each word, you will be asked for an example of it. E.g.: “An example of singer is what?” – 
Pavarotti.  
 
1. An example of KING is what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
2. An example of PASTA is what? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
3. An example of BAG is what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
4. An example of SOAP is what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
5. An example of PAINTER is what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
6. An example of SOUP is what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
7. An example of SPOON is what? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
8. An example of WATER is what? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
9. An example of NECKLACE is what? 
___________________________________________________________ 
10. An example of PEN is what? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
11. An example of SADNESS is what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
12. An example of MINISTER is what? 
____________________________________________________________ 
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13. An example of CAMERA is what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
14. An example of JOY is what? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
15. An example of NOTEBOOK is what? 
___________________________________________________________ 
16. An example of FRUIT is what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
17. An example of SHOP is what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
18. An example of BLOG is what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
19. An example of PAINTING is what? 
____________________________________________________________ 
20. An example of RUNNING SHOES is what? 
_____________________________________________________ 
21. An example of FLOWER is what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
22. An example of CAR is what? 
__________________________________________________________________ 
23. An example of SCHOOL is what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
24. An example of BRIDGE is what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
25. An example of CHURCH is what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
26. An example of TELEPHONE is what? 
__________________________________________________________ 
27. An example of BLUE is what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
28. An example of RUNNING is what? 
____________________________________________________________ 
29. An example of FISH is what? 
_________________________________________________________________ 
30. An example of NEWSPAPER is what? 
__________________________________________________________ 
31. An example of DOCTOR is what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
32. An example of FILM is what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
33. An example of DOLL is what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
34. An example of EXERCISE is what? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 205 
 
35. An example of FATHER is what? 
______________________________________________________________ 
36. An example of DEMOCRACY is what? 
_________________________________________________________ 
37. An example of COMEDY is what? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
38. An example of CHAIR is what? 
________________________________________________________________ 
39. An example of GAMBLING is what? 
___________________________________________________________ 
40. An example of PRESIDENT is what? 
___________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 12 – Study Two – Main Questionnaire (Second Task) (Low Threat Condition) 
 
Note: This task was actually carried out on the computer, in excel form. Participants 
pressed “next” at the end of each page to move to the next. 
 
 
Impression Formation Study 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
We are interested in how people form impressions of candidates in non-political electoral 
settings. 
It is election time again, and as a Union member, you are asked to vote for the Student Union 
Board Director. This is a particularly consequential election, because a number of changes are 
being proposed, to both the University fee system and its examination system. it is expected 
that the Union will have an important role in deciding which shape these changes take. There 
are only two contenders for the position: James Smith and Richard Jones. The race is tight and 
every vote matters.  
STUDENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: ______________________________ 
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The following text is an extract from a review of the two main candidates by a non-partisan journalist 
writing for a local newspaper.  
Please read the article as carefully as you can, and then click continue to answer the questions. 
 
"... While such elections would normally go unnoticed outside of student circles, the proposed changes to  
Universities' fee and examinations systems have put this particular election, and its contenders, in the 
spotlight: 
Candidate 1 
Name:      James Smith 
Age:       21 
Born in:   South Australia 
Degree:    Mechanical Engineering 
Course average (thus far):   73 
Experience: gap year working as a team leader 
in a Non-Governmental Organisation 
Candidate 2 
Name:     Richard Jones 
Age:      22 
Born in:   Victoria 
Degree:    Civil Engineering 
Course average (thus far):   71 
Experience: President of the Engineering 
Undergraduate Association 
 
There is no doubt that both candidates have the background and experience required to be 
successful as Union President at this critical juncture in the University's history. 
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1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the message 
you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree): 
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
The message was informative         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was accurate         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was fair         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was unbelievable          1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was biased         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was useful         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was instructive         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was credible         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was trustworthy         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was inexact         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was neutral         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was precise         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
 
 
2. To what extent do you think the following characteristics describe the source of the 
message you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree).  
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
Expert         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Unqualified         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Honest         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Sincere          1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Selfish         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Unintelligent         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Broad         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Virtuous         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
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Good         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
 
 
3. To what extent did you experience the following emotions while you were reading 
the message (1 = not at all; 7 = a lot): 
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
Interested         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Irritated         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Pleased         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Annoyed         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Hostile         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Angry         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Calm         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
Happy         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
 
 
4. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the message 
you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree): 
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
The message was dogmatic         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was fun         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message tried to make a decision for me         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message tried to manipulate me         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was interesting and novel         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message tried to keep me engaged         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message tried to pressure me         1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message mentioned the number of alcohol 
related problems that occur annually 
        1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message mentioned the number of alcohol 
related problems that occur daily 
        1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
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According to the message, alcohol related 
problems are a serious issue for young adults 
        1         2          3         4         5        6        7 
 
 
5. Please list the thoughts and feelings you experienced when reading the message: 
 
1.  
 
 
 
2.  
 
 
 
3.  
 
 
 
4.  
 
 
 
 
 
6. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (1 = 
strongly disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
 
 Strongly disagree               Strongly agree 
Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me             1          2          3           4          5 
  
I find contradicting others stimulating             1          2          3           4          5 
  
When something is prohibited, I usually think 
“that’s exactly what I am going to do” 
            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I consider advice form others to be an intrusion             1          2          3           4          5 
  
I become frustrated when I am unable to make free 
and independent decisions 
            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I become angry when my freedom of choice is 
restricted 
            1          2          3           4          5 
  
Advice and recommendations usually induce me to 
do just the opposite 
            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I resist the attempts of others to influence me             1          2          3           4          5 
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It makes me angry when another person is held up 
as a role model for me to follow 
            1          2          3           4          5 
  
When someone forces me to do something, I feel 
like doing the opposite 
            1          2          3           4          5 
 
 
7. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (1 = 
strongly disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = strongly agree)* 
 
 Strongly disagree             Strongly agree 
I know when an offer is “too good to be true”             1          2          3           4          5 
  
I can tell when an offer has strings attached             1          2          3           4          5 
  
I have no trouble understanding the sales tactics 
used by salespeople 
            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I know when a marketer is pressuring me to buy             1          2          3           4          5 
  
I can see through sales gimmicks used to get 
consumers to buy 
            1          2          3           4          5 
  
I can separate fact from fantasy in advertising             1          2          3           4          5 
 
 
8. Please answer the following questions: 
 
a. Did you find the message easy to understand? 
Yes     No  
If you answered no, please indicate which parts of the message you found difficult to 
understand: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Did you find the message realistic? 
 
If you answered no, please indicate why not: 
Yes     No  
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c. Were there any questions you found difficult to understand? 
Yes     No  
 
d. Were there any questions you found difficult to answer? 
 
 
e. What do you think is the purpose of this study? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Please indicate: 
 
a) your age: _________________ 
b) sex: _____________________ 
c) nationality: _____________________________ 
d) cultural/ethnic background: _____________________ 
e) religion: _______________________________ 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
Yes     No  
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Appendix 13 – Study Three – Main Questionnaire (First Task) (Low Detail – High Threat 
Condition) 
 
“Topics of Interest” Study 
Thank you for your participation! 
We are interested to know how relevant and interesting certain topics are for university 
students.  
Imagine you are walking along the street and come across the Public Service Announcement 
poster you will see next. Based on pre-tests, we have found that most people need about two 
to read it and think about the information. However, in most ‘real life’ situations, you have 
considerably less time to read an advertisement even if you are interested in it. Therefore, you 
will be given 1 minute to process the information and come to a clear evaluation. Please take 
this time to read over the message and get an overall picture of its contents. 
 
STUDENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: ______________________________ 
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Coffee is a drug 
 
 
 
 
 
As a small, lipid-soluble molecule (like alcohol and nicotine), caffeine is one of the few 
substances capable of penetrating the blood-brain barrier, critical to maintaining cerebral 
homeostasis.  
 
 
Nearly 80% of the world's population uses caffeine, and 25% of the population is diagnosed 
with a mental disorder. Clinical studies indicate that there may be significant overlap between 
those figures. 
 
 
• A significant number of people over-ingest coffee and suffer the physical 
and/or psychological effects of caffeine poisoning 
• People experience intensified stress and psychotic experiences due to 
excessive caffeine consumption. 
• People increase their risk of experiencing hallucinations as well other 
psychoses such as delirium, manic depression, schizophrenia, or anxiety 
syndrome by consuming too much caffeine 
 
 
 
Because self-awareness is one of the first casualties of a toxic brain, caffeinism victims may not 
even suspect they are ill or (if they do) that caffeine is at the root of their symptoms. 
 
Preserve your mental health: don’t drink coffee! 
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1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the message 
you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree): 
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
The message was informative         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was clear and easy to understand         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was accurate         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was unfair         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was believable         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was biased          1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was useful         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was instructive         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was credible         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was trustworthy         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was inexact         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was neutral         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was precise         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
The message was accurate         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
 
2. To what extent do you think the following characteristics describe the source of the 
message you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree).  
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
Expert         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Fair         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Honest         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Unqualified         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Selfish         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Intelligent         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
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Broad         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Neutral         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Sincere         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Biased         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Good         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Nice         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Unpleasant          1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Likeable         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
  
Virtuous         1         2         3         4          5        6        7 
 
3. We are also interested in your opinions regarding advertising more generally. Please 
indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly 
disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
 
 Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
We can depend on getting the truth in most 
advertising 
              1           2           3            4            5 
  
Advertising's aim is to inform the consumer               1           2           3            4            5 
  
I believe advertising is informative.               1           2           3            4            5 
  
Advertising is generally truthful               1           2           3            4            5 
  
Advertising is a reliable source of information . 
about the quality and performanceo f products 
              1           2           3            4            5 
  
Advertising is truth well told               1           2           3            4            5 
  
In general, advertising presents a true picture of 
the product being advertised 
              1           2           3            4            5 
  
I feel I've been accurately informed after viewing 
most advertisements 
              1           2           3            4            5 
  
Most advertising provides consumers with  
essential information. 
              1           2           3            4            5 
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4. To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding the message 
you just read (1 = not at all; 7 = completely agree) 
 
 Not at all                                        Completely agree 
The message was dogmatic           1        2         3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was fun           1        2         3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message tried to make a decision for me           1        2         3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message tried to manipulate me           1        2         3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message was interesting and novel           1        2         3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message tried to keep me engaged           1        2         3         4         5        6        7 
  
The message tried to pressure me           1        2         3         4         5        6        7 
 
5. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (1 = 
strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
 
 Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
While reading the message I tried to take in as much detail 
as I could 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
While reading the message, I considered not only its 
content, but also the tone and style in which it was 
written 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
While reading the message I tried to get just an overall 
idea of what it was trying to say 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
While reading the message, I focused mainly on its 
content, what it was trying to say 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
While reading the message, I thought about what its 
creators were trying to achieve 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
I could relate to the recommendations proposed in the 
message  
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
While reading the message, I thought about the 
motivations behind its creation 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
The recommendations contained in the message seemed 
like something to keep in mind in the long term, for the 
more distant future. 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
 218 
 
While reading the message, I felt as though it was 
addressing me personally, as if it was “close” to me 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
The message felt distant from me, and my sense of self               1            2            3            4           5 
  
The recommendations contained in the message appeared 
to be for immediate consideration and implementation 
              1            2            3            4           5 
 
6. We are also interested to know your opinions regarding the specific topic assigned to 
you and the recommendations proposed in it. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements regarding coffee (and other hot drinks) consumption? (1 = 
Strongly disagree; 5 = Strongly agree) 
 
 Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
People should be free to drink as much coffee as they like               1            2            3            4           5 
  
Being able to choose how much coffee I drink is very 
important to me 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
Limits should not be imposed on people’s coffee 
consumption 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
I would feel uncomfortable if limits were imposed to the 
number of cups of coffee I could consume in one day 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
Having a choice in my actions (for instance, in choosing how 
many cups of coffee I drink in one day) forms an important 
part of my sense of self. 
              1            2            3            4           5 
 
7. Below is a list of feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the 
appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you felt 
in this way while reading the article. Use the following scale to record your answers: 
          1                         2                          3                            4                                5 
very slightly          a little            moderately           quite a bit                extremely 
or not at all 
 
________ alert                                         ________ calm                                   ________ upset 
________ strong                                      ________ afraid                                 ________ angry 
________ irritable                                   ________ attentive                           ________ happy 
________ interested                                ________ nervous                            ________ lively 
________ distressed                                ________ inspired                            ________ enthusiastic 
 219 
 
8. Please try to recall the information you read in the poster in as much detail as you 
can: 
 
1.  
 
 
 
 
 
2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (1 = 
strongly disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
 
 Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
Regulations trigger a sense of resistance in me               1            2            3            4           5 
  
I find contradicting others stimulating               1            2            3            4           5 
  
When something is prohibited, I usually think 
“that’s exactly what I am going to do” 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
I consider advice from others to be an intrusion               1            2            3            4           5 
  
I become frustrated when I am unable to make 
free and independent decisions 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
It irritates me when someone points out things               1            2            3            4           5 
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which are obvious to me 
  
I become angry when my freedom of choice is 
restricted 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
Advice and recommendations usually induce me 
to do just the opposite 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
I resist the attempts of others to influence me               1            2            3            4           5 
  
It makes me angry when another person is held 
up as a role model for me to follow 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
When someone forces me to do something, I feel 
like doing the opposite 
              1            2            3            4           5 
 
10. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements (1 = 
strongly disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 5 = strongly agree)* 
 
 Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 
I know when an offer is “too good to be true”               1            2            3            4           5 
  
I can tell when an offer has strings attached               1            2            3            4           5 
  
I have no trouble understanding the sales tactics 
used by salespeople 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
I know when a marketer is pressuring me to buy               1            2            3            4           5 
  
I can see through sales gimmicks used to get 
consumers to buy 
              1            2            3            4           5 
  
I can separate fact from fantasy in advertising               1            2            3            4           5 
 
11. Please answer the following questions: 
 
a. Did you find the message easy to understand? 
 
 
b. Did you find the message realistic? 
 
 
c. Were there any questions you found difficult to understand? 
 
Yes     No  
Yes     No  
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Yes     No  
 
d. Were there any questions you found difficult to answer? 
 
Yes     No  
 
e. What do you think is the purpose of this study? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f. Where do you think the ad you were presented with comes from and who do 
you think wrote it? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Please indicate: 
 
f) your age: _________________ 
g) gender: _____________________ 
h) nationality: _____________________________ 
i) cultural/ethnic background: _____________________ 
j) religion: _______________________________ 
Thank you! 
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Appendix 14 – Study Three – Drinks Survey (Second Task) 
 
Product and Brand Preferences – Drinks’ study 
 
We are interested in what people like to drink – their choices of different drinks as well as 
brand preferences within each type of drink.  
 
Part I - For each of the drinks below, please indicate how much you like the product, as well as 
how likely you are to purchase it: 
 
 
1. Is this a product you typically consume?  
 
 
2. How much do you like this product? (1 = Don’t like it at all; 7 = 
Like it a lot) 
 
 
3. How likely are you to buy this product during over the next week? (1 = not at all 
likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
Not at all                                                Very likely 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
 
 
 
4. Is this a product you typically consume? 
 
 
 
5. How much do you like this product? (1 = Don’t like it at all; 7 = 
Like it a lot) 
Not at all                                                Like it a lot 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
Yes     No  
Not at all                                                Like it a lot 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
Yes     No  
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6. How likely are you to buy this product during over the next week? (1 = not at all 
likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
Not at all                                                Very likely 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
 
 
 
7. Is this a product you typically consume?  
 
 
 
 
8. How much do you like this product? (1 = Don’t like it at all; 7 = 
Like it a lot) 
 
 
9. How likely are you to buy this product during over the next week? (1 = not at all 
likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
Not at all                                                Very likely 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
 
 
 
10. Is this a product you typically consume?  
 
 
 
11. How much do you like this 
product? (1 = Don’t like it at all; 7 = Like it a lot) 
Not at all                                                Like it a lot 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
 
12. How likely are you to buy this product during over the next week? (1 = not at all 
likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
Not at all                                                Very likely 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
Yes     No  
Not at all                                                Like it a lot 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
Yes     No  
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13. Is this a product you typically consume?  
 
 
 
 
14. How much do you like this product? (1 = Don’t like it at all; 7 = 
Like it a lot) 
Not at all                                                Like it a lot 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
 
15. How likely are you to buy this product during over the next week? (1 = not at all 
likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
Not at all                                                Very likely 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
 
 
 
16. Is this a product you typically consume?  
 
 
17. How much do you like this 
product? (1 = Don’t like it at all; 7 = Like it a lot) 
 
Not at all                                                Like it a lot 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
 
18. How likely are you to buy this product during over the next week? (1 = not at all 
likely; 7 = extremely likely) 
Not at all                                                Very likely 
     1       2       3       4        5      6      7 
 
 
Yes     No  
Yes     No  
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Part II – For each pair below, please indicate the product or brand you would be more likely to 
purchase (circle your preferred option, a or b):  
 
 
1.  
a)                                                                  b) 
 
                         
 
 
2.  
a)                                                                        b) 
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3.  
a)                                                                           b) 
                             
 
 
4.  
a)                                                                          b) 
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5.  
a)                                                                          b) 
                             
 
 
Please indicate: 
k) your age: _________________ 
l) gender: _____________________ 
m) nationality: _____________________________ 
n) what do you think is the purpose of this study? 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your participation 
